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Explanations for Poverty and Demand for Social Policy

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ABSTRACT:

Individuals hold beliefs about what causes poverty and those beliefs have been theorised to explain policy preferences and ultimately cross-country variations in welfare states. However, there has been little empirical work on the effects of poverty attributions welfare state attitudes. We seek to fill this gap by making use of Eurobarometer data from 27 European countries in the years 2009, 2010 and 2014 to explore the effects of poverty attributions on judgments about economic inequality as well as preferences regarding the welfare state. Relying on a four quadrant typology of poverty attribution which includes individual fate, individual blame, social fate and social blame as potential explanations for poverty, our analyses show that these poverty attributions are associated with judgments about inequality and broadly defined support for the welfare state but have little or no effect on more concrete policy proposals such as unemployment benefits or increase of social welfare at the expense of higher taxes.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Why are some people poor? Most parents are one day confronted with this kind of question from their children. In general, adults do have opinions on what causes poverty. As a matter of fact, these "lay explanations for poverty" (as the literature calls them, to stress the distinction with experts' accounts of poverty) are highly variable from one individual to the next. This variation depends on each individual's personal life experiences, exposure to economic hardship, deeply ingrained values and ideology, exposure to elite and media framing of the poverty issue, and embeddedness in specific political cultures. However, research undertaken since the 1970s (e.g., Feagin 1972; van Oorschot & Halman 2000) has established that the various explanations of poverty can be clustered into a small number of "types" structured along a couple of meaningful dimensions.

Importantly, this literature has postulated that personal explanations for poverty bring to bear on judgments about inequality and on welfare policy preferences. This opens up a welcome line of inquiry, which may reinvigorate research on the formation of attitudes toward the welfare state. This research has mainly focused on objective reasons to support the welfare state (such income, risk or education), and more recently on subjective reasons such as political values, political and social trust, and the deservingness of specific welfare recipient groups. Admittedly, explanations for poverty share some predictive capacity with these subjective variables, because they are also related to ideas about social stratification, trust, and deservingness of the poor (see section 2.4). However, as conceived in the strand of research inspiring our analysis, explanations for poverty have a unique feature. Namely, these explanations are distinguished according to whether poverty is assumed to have *individual or social origins*, and according to whether poverty is assumed to result from failure or from fatality — a *blame vs. fate* distinction. Combining these two dimensions yields a four-tiered typology comprising "individual blame", "social blame", "individual fate", and "social fate" explanations for poverty (see section 2.2.).

In turn, this typology of explanations for poverty is thought to have consequences for the formation welfare policy preferences. To take just one example, research has shown systematic differences between the United States (where a majority of survey respondents explain poverty with individualistic causes) and Europe (where individuals are more likely to see poverty as having social causes), which could explain cross-continental differences in support for (and actual levels of) redistribution (e.g., Alesina et al. 2001, Bénabou & Tirole 2006).

In this article, we study the effect of explanations for poverty on social policy using data from the Eurobarometer series, which to the best of our knowledge is the only international survey to simultaneously include measures for all relevant concepts in several recent waves. For data availability reasons, we focus on the three last surveys in which questions about poverty attribution were asked (2009, 2010, and 2014). Our analyses show that poverty explanations are indeed related to support for social policy. As compared to respondents who believe that poverty is due to laziness (individual blame), respondents believing that poverty is related to social injustice (social blame) or bad luck (individual fate) are on average more supportive of the state intervention for mitigating unemployment and more likely to believe that the state (rather than the individual) is responsible for welfare. However, poverty attributions are not directly related to support for the welfare state when guaranteeing social protection is said to be conditional on an increase in individual taxes. This variation between different measurements of welfare state support shows that poverty attributions might shape individuals' policy preferences but also their willingness to contribute to these policies. Robustness checks show that these findings hold even after controlling for the effects of deservingness judgments, social trust, trust in government and ideology.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Welfare policy preferences

Preferences regarding social policies have attracted much scholarly attention in the past decades (e.g., Kangas 1997; Andress & Heien 2001; Svallfors 2003; Rehm 2009; Häusermann & Walter 2010; Roosma et al. 2013; Kulin & Svallfors 2013). This interest is related to the fact that these preferences are expected to influence individuals' electoral choices and thus be linked with public policy. As a result, citizens' preferences are perceived as important for understanding cross-country differences or temporal evolution in the shape or size of welfare states in democracies (Meltzer & Richard 1981; Svallfors 1997).

Early work on the topic has considered individual self-interest as a main driver for individuals' preferences with regard to redistribution (Meltzer & Richard 1981). Following that logic, individuals' support for redistributive policies depends in large on whether they are net contributors or beneficiaries of the welfare state. While self-interest certainly influences individual attitudes (Naumann et al. 2016), research has also established that current income can only explain a small part of the variation in preferences between individuals. Accordingly, recent studies have begun to incorporate other aspects less directly related to self-interest, such as individuals' risk profiles (Rueda 2005; Kananen et al. 2006; Rehm et al. 2012), their expectations about the future (Bénabou & Ok 2001), their unemployment experiences (Naumann et al. 2016),

or "externalities of inequality" (Rueda & Stegmueller 2016). Going one step further, research has stressed the importance of normative orientations which are only dimly related to self-interest — including inequality aversion (e.g., Munro 2017), personal and political values (e.g., Arikan & Bloom 2015; Kulin & Meuleman 2015), ideology (e.g., Arts & Gelissen 2001; Jaeger 2008), or perceptions of the deservingness of the poor (e.g., van Oorschot 2006).

2.2. A (not so) new construct: Lay explanations for poverty

In comparison with the variables reviewed above, there has been relatively little interest in the effect of lay explanations for poverty on policy preferences. As we explain in more detail below, this neglect is somewhat surprising. Ever since it was first proposed by Feagin (1972) in the early 1970s, the construct of "lay explanations for poverty" (or synonymously "poverty attributions") has been obviously related to matters of social inequalities and welfare policy.[1] For one thing, unlike "expert" approaches to socioeconomic inequalities, poverty attributions are the explanations provided by ordinary people to account for the existence and persistence of poverty in contemporary societies. Although these attributions are certainly reflective of elite debates, media framing and policy changes (e.g., Iyengar 1990; Wacquant 1999; Bullock et al. 2001; Kangas 2003), they are a major independent source to understand the ebbs and flows of welfare policy support. Likewise, they may be useful to measure the convergence between attitudes of elites and of the mass public. Thus, for example, when some countries took austerity measures including shrinkage of social services in the wake of the 2008 crisis, this was at odds with a surge of the "social blame" attribution of poverty in the years 2009–2014 (Marquis 2020), which may help explain the social turmoil arising in this period.

While poverty can have a variety of sources at first sight, the literature on popular explanations for poverty has put forward the existence of four main types of explanations for poverty. These four types correspond to the combination of (1) judgments regarding the location of the explanation for poverty at the individual level or at the social level, and (2) the perception that individuals/society are responsible for poverty ("blame") or that poverty arises from circumstances and events beyond control of individuals or social institutions ("fate"). Figure 1 summarizes the four-tiered typology and the way each attribution type is usually operationalized in opinion surveys, including in the Eurobarometer which we use in our analysis. The standard text indicates the label given to each attribution type (see van Oorschot and Halman 2000) and in

[1] In the literature, the expressions "lay popular explanations for poverty", "popular explanations for poverty", and "poverty attributions" convey the same meaning; we use them interchangeably in this article. For a brief historical account of how poverty attribution research has developed over time, see van Oorschot & Halman (2000) and Marquis (2020).

italics the response to the following survey question: "Why do you think there are people who live in need? Here are four opinions: which is the closest to yours?".

Figure 1: Lay explanations for poverty

	Individual	**Society**
Blame (agency)	Individual blame *Because of laziness and lack of willpower*	Social blame *Because there is a lot of injustice in our society*
Fate (non-agency)	Individual fate *Because they have been unlucky*	Social fate *It is an inevitable part of the way the modern world is going*

In fact, popular explanations of poverty have often been analyzed as dependent variables to be explained, much more rarely as *independent* variables to explain political attitudes and behaviors. More often than not, the links between poverty attributions, welfare state preferences and voting is taken for granted. Possibly one of the reasons for this lack of interest in the effect of poverty attributions on political preferences is the rather obvious link between the two. Harper (1996) is more critical toward this neglect, pointing out "a startling lack of curiosity about what effects and functions these kinds of explanations [for poverty] might have. (…) In ignoring such difficulties, traditional attributional research on poverty explanations has been essentially conservative in its theory and methodology and has failed to deliver findings which might be of use in acting politically and socially against poverty" (Harper 1996: 252). Another contentious point which might have refrained scholars from investigating the political consequences of popular explanations for poverty is the issue of *causality*. In particular, there have been suggestions that poverty attributions are ex-post *rationalizations* of individuals' ideological orientation or welfare preferences.[2] In their seminal study, Kluegel and Smith (1986: 267-270) have argued against that viewpoint, emphasizing that sources of poverty attributions lie, for the most part, outside the political realm (see also Iyengar 1990; Gilens 1999: 85-89). This argument is buttressed by studies showing that beliefs about poverty are acquired early in life, before political socialization

[2] For example, Paugam et al. (2017) suggest that affluent people tend to *justify* poverty on the basis of preexisting neoliberal and meritocratic ideological principles. Other scholars (e.g., Niemelä 2008) uncritically assume that causality runs from welfare attitudes to poverty attributions.

per se occurs.[3] This is does not mean, of course, that poverty attributions are exclusively determined by childhood experiences; as a matter of fact, all available evidence shows that lay explanations of poverty can change over time according to macro-level and personal circumstances. But the point is that the existence of political preferences is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for popular explanations of poverty to develop at the individual level.

2.3. Lay explanations for poverty and welfare policy preferences

How do poverty attributions affect social policy preferences? The relationship may seem obvious but it has seldom been subjected to theoretical analysis. It thus seems necessary to reconcile research traditions which, "despite evident conceptual links", have tended to develop "parallel agendas" (Schneider & Castillo 2015: 264). To begin with, the legitimacy of welfare institutions and policies is deeply rooted in well-entrenched social norms such as equity, fairness, solidarity, distributive justice, and reciprocity (e.g., Rawls 1971; Nozick 1973; Deutsch 1985; Kluegel & Smith 1986; Miller 1992; Rothstein 1998; Aalberg 2003; Kangas 2003; Mau 2004). Welfare policies tend to enjoy wide support as long as the actors involved in redistributive mechanisms (i.e., contributors and recipients of welfare policies, but also welfare institutions themselves) are perceived to conform to these social norms (Bowles & Gintis 2000; Fong et al. 2005). In contrast, when these norms are obviously violated, a breakdown of the pro-welfare consensus is likely to ensue. With respect to anti-poverty programs, "people are willing to help the poor, but they withdraw support when they perceive that the poor cheat or fail to cooperate by not trying hard enough to be self-sufficient and morally upstanding" (Fong et al. 2005: 279). This withdrawal of support closely corresponds to the endorsement of the "individual blame" category in the poverty attribution typology presented above. When the poor are deemed responsible for their own fate, feelings of reciprocity and "moral obligations" to the poor seem to dissolve, thus undermining the legitimacy of welfare policies (Kangas 2003).

In this article, we subscribe to the common argument that this blame mechanism extends to other sectors of state intervention. As Kluegel and Smith (1986: 164) put it, "antiwelfare sentiment seems to be linked to a 'victim-blaming' view of the poor as lazy, lacking thrift and good morals, etc.: the items representing individual explanations for poverty". As a matter of fact, several studies have empirically explored the link between poverty attributions and a wide array of welfare policy preferences (Feagin 1972; Alston & Dean 1972; Williamson 1974; Kluegel &

[3] These studies have examined how children develop beliefs about socioeconomic inequality (e.g., Leahy 1990), about poverty and poor people (e.g., Chafel 1997; Bullock 2006), or about the causes and justification of poverty (e.g., Chafel & Neitzel 2005). In general, children tend to emphasize structural explanations more often than individualistic explanations, suggesting that later educational and professional experiences tend to foster a change in beliefs toward more individualistic accounts of poverty.

Smith 1986; Iyengar 1990; Zucker & Weiner 1993; Hasenfeld & Rafferty 1998; Bullock 1999; Burgoyne et al. 1999; Stephenson 2000; Fong 2001; Bradley & Cole 2002; Bullock et al. 2003; Mau 2003; Tagler & Cozzarelli 2013; Habibov et al. 2017). Virtually all of these studies have established significant relationships between poverty attributions and welfare preferences.[4] Interestingly, poverty attributions were also found to affect the degree to which economic inequalities are perceived as just or unjust (Schneider & Castillo 2015). In sum, poverty attributions seem to have a pervasive influence on how people conceive the legitimacy of the social stratification at large.

For our present purposes, it is unfortunate that this strand of research has mostly focused on the distinction between individual attributions (above all "laziness") and structural attributions. With few exceptions, it has failed to take into account the *agency dimension* — are individuals or social institutions to blame for poverty, or is the problem beyond control of individuals and institutions? Thus, to take the perspective of Figure 1, the "blame" and "fate" rows have been conflated within the "individual" and "structural" columns of the typology. Hence, we need to develop more definite expectations about the influence of the four attributional types. Following the general argument formulated above, people endorsing the "individual blame" and "social blame" categories should be the least and the most likely to support redistributive policies, respectively. The two fatalistic categories are expected to fall in between (for a similar analysis, see Halman & van Oorschot 1999: 4-5; van Oorschot & Halman 2000: 21-23). First, "individual fate" attributions (e.g., bad luck) should elicit willingness to help the poor (e.g., public relief services) and thus should foster some support for redistribution. However, since poverty is seen as stemming from fatality rather than from structural inequalities, there should be no real impetus for supporting "preventive" policies designed to fight the causes of poverty (unemployment, low education, insufficient pensions, etc.), which should be more popular among people endorsing a "social blame" attribution of poverty. Second, "social fate" attributions ascribe poverty to a normal state of affairs — poverty is determined by impersonal and uncontrollable social forces, so the "modern world" argument goes. According to the social fate attribution type, poverty is here to stay because it is a natural consequence of the capitalist system. However, social policies may be seen as a necessary tool to maintain the system in the long run. By dealing with social inequalities and by meeting demands for social protection, social policies can be seen to fulfill a social control function designed to keep disadvantaged groups quiescent and to prevent social unrest (Piven & Cloward 1971; Schneider & Ingraham 1984; Armour & Coughlin 1985; Kim

[4] Of course, this near unanimity may stem from the fact that negative results (especially in relation with new concepts) never get published in books or academic journals ("file-drawer bias"). However, this a general tendency which is not limited to the issue at hand.

2007; Soss et al. 2011; Brisman 2012; but see Dodenhoff 1998).[5] Thus, people who attribute poverty to social fate are expected to display more support for welfare policies than people blaming poverty on the poor themselves, but less support than people endorsing a "social blame" explanation.

In sum, welfare policy preferences are likely to depend to some degree on poverty attributions. However, these attributions are no *deus ex machina* — they do not solve intricacies of welfare preferences. For one thing, poverty attributions had been remarkably stable throughout the forty years preceding the 2008 economic crisis, until they abruptly switched in the wake of the crisis. In 2014, almost half of Europeans thought that poverty is due to injustice (social blame), as compared to about a third prior to the crisis (Marquis 2020; see Figure 2 below). Logically, if explanations for poverty are strongly related to policy preferences, we should have noticed changes in overall welfare policy preferences among European public opinion. However, as stressed above, these preferences have remained surprisingly stable. This calls for an empirical assessment of the link between poverty attributions and policy preferences.

2.4. Covariates of poverty attributions

This being said, lay explanations of poverty are closely related to three variables which are also important for the formation of social policy attitudes. First, the perceived *deservingness* of actual or potential welfare state beneficiaries has been identified as an important antecedent of welfare policy preferences (e.g., Feather 1994, 1999; Mau 2003; Larsen 2006: chap. 4; van Oorschot 2000, 2006, 2008; Slothuus 2007; Raven 2012; Van Oorshot & Meuleman 2014; Roosma et al. 2016; van Oorschot et al. 2017; Koster 2018; Delton et al. 2018; Hansen 2019). In a nutshell, empirical research shows that the support for various social policies is conditional on the degree to which different groups are considered "really worthy" of social protection. While certain groups like the elderly, disabled people, or children from needy families are widely recognized as legitimate beneficiaries of welfare assistance, other groups like unemployed people and immigrants typically enjoy much less support (Sirovátka et al. 2002; van Oorschot 2006; Larsen

[5] Of course, we do not assume that all people attributing poverty to "social fate" are keen supporters of the capitalist system. In this regard, a detailed analysis of the four-tiered typology, where 16 specific causes of poverty are related to the four general attributions (Lepianka et al. 2009), indicates that the social fate type is the most heterogeneous and the most uneasy to interpret. This "all-embracing character of the modern world category" (2009: 430) seems to result from the blending of constitutive elements of the "individual fate" and "social blame" categories; in contrast, the key element of the "individual blame" category (i.e., laziness) is rarely mentioned by those who choose the social fate type. However, it should be noted that overlapping categories are not problematic in themselves, as people can have *several* explanations for poverty. Overall, then, the empirical observation that the social fate type overlaps with other attribution types (albeit less with the individual blame category) leads to the same prediction as the "social control" argument: people endorsing the social fate explanation of poverty should show mild support for redistribution, in between the level of support of people stressing individual blame and social blame explanations.

2006; Petersen et al. 2010; Petersen 2012; Jensen & Petersen 2017).[6] It can be argued that poverty attributions have a direct conceptual link with deservingness through the "individual blame" response option. The depiction of the poor as "lazy or lacking willpower" implies that they could change their situation and that, therefore, they are potentially undeserving or illegitimate recipients of welfare benefits. In contrast, if society is mainly responsible for poverty or if the poor owe their condition to "bad luck", it does *not* follow that welfare recipients are undeserving — even though they might be judged undeserving for other, independent, reasons. Accordingly, there is strong evidence that poverty attributions and deservingness judgments are empirically related, though the nature of the relationship is unclear (e.g., Sniderman et al. 1991; Skitka & Tetlock 1993; Gilens 1999; Appelbaum 2001; Petersen 2012; Aarøe & Petersen 2014; Jensen & Petersen 2017; Hansen 2019).

In sum, although deservingness judgments and poverty attributions seem to have similar consequences for welfare policy preferences, we argue that they are not one and the same thing. As a more general concept, poverty attributions enable us to make broader predictions regarding policy preferences. At the same time, unlike deservingness judgments, they do not allow to focus on specific disadvantaged groups. Thus, it would be interesting to model the effects of *both* poverty attributions and deservingness judgments on welfare policy preferences, and to estimate the residual effect of poverty attributions controlling for stereotypical and affective reactions toward specific welfare recipient groups.

A second possible covariate of poverty attributions which may have a confounding effect on welfare policy preferences is *trust*. As argued above, support for redistributive policies hinges on trust relationships between taxpayers and welfare recipients, but it may also depend on how much these two groups trust *welfare institutions themselves*. On the one hand, at least some of the individuals who hold society responsible for poverty may not rely on society for solving it either, and hence they may not be particularly supportive of social policy. On the other hand, many individuals will support social policies as long as their participation to the financing of welfare programs (through taxes and social security contributions) is perceived as fair and efficient. This requires, among other things, that other taxpayers contribute equally (no tax evasion; see Scholz 1998; Cerqueti et al. 2019), that welfare recipients do not abuse the system (e.g., Mau 2003;

[6] Deservingness is rooted in a long political and intellectual tradition of countries such as the United States and Britain, where it has been consistently politicized and framed as an ontological opposition between the "deserving poor" and the "undeserving poor" which still permeates today's partisan and mass media's portrayals of the poverty issue (see Handler & Hasenfeld 1991, 2007; Katz 1995, 2013a, 2013b; Gilens 1999; Wacquant 1999; Rank 2004; Brady 2009; Jones 2011; Roper 2012; Seabrook 2013; Gilman 2014; Larsen 2014; Tihelková 2015). The relevance of the deservingness heuristic is reflected in the frequent use (and acceptance) of catchwords like "welfare queen" or "Sozialschmarotzer", which are able to capture and evoke a host of images, feelings, and stereotypes about welfare recipients and welfare institutions.

Roosma et al. 2016; Habibov et al. 2017; Kumlin et al. 2017), that the welfare system does not encourage idleness and dependency, thus reducing poverty rather than perpetuating it (Schmidtz & Goodin 1998; Mau 2003: 123-126; van Oorschot et al. 2012), or that government is perceived as impartial, uncorrupted and competent (Edlund 2006; Rothstein et al. 2012; Svallfors 2013).

A handful of empirical studies (each focusing on a particular subset of the arguments presented above) has examined whether and how welfare policy preferences depend on trust attitudes. In this research, two variables stand out: *trust in government* (e.g., Edlund 1999, 2006; Svallfors 1999, 2002; Hetherington & Husser 2011; Yamamura 2014; Kuziemko et al. 2015) and *generalized social trust*, i.e., the belief that most people can be trusted (e.g., Scholz 1998; Bergh & Bjørnskov 2011; Algan et al. 2016; Habibov et al. 2017; Kumlin et al. 2017).[7] Overall, these studies suggest that higher levels of government and social trust are beneficial for welfare state support, even though the patterns of findings are not entirely consistent across national and time contexts (Svallfors 1999, 2002). More importantly, however, it is likely that the effects of trust on welfare policy preferences are not completely distinct from the effects of poverty attributions – for example, if "social blame" explanations are premised on beliefs about the government's inefficiency or anti-welfare bias, or if "individual blame" explanations are based on beliefs that most other people are untrustworthy. Hence, to disentangle the effect of poverty attributions and trust variables, both types of variables should be used simultaneously to predict welfare policy preferences.

To better delineate the effects of poverty attributions, a final check consists in considering the role of political ideology. This variable has been shown to affect *both* welfare policy preferences (e.g., Jacoby 1994; Arts & Gelissen 2001; Wilson & Breusch 2003; Jaeger 2006, 2008; Naumann 2014; Gonthier 2017) and poverty attributions (e.g., Furnham 1982; Pandey et al. 1982; Zucker & Weiner 1993; Hunt 2004; Weiner et al. 2011; Hunt & Bullock 2016). As it turns out, then, political ideology is an exogeneous variable that influences both the independent (endogenous) variable (i.e., poverty attributions) and the dependent variable (i.e., welfare policy preferences) in similar ways — for example, left-wing orientations tend to foster "social blame" explanations of poverty *and* pro-welfare stances, which are themselves related (see section 2.3). Therefore, part of the influence of political ideology might be unduly attributed to poverty attributions if ideology is left out of the predictive model of welfare policy preferences. On the opposite, our strategy will be

[7] Generalized social trust is the "thin trust" directed toward "the generalized other" (Putnam 2000: 136), and not toward particular others such as intimates, confidants, or any people with whom an individual identifies: "Generalized trust is the belief that most people can be trusted. Particularized trust is faith only in your own kind" (Uslaner 2000: 573; see also Herreros 2004; Nannestad 2008; Sturgis & Smith 2010; Warren 2017).

to include ideology our predictive model of welfare preferences and thus to provide a rather conservative test of the effect of poverty attributions.

2.5. Hypotheses

Based on the above discussion, we can now summarize our main expectations about the effects of poverty attributions on welfare policy preferences. First, we expect that individuals endorsing a social blame explanation of poverty will be the most supportive of state intervention to reduce social inequalities, whereas individuals endorsing an individual blame explanation will be the least supportive. Second, individuals attributing poverty to fatalistic causes ("individual fate" or "social fate") are expected to fall in between the two previous cases, i.e., they should be mildly supportive of social protection. Third, controlling for the influence of the covariates of poverty attributions reviewed in section 2.4 may well reduce the effect of poverty attributions on welfare policy preferences, but this effect should not fade altogether. Formally, we formulate the following hypotheses:

H1: Individuals attributing poverty to individual blame are less supportive of social policy than those providing other types of explanations for poverty.

H2: Individuals attributing poverty to social blame are more supportive of social policy than those attributing poverty to social fate and individual fate.

H3: The previous hypotheses hold even after controlling for the effects of deservingness judgments, trust, and ideology.

3. MEASUREMENTS

3.1. Empirical data

Our empirical analysis is based on the Eurobarometer, which is one of the few international surveys which at least in some rounds includes questions on both lay explanations for poverty and social policy preferences. This survey series, initiated in 1973 by the European Commission, has included a standard question on lay explanations for poverty in eight surveys spanning a period of nearly 40 years (1976-2014). Unfortunately, very few of the surveys include all relevant variables. Therefore, the present analysis will focus on the three latest relevant EB surveys for the years 2009 (EB 72.1), 2010 (EB 74.1), and 2014 (EB 81.5). The survey was run in all EU member countries. Our analyses focus on the 27 countries that were EU members throughout the period between 2009 and 2014.

3.2. Dependent variables

For convenience reasons, we will refer to the four dependent variables in our empirical analyses as "welfare attitudes", even though they relate to welfare issues to varying degrees.

The first item is related to **judgments about the level of economic inequality**. Respondents were asked the extent to which they agree with the statement: "Differences in income in (OUR COUNTRY) are too large". Response categories ranged from strongly agree to strongly disagree and were recoded into a dichotomous variable in which "strongly agree" and "agree" were assigned a value of 1 and contrasted with the remaining three categories ("neither agree nor disagree", "disagree" and "strongly disagree" coded as 0).

The second item is related to **the role of the state versus private sector in mitigating unemployment**. The question reads: "People think differently on what steps should be taken to help solving social and economic problems in (OUR COUNTRY). I'm going to read you two contradictory statements on this topic. Please tell me which one comes closest to your view." The three answer categories are: "It is primarily up to the (NATIONALITY) Government to provide jobs for the unemployed"; "Providing jobs should rest primarily on private companies and markets in general" and "It depends (SPONTANEOUS)". We have recoded the three potential answer categories into two, where 1 corresponds to the first statement showing clear support for the state intervention whereas the other two statements were coded zero.

The third item is the **allocation of responsibility for welfare**, asking respondents whether "Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for" or "People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves". Similar to the previous items,

responses are dichotomized, with a score of 1 for answers calling for more responsibility to be taken by the government and a score of 0 for all other answers.

The last item is the **prioritization of social protection over taxes**. It stems from the question asking respondents for their preference between two statements: "Higher level of health care, education and social spending must be guaranteed, even if it means that taxes might increase", or "Taxes should be decreased even if it means a general lower level of health care, education and social spending". A preference for social protection over taxes is contrasted (score=1) with both preferences for tax decreases and the spontaneous indication that "it depends" (score=0).

3.3. Independent variables

The question asking respondents for their **explanations for poverty** was asked in the following way:

Q: Why in your opinion are there people who live in poverty? Here are four opinions: which is closest to yours?

1. Because they have been unlucky (*individual fate*);
2. Because of laziness and lack of willpower (*individual blame*);
3. Because there is much injustice in our society (*social blame*);
4. Because it's an inevitable part of progress (*social fate*).

A fifth category (in addition to DKs) was created for respondents who *spontaneously* claimed that "none of these" options reflected their true opinion on the question. Figure 2 enables us to follow the evolution of the five answer categories through the years. As one can see, the "social injustice" attribution attains 50 percent of respondents for the first time in the latest survey (2014), while the other three substantive categories receive less than 15 percent of responses. There is a sharp increase in injustice-based explanations (and decrease in other explanation types) between 2007 and 2009, which is obviously related to the onset of the global financial and economic crisis in late 2008 and early 2009. Later on, the share of social blame explanations remains just below or above the 50% line.

Figure 2: Lay explanations of poverty over time (EU member countries, 1976-2014)



Note: For comparison purposes, Figure 2 is based only on data from the nine countries which participated in all eight surveys (F, B, NL, D, I, L, DK, IRL, UK). However, results are very similar if one considers data from all countries as they have joined the EC/EU (and thus also the Eurobarometer survey) through the years.

Our analyses also include a number of control variables. First, we control for structural variables determining individuals' position in society. These allow to grasp respondents' self-interest in relation to the welfare state by measuring their economic assets (income), skills (education) as well as specific location in the job market (occupation), which have all been found to affect individual demands for the welfare state. We further control for socio-demographic factors including gender, age (including age, age squared and age cubic to account for the non-linear relation with preferences). We also include a variable measuring individuals' exposure to poverty based on a question on how often individuals encounter poor people in their daily life. In fact, exposure to poverty has sometimes been analyzed as a *cause of explanations for poverty*.[8] In our view, however, both exposure to poverty and explanations of poverty can be considered as antecedents of welfare attitudes, which means that these attitudes are related to poverty in two different ways. First, the direct exposure to poverty in one's immediate environment probably elicits demands for social protection in favor of one's relatives, friends or intimate social groups — and probably also for oneself. In contrast, the second mechanism operates through the more *abstract* process of attributing specific causes to poverty *in general*. By having exposure to poverty and explanations for poverty in the same model (as well as other relevant control

[8] For example, Wilson (1996: 422) noted that having friends who are welfare recipients or homeless increases the tendency to ascribe poverty to structural causes; conversely, exposure to poor people through undesirable contacts fosters individualistic attributions (see also Lee et al. 2004; Hopkins 2009; Hunt & Bullock 2016: 104-105). In the same vein, measures of exposure to (and awareness of) poverty aggregated at the local or national level (Lee et al. 2004; Lepianka 2007; Hopkins 2009) have been shown to have direct or indirect effects on poverty attributions, suggesting that the issue of poverty is constructed and framed by shared perceptions and narratives at the community level.

variables such as income or occupation; see above), we ensure that the explanatory capacity of poverty attributions is not significantly conflated with self-interest or group interests. The four levels of exposure to poverty will be entered separately (as dummy variables) in our model to account for a possible nonlinear relationship with welfare attitudes.

Finally, as a special kind of control variables, the **covariates of poverty attributions** discussed in section 2.4 will be included in our predictive model insofar as relevant data are available from the Eurobarometer series. Interpersonal trust and trust in government were assessed in all three waves (2009, 2010, and 2014) on a 10-point scale where higher values indicate higher degrees of trust in others and in government. In contrast, questions about the deservingness of specific groups were asked only in the 2009 and 2010 surveys. The measures are dummy variables indicating whether a given group "should be prioritised in receiving social assistance" or not (coded 1 and 0, respectively).[9] As for ideology, left-right self-placements were assessed only in the 2010 survey on a 1 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right) scale. All control variables are described in detail in the Appendix.

[9] Nine groups were taken into account in these deservingness questions: single parents, immigrants, people suffering from addictions (alcohol, drugs or other types of addiction), homeless people, abandoned or neglected children, young offenders, disabled people, unemployed people, elderly people.

4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS

4.1. Overall findings

Given the hierarchical nature of the dataset with each survey (country × year) including several hundreds of individuals, we model this data using multilevel models. In these 2-level models, individuals are nested in countries; thus, the models take into account the shared variance at the country level. We run separate models for each of the years for which we have data. We use a logistic model[10] given the binary nature of our dependent variables: judgments about inequality, about unemployment, attribution of responsibility for welfare to the government, and prioritization of social policy over taxes.

Results of these models are displayed in Table A1 in the Appendix. For poverty attributions the reference category is individual blame (i.e., laziness, lack of willpower). Hence the effects of the four other categories are to be read in contrast to the individual blame explanation. Consistent with our expectations, we find that explanations for poverty have a significant effect on welfare state attitudes. The patterns differ however to some extent across the four dependent variables. A pattern consistent with expectations emerges in relation to judgments about inequality, unemployment, and welfare responsibility. In all three cases, attributing poverty to social blame, social fate or individual fate tends to increase the probability of favoring state intervention. The magnitude of the effect is particularly large for the social blame attribution and more moderate (or inexistent in some cases) for the social fate and individual fate attributions.

As regards the prioritization of social protection over taxes, we find positive effects of social fate attributions. In substance, these small (but statistically significant) effects mean that individuals who view poverty as an inevitable consequence of the "modern world" are more willing to expand social protection (be it through higher taxes) than individuals who attribute poverty to individual failure. In contrast, individuals providing social blame and individual fate explanations are not different from individuals who blame poverty on the poor themselves. An exception to this pattern is that social blame explanations were also related to demands of social protection in 2009, but not anymore in the following years —perhaps as a result of austerity policies being implemented in many countries, instilling fears that higher taxes may afflict underprivileged classes already impoverished by the crisis.

Importantly, the models are remarkably similar across years showing that the effects of poverty attribution on welfare attitudes remained rather stable over the period considered. In Figure 3, we examine the magnitude of these various effect by means of predicted probabilities. Given the lack

[10] The meologit command in Stata was used to estimate the models.

of substantial differences between surveys, we focus on the year 2014. The figure presents the predicted probability of support for the four welfare state items conditional on poverty attributions. For each of the dependent variables, the scenarios correspond to the probability of supporting the welfare state depending on poverty attribution. All other variables are kept at their observed values. Figure 3 shows that the substantial effect of poverty attribution on support for social policy varies by type of policy. Regarding inequality, unemployment, and the role of government for social welfare, attributing poverty to social blame (injustice) is associated with a higher probability of supporting the welfare state, compared to other poverty attributions. The gap is particularly large with respect to individuals attributing poverty to individual blame. It is, however, also substantial compared to respondents attributing poverty to individual or social fate. To give an example, the predicted probability of supporting social welfare is about fourteen percentage points higher for those respondents who attribute poverty to social blame than those who attribute it to social or individual fate. The gap reaches about twenty percentage points when comparing those respondents who attribute poverty to social blame with those who attribute it to individual blame. On these first three items, the ordering of the various explanations for poverty is similar between cases and support our hypotheses. Social blame is associated with the highest support for social policy, followed by both types of fatalistic explanations. At the other end of the spectrum, individual blame is associated with the lowest probability to support social policy. Although the pattern is similar across the three items, the magnitude of the effect of poverty attributions is larger in the case of broad attitudes regarding inequality and responsibility of social welfare than in the case of the more concrete item asking about responsibility for mitigating unemployment.

Figure 3. Predicted probability of support for social policy by poverty attributions (in 2014; 95-percent confidence intervals)



The results concerning these first three items (judgments about inequality, unemployment, and social welfare) contrast starkly with the results regarding the question on the prioritization of welfare policies above taxes. There, we find hardly any differences between different poverty attributions, except for a (modest) overemphasis on social protection among individuals endorsing a "social fate" view of poverty.

In sum, this analysis of the main effects of poverty attributions on welfare attitudes shows that these effects differ between our four measures of welfare attitudes. Broadly speaking, it seems that the explanatory factors for judgments about inequality, assigning unemployment and welfare responsibility to the state are similar. In contrast, the determinants of preferences for social protection (over taxes) are different. In that case, poverty attributions hardly play any role in explaining preferences. When asked about the role of the state in a general fashion, individuals who attribute responsibility for poverty to social injustice are particularly likely to support welfare. However, when this comes with a trade-off and increased taxes, they are not more likely than other respondents to support the welfare state. Nevertheless, the results for other items makes clear that poverty attributions are important predictors of welfare attitudes, above and beyond the effects of the many predictors related to individuals' self-interest included in the analysis. In line with our expectations, attributing poverty to laziness and lack of will power (individual blame) is associated with low demands for social policy. On the other hand, the most common explanation

for poverty in European countries — social injustice — is associated with more demand for social policy. Hypotheses 1 and 2 are confirmed by our empirical analysis.

4.2. Country-level analysis

To investigate between-country differences in the validity of the general model presented in Figure 3, we tested separate models for each country in each survey wave, and for each dependent variable. Figure 4 summarizes the results of these models.[11] Overall, the country-specific models uncover a good deal of causal heterogeneity related to particular circumstances of the various European countries. More importantly, however, they strongly confirm the two main results of our analysis. First, the way in which people conceptualize the causes of poverty underlies some of their social attitudes. Second, this relationship is conditional on the type of social attitudes we focus on: It is strong for perceptions of social inequalities and for general welfare attitudes, and it is weaker – or arguably more context-dependent – for attitudes on the unemployment and "taxes vs. social protection" issues. As a matter of fact, drawing on the 81 models (27 countries × 3 survey waves) tested for each of the four social attitudes, it appears quite clearly that the share of significant effects of social blame attributions varies considerably between social welfare attitudes (86 % significant) and perceptions of inequalities (78%), on the one hand, and attitudes on unemployment (42%) and taxes (22%), on the other hand.

This overall difference between the two types of attitudes is more or less constant across countries (see Figure 4), but with variations worth noting. To begin with, in a first group of five countries, namely the Czech Republic, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, and Poland, no less than three quarters of the effects of social blame attributions on social attitudes are found to be significant. For these countries, the vast majority of nonsignificant effects (11 out of 14) relate to the "social welfare vs. taxes" item, while all other remaining cases relate to the "unemployment" item. In a second group of countries comprising Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Portugal, and the UK, the social blame attribution contributes to explaining two thirds of the twelve attitudes. For these countries, however, nonsignificant effects are distributed evenly between the "social welfare vs. taxes" and "unemployment" items.[12] For example, in France and Germany, social blame attributions failed to explain unemployment attitudes in any of the three survey waves (and in Finland, Portugal and the UK, it failed to do so in two waves). This suggests that even when

[11] For comparison purposes, Croatia was removed from this analysis, because it was only included in the last (2014) wave of the EB survey. Detailed results of all models are available upon request to the authors.
[12] Of the 28 nonsignificant effects, 12 are related to the "social welfare vs taxes" item, 12 to the "unemployment" item, and 4 to the "inequality" item. The two Central and Eastern European countries (Hungary and Latvia) stand out for showing significant effects on unemployment attitudes in all three years, but some nonsignificant effects on inequality perceptions.

poverty attributions are a salient predictor of social attitudes in a given country, they are sometimes ineffective in determining responses to the welfare vs. taxes dilemma and to the unemployment issue. In other words, perceptions of the causes of poverty are more likely to guide abstract perceptions and principles (i.e., the social welfare and inequality items) than more concrete stances about the role of government (i.e., taxes and unemployment policies).

Perhaps not incidentally, all most populated EU countries (with over 15 million inhabitants) – with the exception of Spain and Romania – are particularly likely to show significant associations between social blame attributions and social attitudes. Conversely, less conclusive cases (i.e., where fewer than one half of the social blame effects are significant) tend to be concentrated among six countries: Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta and Spain. These are smaller countries (with the exception of Spain) which have been severely hit by the economic crisis in the 2008-2013 period (with the exception of Malta).[13] In these countries, there is little evidence that social blame attributions are related to unemployment and taxes attitudes (with only 5 significant coefficients out of 36). Likewise, about half of the effects of social blame attributions are nonsignificant with respect to social welfare and inequality perceptions.[14]

Finally, nine countries (comprising Austria, Belgium, Sweden, and most of the Central and Eastern European countries) fall in between the two main groups of countries discussed thus far. Social blame attributions turn out to have a significant effect on social attitudes in about half of the twelve (year/item-specific) tested models. As a general rule, the social blame attribution of poverty is a fair predictor of social welfare attitudes and inequality perceptions, but it fails to explain most of the variation in answers to the unemployment and taxes issues.

[13] To some extent, this might be due to the small sample sizes in the smallest countries (Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta), where about 500 interviews were conducted, as against 1000 or more in larger countries. However, while small sample size tends to inflate the standard errors of regression coefficients by a good third (in comparison to larger countries), the coefficients themselves are only half the size of those of larger countries. Therefore, sample size is unlikely to account for much of the difference between small and larger countries.

[14] In countries which have experienced a deep and lasting recession, such as Greece and Spain, people blaming poverty on structural causes may tend to see these causes as lying *outside of the national sphere*. In some of these countries (Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Malta), these perceptions may have been reinforced by the massive losses suffered by the large domestic banking sector in the wake of the financial crisis (see Stephanou 2011; Borroni & Rossi 2019: 62-63). If dysfunctions of the international system (rather than faulty domestic policies) are seen as the main structural cause of poverty, government action in a context of decreasing state revenue may be deemed irrelevant or unable to improve the situation of the poor, whether it be through taxation (which may be harmful for low-wage workers) or through unemployment policies. More generally, we may expect that *many* respondents in these countries (regardless of their poverty attributions) were ambivalent about which policies to pursue to curb the social and economic consequences of the recession. As a rough measure of ambivalence, we may take the percentage of respondents who answered "it depends" or "don't know" to the unemployment and taxes questions. We find that, with the exception of Cyprus, ambivalence was indeed more widespread in the "crisis countries" (detailed results of this analysis are available upon request to the authors).

Figure 4: Logistic regression coefficients for the social blame explanation by country and year (95-percent confidence intervals)



Notes: Country codes: 1: Austria; 2: Belgium; 3: Bulgaria; 4: Cyprus; 5: Czech Republic; 6: Denmark; 7: Estonia; 8: Finland; 9: France; 10: Germany; 11: Greece; 12: Hungary; 13: Ireland; 14: Italy; 15: Latvia; 16: Lithuania; 17: Luxembourg; 18: Malta; 19: Netherlands; 20: Poland; 21: Portugal; 22: Romania; 23: Slovakia; 24: Slovenia; 25: Spain; 26: Sweden; 27: United Kingdom.

4.3. Robustness checks

Our next set of analyses provides a number of important robustness checks. For reasons of brevity, the tables reporting our results are included in the Appendix. Overall, we want to test whether the results regarding the effect of poverty attributions on welfare state preferences are robust to the inclusion of covariates that could drive the results. We focus on three categories of covariates discussed in section 2.4. Specifically, we assume that poverty attributions have a direct influence on welfare preferences, but that they also have an *indirect* influence via other individual characteristics such as respondents' levels of trust (interpersonal and institutional), their perception of the deservingness of welfare state recipients, and/or their ideology. Because poverty attributions may be related to each of these variables, their effects may be confounded with those of trust, deservingness judgments, and ideology.

Accordingly, we run four types of models that include measurements of these additional variables, first separately, and then all included at once. In the first set of models (Table A2), we add variables controlling for social trust as well as trust in government. We then focus on deservingness and run models that include controls for perceived deservingness for the years 2009 and 2010 for which these variables are available in the Eurobarometer data (see Table A3). In Table A4, we report results controlling for left-right ideology — as this variable is only present in the 2010 Eurobarometer data, we focus on that year. The same constraint applies obviously for the full models including all variables simultaneously, which are reported in Table A5.

In summary, each of the additional control variables has some effect on the outcome variables. There is a strong positive association between welfare preferences and perceiving some groups as deserving of public assistance. There is also a clear effect of ideology on these preferences, with left wing respondents being more likely to support welfare policy. The effects of interpersonal trust and trust in government are also significant in most of the models, though the direction of these effects differs across items and years. *However, even with these controls, the effect of poverty attributions on welfare preferences remains strong*. These results provide strong support that there is a direct effect of poverty attribution on welfare state preferences that cannot be attributed to trust, perceptions of deservingness or ideology.

5. CONCLUSION

Popular explanations for poverty have been at the heart of sociological work on the welfare state in the 70's and 80's, but interest in the topic has not taken off since. In particular, research has only seldom addressed the effect of explanations for poverty on actual policy preferences assuming rather than studying the link. This link becomes particularly relevant in the post economic crisis period which saw the first major shift in explanations for poverty since the 70's. We argue that poverty attributions inform about individuals' perceptions of deservingness of welfare state beneficiaries as well as about their views regarding the ability of society to curb poverty and therefore should be closely related to policy preferences.

Our analysis of Eurobarometer survey data from 27 EU countries shows the relevance of these arguments. Looking at the impact of poverty attribution on judgments about inequality as well as preferences regarding the involvement of the state in unemployment, and welfare as well as preferences on social policy expansion at the expense of higher taxation, we find that those respondents attributing poverty to individual blame (laziness and lack of willpower) are less likely to support state intervention. The contrast is particularly striking with those individuals who attribute poverty to social blame (injustice). Individuals who attribute poverty to individual or social blame are to be found somewhere in between these two extremes when asked about their preferences regarding the welfare state. However, these effects are substantial only for questions regarding general preferences about the welfare state. There are no systematic differences between individuals attributing poverty to different explanations in relation to their support of welfare state if this means increased taxes.

These results are significant in several ways. First, they show the importance of poverty attribution in the formation of broad policy preferences, something that has been overlooked in the empirical literature in recent years. Second, they also show that poverty attributions only impact preferences on some broad dimensions regarding the role of the state in the economy but not on more specific preferences related to taxation. To some extent, this might explain the puzzling observation that despite a change in overall poverty attributions in the last decade, support for redistribution or the share of left parties' supporters has hardly increased in European countries. Future research should pay more attention to the cross-country variations in the effect of poverty attribution on the various types of policy preferences.

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APPENDIX: Description of control variables

A constraint in selecting control variables at the individual level was their availability and comparability over time and across surveys. This prevented us from using potentially relevant variables (e.g., religious affiliation) because they were not available in the whole period under investigation and were ruled out from our analyses. This leaves us with the following variables:

- **Age and sex** were measured in a straightforward way. To account for possible nonlinear effects of age (resulting, for example, from a combination of life-cycle and generation effects), we included in the model quadratic and cubic terms for age.
- **Education** was measured by asking respondents for their age at the time they finished her full-time education. This scale was recoded in five ordered categories: (1) up to 14 years; (2) 15-16 years; (3) 17-18 years; (4) 19-21 years; (5) 22 years and more.
- **Income** was measured at the level of households; the indicator was standardized (with M=0 and SD=1) within each year and country, to account for extremely varying income levels across European countries.[15]
- **Occupation** was measured from the reported professional occupation of the respondent, and recoded into seven nominal categories: (1) farmer/fisherman and self-employed; (2) professional and manager; (3) middle management; (4) employee; (5) skilled worker; (6) unskilled worker; (7) other (unemployed, student, retired, housewife, etc.).
- **Interpersonal trust** was measured based on the survey question that reads: *Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? Please use a scale from 1 to 10, where [1] means that 'you can't be too careful' and [10] means that 'most people can be trusted'.*
- **Trust in government** was measured based on responses to the following question: *How much do you trust the (national government) to do what is right?*
- **Perceived deservingness** of various social groups was measured based on the responses to a question asking whether the following groups should be prioritized in receiving social assistance: Single parents, Immigrants, People suffering from addictions (e.g., alcohol, drugs), Homeless people, Abandoned or neglected children, Young offenders, Disabled people, Unemployed people, Elderly people.

[15] Details about the whole standardization procedure, as well as about the data used to extract income levels in the first place, are available upon request to the authors. Similar details about the construction of the education variable (in particular for respondents who indicated that they were "still studying" at the time of the interview) can be obtained in the same way.

- **Left-right ideology** was measured based on the answers to the following survey question: *In political matters people talk of "the left" and "the right". How would you place your views on this scale?* (10-point scale ranging from 1 to 10).

Table A1: Explaining social welfare attitudes

	Judgments about inequality			Unemployment			Welfare state			Welfare state vs taxes		
	2009	2010	2014	2009	2010	2014	2009	2010	2014	2009	2010	2014
Poverty attribution:												
Individual fate (IF)	0.068	0.073	0.063	0.211***	0.160***	0.125**	0.548***	0.537***	0.432***	0.046	0.017	-0.045
	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.053)
Social blame (SB)	0.715***	0.701***	0.822***	0.403***	0.346***	0.383***	0.931***	0.947***	1.017***	0.173***	0.066	0.028
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Social fate (SF)	0.100*	0.185***	0.080	0.066	0.047	0.028	0.351***	0.319***	0.380***	0.196***	0.146***	0.138***
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.051)
None of these	0.147*	0.231***	0.044	-0.072	-0.187***	-0.283***	0.307***	0.364***	0.209***	-0.169**	-0.396***	-0.371***
	(0.078)	(0.073)	(0.063)	(0.077)	(0.072)	(0.063)	(0.078)	(0.073)	(0.065)	(0.077)	(0.072)	(0.063)
Exposure to poverty:												
High	-0.063	0.065	0.658***	0.095**	0.155***	0.257***	0.208***	0.217***	0.503***	0.195***	0.142***	0.212***
	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.052)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.050)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.053)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.050)
Fairly high	0.252***	0.322***	0.737***	0.291***	0.258***	0.368***	0.490***	0.474***	0.602***	0.209***	0.120***	0.138***
	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.053)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.051)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.054)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.051)
Low	0.583***	0.796***	0.890***	0.547***	0.467***	0.409***	0.724***	0.730***	0.671***	0.073	-0.025	0.066
	(0.060)	(0.058)	(0.069)	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.067)	(0.058)	(0.056)	(0.069)	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.067)
Sex = female	0.089***	0.061**	0.074**	0.200***	0.152***	0.142***	0.101***	0.033	0.053*	-0.036	0.030	-0.021
	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.029)
Age	0.027	-0.012	-0.004	0.001	-0.025	-0.047***	-0.004	-0.003	0.007	-0.024	-0.040**	-0.063***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.016)
Age squared	-0.000	0.001	0.001	-0.000	0.000	0.001***	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.001	0.001**	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Age cubic	-0.000	-0.000**	-0.000**	0.000	-0.000	-0.000**	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000*	-0.000**	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Education (leaving age)												
15-16 yrs old	0.111*	0.105*	0.068	-0.037	-0.013	-0.051	0.039	-0.027	0.084	-0.027	0.088	-0.009
	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.057)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.057)
17-18 yrs old	-0.003	-0.042	-0.044	-0.246***	-0.182***	-0.156***	-0.144**	-0.179***	0.056	0.068	0.025	0.090
	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.054)
19-21 yrs old	-0.078	-0.128**	-0.031	-0.349***	-0.294***	-0.299***	-0.227***	-0.304***	-0.084	0.167***	0.137**	0.226***
	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.058)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.059)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.058)

22 yrs old and above	-0.210***	-0.275***	-0.151**	-0.457***	-0.280***	-0.418***	-0.303***	-0.334***	-0.167***	0.300***	0.212***	0.408***
	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.060)	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.059)
Income	-0.134***	-0.110***	-0.212***	-0.071***	-0.050***	-0.135***	-0.104***	-0.123***	-0.208***	0.077***	0.095***	0.174***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.015)
Profession:												
Professional, manager	-0.118	-0.054	-0.065	-0.271***	-0.315***	-0.097	-0.325***	-0.096	-0.118	0.140	0.216**	-0.022
	(0.087)	(0.085)	(0.078)	(0.086)	(0.083)	(0.078)	(0.088)	(0.086)	(0.080)	(0.088)	(0.086)	(0.078)
Middle management	-0.001	0.096	-0.019	-0.125*	-0.206***	-0.067	-0.152**	0.034	0.043	0.253***	0.286***	0.197***
	(0.075)	(0.073)	(0.069)	(0.075)	(0.072)	(0.068)	(0.075)	(0.073)	(0.069)	(0.075)	(0.073)	(0.068)
Employee	0.193***	0.221***	0.139**	0.035	0.008	0.067	0.037	0.181***	0.171***	0.160**	0.140**	0.102*
	(0.068)	(0.065)	(0.062)	(0.068)	(0.064)	(0.061)	(0.068)	(0.065)	(0.063)	(0.066)	(0.063)	(0.062)
Skilled worker	0.255***	0.247***	0.226***	0.192***	0.161**	0.144**	0.211***	0.262***	0.270***	0.081	0.096	0.047
	(0.069)	(0.066)	(0.064)	(0.069)	(0.065)	(0.063)	(0.069)	(0.066)	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.064)	(0.064)
Worker	0.371***	0.372***	0.275***	0.167**	0.167**	0.252***	0.224***	0.447***	0.449***	0.008	0.044	-0.042
	(0.079)	(0.076)	(0.074)	(0.078)	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.078)	(0.075)	(0.073)	(0.074)	(0.072)	(0.073)
Other	0.154*	0.074	-0.018	0.095	0.202**	0.034	0.204**	0.385***	0.347***	0.190**	0.126	0.013
	(0.086)	(0.084)	(0.083)	(0.088)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.088)	(0.086)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.082)	(0.083)
Intercept	-1.205***	-0.703**	-1.474***	-0.072	0.170	0.103	-0.677**	-0.734**	-1.659***	0.384	0.639**	0.338
	(0.312)	(0.306)	(0.288)	(0.307)	(0.297)	(0.285)	(0.308)	(0.304)	(0.284)	(0.307)	(0.300)	(0.293)
Variance(country-level)	0.338***	0.275***	0.291***	0.312***	0.226***	0.340***	0.277***	0.240***	0.241***	0.322***	0.265***	0.460***
	(0.094)	(0.077)	(0.081)	(0.087)	(0.063)	(0.094)	(0.077)	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.090)	(0.074)	(0.127)
N(individuals)	21,356	21,356	21,959	21,959	24,706	24,706	21,356	21,356	21,959	21,959	24,706	24,706
N(countries)	27	27	27	27	27	27	27	27	27	27	27	27

Notes: ***: p<.001; **: p<.01; *: p<.05. Reference categories: Poverty attribution: individual blame (laziness); Exposure to poverty = very low/none; Education (leaving age) = 14 years and less; Profession = self-employed.

Table A2: Explaining social welfare attitudes, controlling for social trust and trust in government

	Judgments about inequality			Unemployment			Welfare state			Welfare state vs taxes		
	2009	2010	2014	2009	2010	2014	2009	2010	2014	2009	2010	2014
Poverty attribution:												
Individual fate (IF)	0.096*	0.077	0.085	0.234***	0.169***	0.141***	0.567***	0.547***	0.453***	0.033	0.000	-0.078
	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.053)
Social blame (SB)	0.652***	0.617***	0.776***	0.365***	0.296***	0.350***	0.885***	0.881***	0.985***	0.187***	0.087**	0.030
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.044)
Social fate (SF)	0.106**	0.193***	0.081	0.082	0.047	0.026	0.361***	0.322***	0.384***	0.181***	0.133**	0.124**
	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.052)
None of these	0.149*	0.202***	0.051	-0.058	-0.211***	-0.285***	0.299***	0.338***	0.209***	-0.163**	-0.400***	-0.382***
	(0.080)	(0.075)	(0.063)	(0.078)	(0.073)	(0.064)	(0.080)	(0.075)	(0.066)	(0.079)	(0.073)	(0.063)
Exposure to poverty:												
High	-0.072	0.072	0.595***	0.091**	0.152***	0.216***	0.214***	0.232***	0.458***	0.183***	0.132***	0.243***
	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.052)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.051)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.054)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.050)
Fairly high	0.190***	0.267***	0.631***	0.245***	0.229***	0.300***	0.457***	0.454***	0.521***	0.222***	0.130***	0.189***
	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.053)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.052)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.055)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.051)
Low	0.444***	0.669***	0.745***	0.462***	0.396***	0.309***	0.658***	0.653***	0.555***	0.110*	0.011	0.147**
	(0.062)	(0.060)	(0.071)	(0.058)	(0.056)	(0.068)	(0.059)	(0.057)	(0.070)	(0.058)	(0.056)	(0.068)
Sex = female	0.091***	0.058*	0.062**	0.201***	0.156***	0.136***	0.092***	0.034	0.043	-0.026	0.032	-0.017
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.029)
Age	0.021	-0.022	-0.014	-0.004	-0.029	-0.052***	-0.005	-0.011	0.002	-0.024	-0.035*	-0.059***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.016)
Age squared	-0.000	0.001**	0.001*	-0.000	0.001	0.001***	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001**	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Age cubic	-0.000	-0.000**	-0.000**	0.000	-0.000	-0.000***	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000*	-0.000**	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Education (leaving age) 15-16 yrs old	0.098	0.097	0.082	-0.048	-0.015	-0.045	0.030	-0.034	0.091	-0.026	0.111*	-0.011
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.057)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.057)
17-18 yrs old	0.019	-0.025	-0.025	-0.232***	-0.173***	-0.146***	-0.135**	-0.170***	0.065	0.047	0.024	0.082
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.055)
19-21 yrs old	-0.029	-0.074	-0.004	-0.323***	-0.259***	-0.284***	-0.201***	-0.268***	-0.069	0.140**	0.124**	0.214***
	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.059)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.059)
22 yrs old and above	-0.128*	-0.200***	-0.110*	-0.404***	-0.239***	-0.391***	-0.257***	-0.287***	-0.140**	0.263***	0.184***	0.383***

	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.061)	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.060)	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.061)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.060)
Income	-0.114***	-0.093***	-0.170***	-0.052***	-0.041***	-0.107***	-0.084***	-0.109***	-0.176***	0.071***	0.084***	0.151***
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.015)
Profession:												
Professional, manager	-0.103	-0.043	-0.055	-0.273***	-0.314***	-0.089	-0.334***	-0.093	-0.120	0.121	0.209**	-0.033
	(0.088)	(0.087)	(0.079)	(0.087)	(0.084)	(0.078)	(0.089)	(0.087)	(0.080)	(0.088)	(0.087)	(0.078)
Middle management	0.032	0.150**	-0.018	-0.118	-0.179**	-0.060	-0.152**	0.061	0.043	0.233***	0.276***	0.192***
	(0.077)	(0.075)	(0.069)	(0.076)	(0.072)	(0.068)	(0.076)	(0.074)	(0.070)	(0.076)	(0.074)	(0.068)
Employee	0.198***	0.225***	0.142**	0.034	0.012	0.070	0.031	0.178***	0.170***	0.157**	0.144**	0.100
	(0.069)	(0.066)	(0.063)	(0.069)	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.069)	(0.066)	(0.063)	(0.066)	(0.064)	(0.062)
Skilled worker	0.266***	0.207***	0.232***	0.185***	0.140**	0.140**	0.198***	0.228***	0.261***	0.080	0.115*	0.057
	(0.070)	(0.068)	(0.065)	(0.070)	(0.066)	(0.063)	(0.070)	(0.067)	(0.065)	(0.067)	(0.065)	(0.064)
Worker	0.368***	0.341***	0.277***	0.159**	0.160**	0.249***	0.211***	0.412***	0.444***	0.015	0.078	-0.027
	(0.080)	(0.078)	(0.075)	(0.079)	(0.074)	(0.072)	(0.079)	(0.076)	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.073)	(0.073)
Other	0.183**	0.106	-0.002	0.101	0.217**	0.038	0.226**	0.396***	0.371***	0.178**	0.133	0.006
	(0.088)	(0.086)	(0.084)	(0.089)	(0.085)	(0.083)	(0.089)	(0.087)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.083)	(0.084)
Interpersonal trust	-0.026***	-0.025***	-0.037***	-0.023***	-0.006	-0.037***	-0.002	-0.006	-0.029***	0.027***	0.038***	0.047***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Trust in government	-0.132***	-0.162***	-0.129***	-0.079***	-0.084***	-0.069***	-0.100***	-0.119***	-0.095***	0.036***	0.045***	0.037***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)
Intercept	-0.579*	0.077	-0.694**	0.361	0.532*	0.619**	-0.290	-0.200	-1.105***	0.187	0.287	-0.055
	(0.316)	(0.313)	(0.295)	(0.312)	(0.304)	(0.290)	(0.314)	(0.311)	(0.288)	(0.310)	(0.304)	(0.296)
Variance(country-level)	0.289***	0.239***	0.292***	0.295***	0.229***	0.328***	0.277***	0.239***	0.207***	0.294***	0.229***	0.417***
	(0.081)	(0.067)	(0.081)	(0.083)	(0.064)	(0.091)	(0.078)	(0.067)	(0.058)	(0.082)	(0.065)	(0.116)
N(individuals)	21,068	21,645	24,563	21,068	21,645	24,563	21,068	21,645	24,563	21,068	21,645	24,563
N(countries)	27	27	27	27	27	27	27	27	27	27	27	27

Notes: ***: p<.001; **: p<.01; *: p<.05. Reference categories: Poverty attribution: individual blame (laziness); Exposure to poverty = very low/none; Education (leaving age) = 14 years and less; Profession = self-employed.

Table A3: Explaining social welfare attitudes, controlling for deservingness

	Judgments about inequality		Unemployment		Welfare state		Welfare state vs taxes	
	2009	2010	2009	2010	2009	2010	2009	2010
Poverty attribution: Individual fate (IF)	0.041	0.057	0.187***	0.140***	0.493***	0.496***	0.043	0.017
	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.056)	(0.054)
Social blame (SB)	0.673***	0.658***	0.378***	0.311***	0.877***	0.886***	0.168***	0.053
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Social fate (SF)	0.080	0.161***	0.053	0.028	0.322***	0.286***	0.194***	0.140***
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.052)
None of these	0.140*	0.218***	-0.084	-0.210***	0.275***	0.322***	-0.166**	-0.393***
	(0.079)	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.072)	(0.079)	(0.074)	(0.078)	(0.072)
Exposure to poverty: High	-0.081*	0.055	0.087**	0.153***	0.189***	0.212***	0.190***	0.139***
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.046)
Fairly high	0.229***	0.303***	0.274***	0.243***	0.458***	0.447***	0.206***	0.116**
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Low	0.558***	0.774***	0.528***	0.446***	0.684***	0.692***	0.071	-0.030
	(0.060)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.058)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.055)
Sex = female	0.071**	0.040	0.207***	0.155***	0.114***	0.034	-0.041	0.023
	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.030)
Age	0.022	-0.012	0.002	-0.025	-0.003	-0.003	-0.024	-0.038**
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Age squared	-0.000	0.001	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Age cubic	-0.000	-0.000*	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000*	-0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Education (leaving age) 15-16 yrs old	0.106*	0.109*	-0.042	-0.012	0.033	-0.035	-0.033	0.089
	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.058)	(0.058)
17-18 yrs old	-0.004	-0.040	-0.247***	-0.176***	-0.139**	-0.179***	0.059	0.023
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.056)	(0.055)
19-21 yrs old	-0.085	-0.129**	-0.355***	-0.283***	-0.232***	-0.298***	0.156**	0.132**
	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.061)	(0.061)
22 yrs old and above	-0.212***	-0.270***	-0.460***	-0.259***	-0.306***	-0.323***	0.285***	0.209***

	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.064)
Income	-0.137***	-0.118***	-0.065***	-0.048***	-0.096***	-0.119***	0.077***	0.091***
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Profession: Professional, manager	-0.112	-0.047	-0.268***	-0.312***	-0.318***	-0.092	0.140	0.219**
	(0.088)	(0.086)	(0.087)	(0.084)	(0.088)	(0.086)	(0.088)	(0.086)
Middle management	-0.005	0.103	-0.120	-0.199***	-0.147*	0.047	0.251***	0.286***
	(0.076)	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.072)	(0.076)	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.073)
Employee	0.193***	0.227***	0.033	0.005	0.033	0.178***	0.161**	0.142**
	(0.068)	(0.065)	(0.068)	(0.064)	(0.068)	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.063)
Skilled worker	0.264***	0.250***	0.188***	0.153**	0.206***	0.250***	0.085	0.098
	(0.069)	(0.067)	(0.069)	(0.065)	(0.069)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.065)
Worker	0.370***	0.374***	0.154**	0.152**	0.202***	0.429***	0.011	0.048
	(0.079)	(0.076)	(0.078)	(0.074)	(0.078)	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.072)
Other	0.172**	0.092	0.093	0.196**	0.202**	0.372***	0.197**	0.140*
	(0.087)	(0.084)	(0.088)	(0.084)	(0.088)	(0.086)	(0.084)	(0.082)
Deservingness unemployed	0.196***	0.106***	0.125***	0.204***	0.271***	0.344***	0.016	0.004
	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Deservingness elderly	0.196***	0.218***	0.004	0.068**	0.011	0.006	-0.028	0.007
	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Deservingness disabled	0.094***	0.147***	-0.009	0.046	-0.053	0.007	0.040	0.142***
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Deservingness immigrants	-0.088	-0.066	0.013	-0.096*	-0.088	-0.109**	0.081	0.059
	(0.054)	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.056)	(0.052)
Deservingness addicts	0.025	-0.083*	0.094**	0.015	0.132***	0.082*	0.140***	0.026
	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.043)
Deservingness single parents	0.145***	0.075**	0.073**	0.087***	0.067**	0.161***	0.063*	0.015
	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.031)
Deservingness homeless	0.059*	0.054*	0.085***	0.050	0.293***	0.126***	-0.024	-0.003
	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.032)
Deservingness neglected children	0.175***	0.222***	-0.119***	-0.080**	-0.123***	-0.110***	0.078**	0.131***
	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.032)
Deservingness young offenders	-0.017	-0.016	-0.040	-0.120**	-0.024	0.012	-0.123**	-0.140***
	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.048)	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.050)
Intercept	-1.539***	-1.080***	-0.137	0.038	-0.874***	-0.953***	0.298	0.456

	(0.314)	(0.308)	(0.309)	(0.299)	(0.309)	(0.305)	(0.308)	(0.302)
Variance(country-level)	0.336***	0.266***	0.311***	0.217***	0.253***	0.222***	0.312***	0.266***
	(0.094)	(0.075)	(0.087)	(0.061)	(0.071)	(0.063)	(0.087)	(0.075)
N(individuals)	21,356	21,959	21,356	21,959	21,356	21,959	21,356	21,959
N(countries)	27	27	27	27	27	27	27	27

Notes: ***: p<.001; **: p<.01; *: p<.05. Reference categories: Poverty attribution: individual blame (laziness); Exposure to poverty = very low/none; Education (leaving age) = 14 years and less; Profession = self-employed.

Table A4: Explaining social welfare attitudes, controlling for left-right ideology

	Judgments about inequality	Unemployment	Welfare state	Welfare state vs taxes
	2010	2010	2010	2010
Poverty attribution:				
Individual fate (IF)	0.052	0.151**	0.502***	0.039
	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.061)	(0.061)
Social blame (SB)	0.702***	0.313***	0.912***	0.098**
	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.049)
Social fate (SF)	0.166***	0.014	0.262***	0.151***
	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.058)	(0.058)
None of these	0.243***	-0.292***	0.332***	-0.416***
	(0.084)	(0.083)	(0.085)	(0.083)
Exposure to poverty:				
High	0.065	0.173***	0.181***	0.146***
	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.051)
Fairly high	0.328***	0.298***	0.449***	0.075
	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.053)
Low	0.741***	0.434***	0.723***	-0.047
	(0.066)	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.064)
Sex = female	0.057*	0.158***	0.029	0.025
	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Age	-0.005	-0.034	-0.020	-0.055***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Age squared	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Age cubic	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Education (leaving age)				
15-16 yrs old	0.107	-0.063	-0.060	0.063
	(0.070)	(0.068)	(0.070)	(0.068)
17-18 yrs old	-0.080	-0.230***	-0.181***	0.010
	(0.066)	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.064)
19-21 yrs old	-0.096	-0.364***	-0.299***	0.125*
	(0.071)	(0.069)	(0.071)	(0.070)
22 yrs old and above	-0.276***	-0.306***	-0.323***	0.236***

	(0.073)	(0.071)	(0.073)	(0.073)
Income	-0.093***	-0.053***	-0.131***	0.107***
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Profession:				
Professional, manager	-0.110	-0.345***	-0.093	0.165*
	(0.093)	(0.092)	(0.095)	(0.094)
Middle management	0.033	-0.259***	0.038	0.246***
	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.082)	(0.082)
Employee	0.165**	-0.023	0.173**	0.123*
	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.074)	(0.072)
Skilled worker	0.191**	0.107	0.232***	0.087
	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.073)
Worker	0.303***	0.150*	0.393***	0.074
	(0.087)	(0.084)	(0.086)	(0.084)
Other	-0.016	0.123	0.355***	0.134
	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.099)	(0.095)
Left-right ideology	-0.084***	-0.056***	-0.107***	-0.042***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Intercept	-0.329	0.720**	0.188	1.168***
	(0.352)	(0.344)	(0.351)	(0.348)
Variance(country-level)	0.291***	0.245***	0.251***	0.251***
	(0.082)	(0.069)	(0.071)	(0.071)
N(individuals)	17,539	17,539	17,539	17,539
N(countries)	27	27	27	27

Notes: ***: p<.001; **: p<.01; *: p<.05. Reference categories: Poverty attribution: individual blame (laziness); Exposure to poverty = very low/none; Education (leaving age) = 14 years and less; Profession = self-employed.

Table A5: Explaining social welfare attitudes, controlling for trust, deservingness and left-right ideology

	Judgments about inequality	Unemployment	Welfare state	Welfare state vs taxes
	2010	2010	2010	2010
Poverty attribution:				
Individual fate (IF)	0.044	0.144**	0.472***	0.013
	(0.062)	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.062)
Social blame (SB)	0.591***	0.240***	0.801***	0.084*
	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Social fate (SF)	0.157***	-0.000	0.229***	0.126**
	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.059)	(0.059)
None of these	0.211**	-0.336***	0.262***	-0.443***
	(0.086)	(0.084)	(0.087)	(0.084)
Exposure to poverty:				
High	0.068	0.172***	0.191***	0.137***
	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.052)
Fairly high	0.265***	0.265***	0.400***	0.084
	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.053)
Low	0.614***	0.355***	0.613***	-0.014
	(0.068)	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.065)
Sex = female	0.037	0.167***	0.034	0.015
	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Age	-0.012	-0.034	-0.022	-0.048**
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.021)
Age squared	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Age cubic	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Education (leaving age)				
15-16 yrs old	0.109	-0.067	-0.072	0.083
	(0.072)	(0.069)	(0.071)	(0.068)
17-18 yrs old	-0.060	-0.216***	-0.169**	0.012
	(0.067)	(0.065)	(0.067)	(0.064)
19-21 yrs old	-0.049	-0.319***	-0.254***	0.112
	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.072)	(0.070)
22 yrs old and above	-0.190**	-0.242***	-0.253***	0.204***

	(0.075)	(0.072)	(0.074)	(0.074)
Income	-0.085***	-0.042**	-0.115***	0.092***
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Profession:				
Professional, manager	-0.110	-0.350***	-0.097	0.170*
	(0.096)	(0.092)	(0.096)	(0.095)
Middle management	0.083	-0.237***	0.068	0.239***
	(0.083)	(0.080)	(0.083)	(0.082)
Employee	0.173**	-0.026	0.166**	0.129*
	(0.075)	(0.072)	(0.075)	(0.072)
Skilled worker	0.161**	0.080	0.181**	0.108
	(0.077)	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.074)
Worker	0.256***	0.117	0.336***	0.098
	(0.089)	(0.085)	(0.088)	(0.084)
Other	0.029	0.117	0.348***	0.151
	(0.099)	(0.098)	(0.101)	(0.096)
Interpersonal trust	-0.024***	-0.009	-0.011	0.040***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Trust in government	-0.153***	-0.076***	-0.110***	0.039***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Deservingness unemployed	0.079**	0.208***	0.362***	0.045
	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Deservingness elderly	0.208***	0.050	-0.019	0.036
	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Deservingness disabled	0.140***	0.007	0.004	0.151***
	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.036)
Deservingness immigrants	-0.047	-0.049	-0.087	0.063
	(0.058)	(0.055)	(0.058)	(0.059)
Deservingness addicts	-0.125**	0.006	0.118**	0.034
	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.049)
Deservingness single parents	0.076**	0.070**	0.171***	0.007
	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Deservingness homeless	0.072*	0.052	0.150***	0.021
	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.037)

Deservingness neglected children	0.217***	-0.089**	-0.115***	0.160***
	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Deservingness young offenders	0.011	-0.143***	-0.017	-0.154***
	(0.057)	(0.054)	(0.057)	(0.057)
Left-right ideology	-0.062***	-0.042***	-0.089***	-0.048***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Intercept	-0.109	0.836**	0.298	0.595*
	(0.361)	(0.350)	(0.359)	(0.353)
Variance(country-level)	0.248***	0.240***	0.229***	0.217***
	(0.071)	(0.068)	(0.065)	(0.062)
N(individuals)	17,394	17,394	17,394	17,394
N(countries)	27	27	27	27

Notes: ***: p<.001; **: p<.01; *: p<.05. Reference categories: Poverty attribution: individual blame (laziness); Exposure to poverty = very low/none; Education (leaving age) = 14 years and less; Profession = self-employed.