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Do Parties Dislike Working-Class Candidates?

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ABSTRACT:

In most democracies, members of parliament tend to be better off than the citizens they are elected to represent. How can we explain why democratic parliaments are systematically run by the affluent? Previous research has mostly focused on the explanation that voters may prefer to elect candidates who are better off than they themselves are. The goal of this paper is to explore an alternative mechanism, viz., whether political parties favor well-off rather than less well-off candidates. To examine this question, I analyze data from the 2007 election to the lower chamber of the Swiss parliament. The results show that parties are more likely to assign favorable party list positions to candidates who are fairly well-off. In particular, I find that parties favor candidates from the skilled working class or the core middle class over candidates from the routine working class as well as candidates who are well educated over candidates who are less well educated. These findings suggest that party bias in the candidate nomination process is a factor contributing to the descriptive misrepresentation by income and social class that is so common in current democracies.

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A growing literature documents that government policy in the United States (US) and other advanced democracies is more responsive to the preferences of affluent citizens than to those of middle-income and poor citizens (Bartels 2008; Hacker and Pierson 2010; Gilens 2012; Persson and Gilljam 2017; Elsässer, Hense and Schäfer 2018). Why do democratically elected politicians not produce policies that are more in line with the policy preferences of the mass public? To answer this question, it is useful to distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic factors influencing the policymaking behavior of politicians. On the one hand, politicians can have a number of extrinsic incentives to respond primarily to the preferences of the affluent. Affluent citizens are more likely to vote, contact public officials, make campaign contributions, be knowledgeable about politics, and have their interests represented by powerful lobbying organizations (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Rosenstone and Hansen 2003; Grönlund and Milner 2006; Baumgartner et al. 2009; Schlozman, Verba and Brady 2012; Bonica et al. 2013). As a consequence, the preferences of affluent citizens are not only more visible than the preferences of less affluent citizens, but politicians also have electoral, and perhaps "revolving-door," incentives to prioritize them.

On the other hand, it might also be that politicians have policy preferences that are more similar to the preferences of affluent citizens than to those of less affluent citizens, in which case the politicians are intrinsically motivated to produce policies that are more consistent with the preferences of the affluent. In basically all advanced democracies, politicians themselves tend to be more affluent, better educated, have higher-status occupations, and come from more privileged backgrounds than most citizens (Matthews 1984; Best and Cotta 2000; Best 2007; Carnes and Lupu 2015; Bovens and Wille 2017). These inequalities in descriptive representation can lead to inequalities in substantive representation because similar socialization and life experiences and self-interest among politicians and affluent citizens might lead them to have similar preferences (Phillips 1995; Burden 2007). If politicians' behavior in office is influenced by their personal preferences and knowledge (Kingdon 1989; Levitt 1996; Butler 2014), then there is a good chance that the policies they pursue will also reflect the preferences and priorities of affluent citizens.

If this intrinsic motivation matters, so that the greater substantive representation of the affluent is, at least in part, due to their greater descriptive repre-

sentation in parliament, then the question becomes why poor and middle-income voters do not more often elect representatives with socio-economic characteristics that are more similar to their own. There are three potential mechanisms that may explain why democratic elections fail to produce more descriptively representative parliaments. The first mechanism is voter bias: ordinary voters might prefer to elect candidates who are better off than they themselves are. The second mechanism is candidate self-selection: less affluent citizens might be less likely than affluent citizens to run for political office. The third mechanism, finally, is party bias: parties might favor better-off candidates over less well-off candidates in the nomination (or election) process.

While most of the previous literature on descriptive misrepresentation by income and social class has focused on the first of the above mechanisms, the aim of this paper is to explore the third mechanism. Hence, the research question is: do parties favor candidates who are more affluent in the candidate nomination process? To answer this question, I rely on data from the 2007 election to the lower chamber of the Swiss parliament (the National Council). Combining information from a survey among candidates in the 2007 parliamentary election with official information on party lists, I explore whether parties favor better-off candidates in the allocation of party-list seats. The results indicate that parties are more likely to assign favorable list positions to candidates from the skilled working class or the core middle class than to candidates from the routine working class. The results also show that parties are more likely to assign favorable positions to candidates who are well educated than to candidates who are less well educated. These findings suggest that parties' list placement strategies may contribute to the descriptive underrepresentation of low-income, routine working-class citizens and to the overrepresentation of fairly affluent citizens in democratic parliaments.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. I first provide an overview of the existing literature. Next, I motivate the hypotheses that I set out to test in the paper. I then describe the data and methods that I use to test my hypotheses. Finally, I present the results of the analysis and, in the last section, conclude the paper.

Previous Literature

As mentioned above, most of the previous literature on the descriptive representation of income groups and social classes has focused on the question of whether voters prefer to vote for candidates who are better off. Carnes and Lupu (2016) conducted survey experiments in Argentina, Britain, and the US in which they presented respondents with a choice between a working-class candidate (factory worker) and a white-collar candidate (business owner) for local political office. Their results provide no indication of a voter bias in favor of better-off candidates: respondents in all three countries are just as likely to vote for a working-class candidate as for a white-collar candidate. In a survey experiment among British citizens, Campbell and Cowley (2014) presented respondents with a choice between parliamentary candidates whose incomes ranged from an average (male) salary to an income approximately 36 times the average salary. Campbell and Cowley's results show that British respondents tend to prefer candidates with an average rather than a high income. For the US, Sadin (2015) also finds a voter bias against high-income candidates relative to candidates with a moderate income. Wüest and Pontusson (2018) report the results of a survey experiment in which Swiss citizens were asked to choose among parliamentary candidates distinguished by occupation, education, and income as well as other characteristics. Exploring the effects of social class defined as a combination of occupation, education, and income, they find that Swiss respondents are biased not only against well-off, "upper middle-class" candidates but also against less well-off, "routine working-class" candidates.

Studies dealing with candidate self-selection (and factors that influence candidate self-selection) or party bias in candidate nominations as possible reasons for descriptive misrepresentation by income or social class are scarce. Carnes (2016) uses aggregate data for US states to explore the link between the share of workers in state legislatures and a range of demand- and supply-side factors that might affect the descriptive representation of working-class citizens. Carnes finds that the descriptive representation of the working class is positively related to unionization and the share of workers among high-income citizens in a state and negatively related to state legislative professionalism. On the other hand, political interest, ability, political aspiration, self-assessed qualification, access to political recruiters, and turnout among working-class citizens appear to have lit-

tle effect on their descriptive representation in state legislatures. Carnes's result on the relationship between union density and the descriptive representation of workers confirms findings of earlier studies of US state legislatures, which also uncovered a positive association between the two variables (Sojourner 2013).

Hypotheses

Candidates to the Swiss National Council are elected in a system of proportional representation (PR) with open party lists. Elections are held in 26 electoral districts, the cantons, that vary in size between one and 34 seats (in 2007).[1] Six cantons are represented by a single representative in the National Council. In these cantons, candidates are effectively elected by plurality vote. Among the individuals who self-select into the pool of potential parliamentary candidates, parties must choose which ones to nominate as candidates and, for parties with more than one candidate, how to rank the candidates on their lists. The nomination of candidates and their ranking on the party list are decided at the district level by cantonal party delegates. Party lists can present, and voters can vote for, as many candidates as there are seats to be filled in a canton.

The electoral system allows voters to cast positive and negative preference votes for candidates. Voters who vote for a particular list can cast negative preference votes by removing candidates from that list and positive preference votes by adding candidates from other lists or by giving a second vote to candidates who are already on the list (each candidate can receive at most two votes from a single voter). After voters have cast their votes, the determination of elected candidates proceeds in two steps (Vatter 2016). In a first step, the votes for candidates are aggregated to the party list level. Seats are then allocated to party lists in proportion to the aggregate vote totals. In a second step, for each party list that was allocated one or more seats, the elected candidates are determined according to the number of votes that each candidate on the list received.

Parties may favor particular candidates by assigning them to higher party list positions. There are several possible reasons why parties might have a preference for candidates who are more affluent than the average citizen. First, parties might wish to get candidates elected to parliament who are able to effectively

[1] Due to changes in the cantons' relative population sizes, the number of seats of the canton with the largest population (Zurich) has increased from 34 to 35 since the 2015 election.

pursue the party's policy objectives. Hence, they might privilege candidates who are competent and well-educated (Valen 1966) and therefore also more affluent. Second, parties might prefer affluent candidates because of the financial resources they have at their disposal (Gherghina and Chiru 2010). Candidates' financial resources can be an important electoral asset, especially to the extent to which parties and candidates rely on private sources to fund election campaigns (see Koss 2010 for a comparative study of the sources of party and campaign funding). For Switzerland, data from the Comparative Candidates Survey (CCS 2016) show that in the 2007 election to the National Council successful and unsuccessful candidates financed about 45% and 48%, respectively, of their campaign budget from private funds. In the 2011 election, the respective numbers were about 39% and 51%. Data from the Comparative Candidates Survey also show that the shares of the campaign budget that Swiss candidates pay from their own pocket is fairly average in a comparative perspective: across the 17 elections (in 14 democracies) for which the Comparative Candidates Survey provides data, successful and unsuccessful candidates covered, on average, about 44% and 52% of their campaign budget from private funds.[2] Finally, a third reason for parties to favor affluent candidates might be that voters prefer these candidates over less affluent candidates. For Switzerland, Wüest and Pontusson (2018) provide experimental evidence showing that Swiss citizens prefer "skilled working-class" and "core middle-class" candidates, who are fairly well-off, over "routine working-class" and "upper middle-class" candidates, who are less well-off and very well-off, respectively.[3] Swiss voters thus seem to have a preference for candidates who are fairly well-off but not very well-off.

[2]The countries (and election years) for which data are available are Australia (2007), Austria (2008), Belgium (2010), Estonia (2011), Finland (2007, 2011), Germany (2005, 2009), Greece (2012), Iceland (2009), Italy (2013), Netherlands (2006), Portugal (2011), Romania (2012), Switzerland (2007, 2011), and the UK (2010).

[3]In their survey experiment, Wüest and Pontusson (2018) define the skilled working-class candidate as a retail salesperson with a higher vocational education and a gross monthly salary of CHF 10,000, the core middle-class candidate as an engineer with a master's degree and a salary of CHF 10,000, the routine working-class candidate as a retail salesperson with a basic vocational education and a salary of CHF 5,000, and the upper middle-class candidate as a lawyer with a PhD and a salary of CHF 30,000. For reference, the median gross monthly private-sector salary in Switzerland was CHF 6,235 in 2016 according to survey data compiled by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (`https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/arbeit-erwerb/loehne-erwerbseinkommen-arbeitskosten/lohnniveau-schweiz.assetdetail.5126543.html`, last accessed on August 21, 2018).

Based on the above discussion, I expect that the descriptive misrepresentation by income and social class in democratic parliaments is, at least in part, due to party bias in favor of affluent candidates. Specifically, I formulate the following three hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1. *Parties are more likely to assign higher list positions to candidates with a higher education than to candidates with a lower education.*

Hypothesis 2. *Parties are more likely to assign higher list positions to candidates with a higher household income than to candidates with a lower household income.*

Hypothesis 3. *Parties are more likely to assign higher list positions to candidates from the skilled working class or the core middle class, but not the upper middle class, than to candidates from the routine working class.*

It is important to note that the effect of list position on the electoral success of candidates to the Swiss National Council is indirect: it works entirely through the effect that list position has on the preferences of voters for candidates (Lutz 2010). Therefore, Swiss parties are likely to have less incentive to rank their favored candidates on the top of the list compared to parties in closed-list PR systems, where a candidate's list position directly affects her probability of winning a seat. I thus consider my estimates of the effects of candidate education, income, and social class on list placement as lower bounds in a comparative perspective.

Data and Methods

I test the hypotheses relying on data from the 2007 election to the Swiss National Council. My empirical analysis proceeds in two steps. In the first step, I regress measures of candidates' electoral success on their list placement. The aim of this preliminary analysis is to determine whether party bias in the ranking of candidates may be part of the explanation of descriptive misrepresentation by income and social class. If list position has no effect on electoral success, then parties cannot favor particular candidates by placing them higher on their lists and candidate placement strategies cannot contribute to descriptive misrepresentation.[4] The variables I use to measure candidates' electoral success are, first, a

[4]Previous literature provides mixed evidence on whether a "primacy effect" exists, i.e., whether voters are more likely to vote for higher-placed candidates because of their list positions.

binary indicator variable that takes the value of one if a candidate was elected to the National Council and the value of zero otherwise and, second, a variable measuring the total number of votes a candidate received. I rely on two measures of candidates' list placement. The first measure is the relative position of a candidate on the party list, which I define as follows:

$$relative\ position_{ij} = \frac{max\ pos_j - cand\ pos_{ij}}{max\ pos_j - 1}, \tag{1}$$

where $cand\ pos_{ij}$ denotes the position of candidate i on list j and $max\ pos_j$ denotes the "lowest" position on list j (e.g., if list j has 34 candidates, then 34 is the lowest position). The second measure of list placement is a binary indicator variable that takes the value of one if candidate i on list j holds a top position on the party list and zero otherwise. More precisely, I define this measure as follows:

$$top\ position_{ij} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } cand\ pos_{ij} \leq (max\ pos_j)^{(1/3)}, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \tag{2}$$

In the analysis, I exclude candidates from cantons with a single representative in the National Council and party lists containing a single candidate because there exists no preferential ordering among these candidates. Hence, in the data I analyze, variable $max\ pos_j$ can range from two to 34. Note that for lists with two seats, the measure $top\ position_{ij}$ considers only the first position on the list as a top position, while for lists with 34 seats, it considers the first three positions as top positions. Data on whether candidates were elected come from the Selects Candidates Survey 2007 (FORS 2009). Data on the total number of votes and party list positions of candidates and on the number of candidates per party list come from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. I fit a hierarchical logistic regression when the dependent variable is the binary indicator for candidates' electoral success and a hierarchical linear regression when the dependent variable is the total number of votes. Candidates are nested within party lists in both models.

Miller and Krosnick (1998) provide evidence for such an effect, arguing that this is because voters tend to evaluate higher-placed candidates more positively than lower-placed candidates. Drawing on a natural experiment in California in which the ballot positions of candidates for state offices are randomized, Ho and Imai (2008) find evidence of a primacy effect for minor party but not major party candidates in general elections (they find a primacy effect for all candidates in primary elections).

In the second step of the analysis, I test the hypotheses set out above by regressing the measures of candidates' list placement on indicators of candidates' education, household income, and social class. The indicator of candidate education is a variable distinguishing between candidates with secondary education or less, candidates with higher vocational education, candidates with a higher vocational college degree, and candidates with a university degree. The indicator of candidate household income is a variable that distinguishes between candidates with a monthly household income of CHF 4,000 or less, candidates with an income between CHF 4,001 and 6,000, candidates with an income between CHF 6,001 and 8,000, candidates with an income between CHF 8,001 and 10,000, candidates with an income between CHF 10,001 and 12,000, and candidates with an income of more than CHF 12,000. Following Wüest and Pontusson (2018), I define social class as a combination of occupation, education, and income and assign candidates to one of four classes: the routine working class, the skilled working class, the core middle class, and the upper middle class.[5] Candidates from the routine working class are unskilled workers, skilled workers, or small business owners with no more than a secondary education and a household income not exceeding CHF 8,000.[6] Candidates from the skilled working class are skilled workers or small business owners with a higher vocational education and an income between CHF 4,001 and 12,000. Candidates from the core middle class are small business owners or members of the lower-grade or higher-grade service class who have a higher vocational college or university degree and an income between CHF 6,001 and 12,000. Finally, candidates from the upper middle class are members of the higher-grade service class who have a university degree and an income of more than CHF 12,000.[7] I fit again two types of regression models:

[5] I define the classes in such a way that they correspond with the routine working-class, skilled working-class, core middle-class, and upper middle-class candidates that Wüest and Pontusson (2018) used in their survey experiment (see fn. 3 for their definition of these candidates).

[6] The median monthly household income for the Swiss population was somewhat below CHF 8,000 in 2006-08 (`https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/kataloge-datenbanken/tabellen.assetdetail.308364.html`, last accessed on June 3, 2018). Hence, the household income of my routine working-class candidates cannot be higher than the median household income.

[7] The occupational categories rely on Oesch's (2006*a*; 2006*b*) simplified class schema, which collapses his original 17-group schema into five groups, namely unskilled workers, skilled workers, small business owners, the lower-grade service class, and the higher-grade service class. Assigning candidates to one of Oesch's occupational groups requires information on their occupation, employment status, and, for the self-employed, the number of employees they have.

a hierarchical beta regression (Ferrari and Cribari-Neto 2004) when the dependent variable is *relative position*$_{ij}$ and a hierarchical logistic regression when the dependent variable is *top position*$_{ij}$, with candidates nested within party lists in both models.[8] Data on candidates' education and household income come from the Selects Candidates Survey. My social class variable combines information on candidates' education and household income with information on candidates' occupation and employment status. The latter pieces of information come from the Comparative Candidates Survey (CCS 2016).[9]

The models I estimate in the second step include two control variables. These are an indicator variable that takes the value of one for female candidates and the value of zero for male candidates and a variable for candidate age. I deliberately do not control for whether or not candidates were "pre-cumulated" on their party list (i.e., whether their name was printed twice) or for whether or not they were incumbents. The reason is that controlling for these variables would likely lead to "post-treatment" bias.[10]

Finally, it is important to note that both steps of my analysis are complicated by the fact that some parties choose to constrain their scope in the allocation of list positions. The most important ways of doing so are to require candidates (or a subset of candidates) to appear in alphabetical order or alternation of female and male candidates. Excluding candidates who did not participate in

Unfortunately, I lack information on the number of employees of self-employed candidates, which prevents me from distinguishing between candidates who own large businesses and candidates who own businesses with few or no employees. I decided to treat all candidates owning a business as small business owners. My small business owner category might therefore contain some large business owners, who, according to Oesch's schema, are members of the higher-grade service class. As a consequence, I might underestimate the "true" differences between small business owners and the higher-grade service class in my empirical analysis.

[8] I use the `rstanarm` package (Stan Development Team 2016) in `R` to fit the hierarchical regression models. The beta regression requires the outcome variable to take values in the open standard unit interval $(0, 1)$. As variable *relative position*$_{ij}$ can also assume the values of zero and one, I use the following transformation to transform it into the open standard unit interval: $(\textit{relative position}_{ij} \times (n-1) + 0.5)/n$, where n is the sample size (Cribari-Neto and Zeileis n.d.).

[9] The Comparative Candidate Survey reports ISCO-88 (2-digits) codes for the occupations of candidates in the 2007 election to the Swiss parliament. Guidelines on how to create Oesch's (2006*a*; 2006*b*) class schema based on ISCO codes are available online from `http://people.unil.ch/danieloesch/scripts/` (last accessed on August 22, 2018).

[10] A variable should be included as a control variable in a regression model when it is believed to have a causal effect on both the outcome variable and the independent variable(s) of main interest. Pre-cumulation and incumbency are likely to be correlated with candidate education, household income, and social class, but they are unlikely to causally affect these variables.

the candidate survey, cantons represented by a single representative, and party lists that contained only one candidate, my sample consists of 1,658 candidates and 287 party lists.[11] I coded all party lists in the sample according to whether or not there is any indication of a seat allocation constraint (and, if so, what kind of a constraint).[12] This coding exercise revealed that 194 lists show indication of a constraint, while the remaining 93 lists appear to be unconstrained. Party lists can contain valuable information even if they have been subject to seat allocation constraints. For example, if female and male candidates are alternated on a party list, then this list can essentially be treated as two unconstrained lists: one containing the female candidates and the other containing the male candidates. Similarly, if all but the first p candidates on a list appear in alphabetical order, then the p candidates can be considered as a separate, unconstrained list. I therefore created three data sets. The first one contains all 287 party lists and 1,658 candidates. The second one contains all party lists or subsets of lists that are completely constrained, leaving no leeway in the assignment of list positions (as is, for example, the case when lists are alphabetically ordered). It consists of 145 lists and 709 candidates. The third data set contains all party lists or subsets of lists that are unconstrained (e.g., if female and male candidates are alternated on a list, then each group of candidates enters the third data set as a separate list; or, if a list is alphabetically ordered with the exception of the first p candidates, then these p candidates, but not the other ones, enter the third data set as a list). This data set includes 168 lists and 943 candidates. I use the second data set in the first step of the analysis, where my goal is to estimate the effect of candidates' list position on their electoral success. The first and third data sets are employed in the second step of the analysis, where the goal is to estimate the effect of candidates' education, income, and social class on their list placement.

[11] The Selects Candidate Survey 2007 was conducted among all 3,100 candidates in the 2007 election to the National Council. 1,672 of these candidates participated in the survey (53.94%). Excluding candidates from cantons with a single representative in the National Council and candidates from lists containing a single candidate leaves me with a sample of 1,658 candidates.

[12] More precisely, I checked for each list whether the last names and first names of candidates appear in alphabetical order, whether candidates are ordered according to their age, whether female and male candidates are alternated, or whether there is any other pattern in the data.

Results

Before testing the hypotheses stated above, I explore the effect that list position has on candidates' electoral success. Figure 1 presents the results from regressing the electoral success of candidates on their list placement. The top-left panel in the figure shows the results from regressing the binary indicator for elected candidates on candidates' relative list position, the top-right panel the results from regressing the total number of votes candidates received on candidates' relative list position, the bottom-left panel the results from regressing the indicator for elected candidates on the indicator for top list positions, and the bottom-right panel the results from regressing the total number of votes received on the indicator for top list positions.

The left-hand panels in Figure 1 show that the list position of a candidate has a positive effect on her election probability. Considering an "average" party list (which I define as the party list whose random effect deviates the least from the global mean), a candidate with a value of one (the maximum value) on the relative list position variable has an election probability of 0.13, while a candidate with a value of zero (the minimum value) on that variable has an election probability of 0.02. Hence, moving from the bottom to the top of the list increases the probability of being elected by 0.11. Similarly, a candidate on a top list position is elected with probability 0.14, while a candidate on a position not considered a top position is elected with probability 0.04. Being placed on a top position thus increases the probability of being elected by 0.1. The right-hand panels in the figure tell a similar story regarding the number of votes candidates receive. Considering again an average party list, a candidate with the maximum value on the relative list position variable can expect to receive about 3,985 votes more than a candidate with the minimum value on that variable. A candidate on a top list position can even expect to win about 4,533 votes more than a candidate on a position not at the top of the list.

I now turn to testing my hypotheses. Figure 2 presents the results from regressing candidates' list placement on indicators of their education. The left-hand panels show the regressions using relative list position as the dependent variable and the right-hand panels the regressions using top list position as the dependent variable. The models in the top panels are fit to all party lists in my data set, while the models in the bottom panels are fit only to those party

Figure 1: Results from regressing candidates' electoral success on their list placement



Note: The figure shows the means and 95% highest posterior density (HPD) intervals of the posterior distributions of the intercept and the coefficient for the candidate placement variable. Top-left panel: the dependent variable is the binary indicator for elected candidates and the measure of candidates' list placement is the relative position of a candidate on the party list. Top-right panel: the dependent variable is the total number of votes a candidate received and the measure of list placement is the relative list position. Bottom-left panel: the dependent variable is the indicator for elected candidates and the measure of list placement is the indicator for top list positions. Bottom-right panel: the dependent variable is the total number of votes received and the measure of list placement is the indicator for top list positions. The regressions are fit to the 145 party lists or subsets of lists that are completely constrained, containing 709 candidates. Party list random effects are not shown in the figure.

lists or subsets of lists that are not subject to a list placement constraint. The reference category in all models are candidates with secondary education or less. The results show that candidates with a higher vocational college degree or a university degree are likely to have higher relative list positions than candidates with no more than secondary education. Candidates with a university degree, but not candidates with a higher vocational college degree, are also more likely to be placed on a top list position. In terms of effect size, the effect of a university degree on list placement is rather limited. For a male, 43-year-old candidate on an average list, the expected relative list position is 0.52 if he has a university degree and 0.47 if he has only secondary education or less.[13] Having a university degree therefore increases the expected relative list position by 0.05. For the same candidate, the probability of being placed on a top list position is 0.16 if he has a university degree and 0.11 if he has secondary education or less. Hence, a university degree increases the probability of being placed on a top position by 0.05.[14]

Figure 3 shows the results from regressing candidates' list placement on indicators of their household income. The reference category are candidates with an income of CHF 4,000 or less. Looking at all party lists, candidates with an income between CHF 8,000 and 10,000, and perhaps also candidates with an income between CHF 10,001 and 12,000, appear to be more likely than candidates with an income of CHF 4,000 or less to be placed on a top list position. For a male, 43-years-old candidate on an average list, the probability of being placed on a top list position is 0.17 if the candidate has an income between CHF 8,000 and 10,000, 0.16 if he has an income between CHF 10,001 and 12,000, and 0.09 if he has an income of CHF 4,000 or less. Hence, having a household income between CHF 8,000 and 10,000 increases the probability of being placed on a top position by 0.08, while having an income between CHF 10,001 and 12,000 increases that probability by 0.07. As can be seen in the bottom-right panel, it becomes less certain that these income categories have a positive effect when the

[13] Male is the modal value and 43 the median age among the candidates in the sample.

[14] These numbers are calculated based on the estimates I obtained from fitting the models to all party lists in the data set. Using instead the estimates obtained from fitting the models to the unconstrained lists leads to similar results: the expected relative list position is 0.56 for the candidate with a university degree and 0.52 for the candidate with secondary education or less (so the difference is 0.04); the probability of being placed on a top list position is 0.19 for a candidate with a university degree and 0.15 for a candidate with secondary education or less (the difference is 0.04).

Figure 2: Results from regressing candidates' list placement on indicators of their education



Note: The figure shows the means and 95% highest posterior density (HPD) intervals of the posterior distributions of the intercept and the coefficients for the candidate education variables. Top-left panel: the dependent variable is the relative position of a candidate on the party list and the model is fit to all party lists (sample size: $N_{lists} = 287$ and $N_{cand} = 1{,}630$). Top-right panel: the dependent variable is the indicator for top list positions and the model is fit to all party lists (sample size: $N_{lists} = 287$ and $N_{cand} = 1{,}630$). Bottom-left panel: the dependent variable is the relative list position and the model is fit only to those party lists or subsets of lists that are not subject to a list placement constraint (sample size: $N_{lists} = 168$ and $N_{cand} = 928$). Bottom-right panel: the dependent variable is the indicator for top list positions and the model is fit only to those party lists or subsets of lists that are not subject to a list placement constraint (sample size: $N_{lists} = 168$ and $N_{cand} = 928$). The reference category are candidates with secondary education or less. Party list random effects are not shown in the figure.

analysis is based only on party lists or subsets of lists that are not subject to a list placement constraint. All other candidates are neither more nor less likely than the reference candidates to be placed on a high list position.

Figure 3: Results from regressing candidates' list placement on indicators of their household income



Note: The figure shows the means and 95% highest posterior density (HPD) intervals of the posterior distributions of the intercept and the coefficients for the household income variables. Top-left panel: the dependent variable is the relative position of a candidate on the party list and the model is fit to all party lists (sample size: $N_{lists} = 284$ and $N_{cand} = 1{,}491$). Top-right panel: the dependent variable is the indicator for top list positions and the model is fit to all party lists (sample size: $N_{lists} = 284$ and $N_{cand} = 1{,}491$). Bottom-left panel: the dependent variable is the relative list position and the model is fit only to those party lists or subsets of lists that are not subject to a list placement constraint (sample size: $N_{lists} = 163$ and $N_{cand} = 865$). Bottom-right panel: the dependent variable is the indicator for top list positions and the model is fit only to those party lists or subsets of lists that are not subject to a list placement constraint (sample size: $N_{lists} = 163$ and $N_{cand} = 865$). The reference category are candidates with a household income of CHF 4,000 or less. Party list random effects are not shown in the figure.

Finally, Figure 4 presents the estimates obtained from regressing candidates' list placement on indicators of their social class. The reference category are candidates who belong to the routine working class. My results show that candidates

from the skilled working class or the core middle class are likely to have a higher relative list position than candidates from the routine working class, although the uncertainty around the estimates is quite large when the analysis is based on lists that are not subject to a list placement constraint. Members of the skilled working class or the core middle class are also more likely than members of the routine working class to be placed on a top list position. Regarding the size of the effects, a male, 43-years-old candidate on an average list has an expected relative list position of 0.53 if he is a member of the skilled working class or the core middle class and an expected relative position of 0.42 if he is a member of the routine working class. Belonging to the skilled working class or the core middle class thus increases the expected relative position on a list by 0.11. In other words, on a list with ten seats, skilled working-class and core middle-class candidates can expect to be placed one position higher than routine working-class candidates who are otherwise similar to them.[15] Considering again a male, 43-years-old candidate on an average list, the probability of being placed on a top list position is 0.18 if the candidate is a member of the skilled working class, 0.17 if he is a member of the core middle class, and 0.1 if he comes from the routine working class. Belonging to one of the former two classes thus increases the probability of being placed on a top list position by 0.08 and 0.07, respectively.[16] Unlike skilled working-class and core middle-class candidates, upper middle-class candidates are hardly more likely than routine working-class candidates to have a higher relative list position or to be placed on a top list position.

Hence, the data provide the strongest support for Hypothesis 3. Parties are more likely to assign higher list positions to candidates from the skilled working class or the core middle class than to candidates from the routine working class. Candidates from the upper middle class, in contrast, are no more likely to be assigned higher positions than candidates from the routine working class. I also

[15]Note that the median party list had 15 seats in the 2007 election to the National Council.

[16]The numbers in the text are calculated based on the estimates obtained from fitting the models to all party lists. Using instead the estimates obtained from fitting the models to the unconstrained lists leads to similar results: the expected relative list position for the same candidate is 0.6 if he is a member of the skilled working class, 0.59 if he is a member of the core middle class, and 0.52 if he is a member of the routine working class (so the difference to the reference candidate is 0.08 and 0.07, respectively); the probability of being placed on a top list position is 0.22 if the candidate is a member of the skilled working class, 0.23 if he is a member of the core middle class, and 0.09 if he is a member of the routine working class (so the difference to the reference candidate is 0.13 and 0.14, respectively).

Figure 4: Results from regressing candidates' list placement on indicators of their social class



Note: The figure shows the means and 95% highest posterior density (HPD) intervals of the posterior distributions of the intercept and the coefficients for the social class variables. Top-left panel: the dependent variable is the relative position of a candidate on the party list and the model is fit to all party lists (sample size: $N_{lists} = 217$ and $N_{cand} = 653$). Top-right panel: the dependent variable is the indicator for top list positions and the model is fit to all party lists (sample size: $N_{lists} = 217$ and $N_{cand} = 653$). Bottom-left panel: the dependent variable is the relative list position and the model is fit only to those party lists or subsets of lists that are not subject to a list placement constraint (sample size: $N_{lists} = 114$ and $N_{cand} = 362$). Bottom-right panel: the dependent variable is the indicator for top list positions and the model is fit only to those party lists or subsets of lists that are not subject to a list placement constraint (sample size: $N_{lists} = 114$ and $N_{cand} = 362$). The reference category are candidates from the routine working class. Party list random effects are not shown in the figure.

find evidence in support of Hypothesis 1. Parties are more likely to assign higher list position to candidates with university education than to candidates with secondary education, but the magnitude of the effect is rather limited. Finally, there is little support for Hypotheses 2. The household income of candidates tends to be unrelated to list placement. To the extent that there is an effect, parties appear to favor candidates with above-average incomes, i.e., incomes between CHF 8,000 and 10,000 or between CHF 10,001 and 12,000, but this does not hold for candidates in the highest income category, i.e., those with incomes of more than CHF 12,000.

Conclusion

One explanation for why government policy in advanced democracies tends to be more responsive to the preferences of affluent citizens than to those of less affluent citizens is that most elected politicians are themselves well-off. This raises the question why less affluent voters do not more often elect representatives who are more similar to them. There are three potential mechanisms that may explain why democratic elections fail to produce more descriptively representative parliaments. The first mechanism is that voters might prefer to vote for candidates who are better off than they themselves are. The second mechanism is that less affluent citizens might be less likely than affluent citizens to run for elective office. The third mechanism, finally, is that parties might favor better-off candidates over less well-off candidates.

While previous literature has mostly focused on the first of the above mechanisms, the goal of this paper was to explore the third mechanism. Hence, my research question was: do parties favor candidates who are more affluent in the candidate nomination process? To answer this question, I relied on data from the 2007 election to the Swiss National Council. My results showed that parties are likely to allocate favorable list positions to candidates who are fairly well-off. Specifically, parties favor candidates preferred by voters, which are candidates who come from the skilled working class or the core middle class rather than the routine working class (or the upper middle class), and candidates who are competent and hence well educated. This suggests that party bias in the candidate nomination process is one factor contributing to the descriptive misrepresentation by income and social class that is so common in current democracies.

There are a number of issues that I would like to address in the next iteration of this paper. First, district magnitude varies considerably across Swiss cantons and it seems likely that the value of a high position on a party list is positively related to the number of candidates on that list. In other words, we would expect that as the number of candidates on a list increases, it becomes more important for favored candidates to be placed higher on the list. To account for potentially heterogeneous effects of candidate education, income, and social class, I will allow the coefficients of these variables to vary as a function of the number of seats on the party list.

Second, it is also possible that the effects of candidate education, income, and class on list placement depend on the ideological position (and perhaps the professionalization) of the party. Therefore, I will allow the coefficients of these variables to vary not only as a function of the number of seats on the party list but also as a function of party ideology (professionalization).

Third, the paper in its current version relies on the assumption that the positive association between list position on electoral success that I uncovered on the basis of the constrained party lists also holds for the set of unconstrained party lists, which I use to estimate the effects of candidate education, income, and class on list placement. To make this assumption more credible, I will have to show that there are no systematic differences in observable characteristics between the two data sets. If it turns out that these data sets differ, I will have to use post-stratification weights in the first step of my analysis.

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