UNEQUAL DEMOCRACIES

Working paper n°6

March, 2019

Paper Stones Revisited:
Class Voting, Unionization and the Electoral Decline of the Mainstream Left

Line Rennwald (University of Geneva)
Line.Rennwald@unige.ch

Jonas Pontusson (University of Geneva)
jonas.pontusson@unige.ch

FACULTÉ DES SCIENCES DE LA SOCIÉTÉ
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

European Research Council
Established by the European Commission

UNIVERSITÉ DE GENÈVE

ABSTRACT:

Relying on post-election surveys, this paper analyzes how class and union membership condition voters' abandonment of mainstream Left parties and the alternatives chosen by former mainstream-Left voters in the period 2001-15. Inspired by Przeworski and Sprague's Paper Stones (1986), our analysis shows that Left parties face a trade-off between mobilizing workers and other voters and that unionization renders workers more loyal to Left parties that mobilize non-workers. By contrast, unionization does not render non-workers more loyal to Left parties that mobilize workers. Union membership increases the likelihood that workers who abandon the mainstream Left continue to vote. It also increases the likelihood that voters abandon the mainstream Left in favor of radical Left and Green parties rather than Center-Right parties. Finally, we show that workers are more likely to abandon mainstream Left parties in favor of radical Right parties than non-workers and that union membership does not affect their propensity to do so. We conclude that reversing the decline of working-class organization should be a long-term objective of mainstream Left parties.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:

The research for and write-up of this paper have been supported by the European Research Council (Grant Agreement no. 741538). Earlier versions of the paper were presented at the Annual Conference of the European Political Science Association (Milan 2017), the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (San Francisco 2017), the Norwegian Institute for Social Research (Oslo, 2018), the Swedish Institute for Social Research (Stockholm, 2018), the Institute of Political Science at the University of Bern (2018), the European University Institute (Fiesole, 2018) and a workshop at the University of Geneva (2018). For insightful comments, we wish to thank John Ahlquist, Christoph Arndt, Paul Bauer, Björn Bremer, Reto Bürgisser, Henning Finseeras, Daniel Oesch, Nadja Mosimann, Adam Przeworski and Magnus Bergli Rasmussen.

It is commonplace to construe recent elections in liberal democracies as a struggle between, on the one hand, establishment politicians and parties and, on the other hand, "populist challengers." In this paper, we focus on another feature of recent elections in liberal democracies: the decline of support for mainstream Left parties. The most dramatic instance of this phenomenon is the collapse of the Greek Socialist Party (PASOK), whose vote share fell from 43.9% in 2009 to 12.3% in 2012 and then to 6.3% in 2015. Other recent cases of electoral collapse of the mainstream Left include Iceland, France and the Netherlands. In Iceland, the vote share of the Social Democratic Alliance fell from 29.8% in 2009 to 12.9% in 2013, dropped again in 2016 (to 6.6%) and almost regained its 2013 level in 2017 (12.1%). In the French and Dutch elections of 2017, the mainstream Left suffered setbacks of similar magnitude, with the vote share of the French Socialists falling from 29.4% to 7.4% (first-round parliamentary elections) and the vote share of the Dutch Labor Party falling from 24.8% to 5.7%. Though less dramatic in other countries, the vote share of mainstream Left parties, defined as reformist parties that have historically prioritized the mobilization of working-class voters, has declined in all liberal democracies since the 1990s.

Seeking to shed light on the decline of mainstream Left parties, we present the results of two separate analyses of election surveys. Restricted to survey respondents who voted for the mainstream Left in the previous election, the first analysis addresses the question of who has abandoned the mainstream Left. Restricted to survey respondents who voted for the mainstream Left in the previous election but not in the election that just occurred, the second analysis addresses the question of where former mainstream-Left voters have gone. The data for both analyses come from the Comparative Study of

Electoral Systems (CSES). As Module 1 of the CSES does not include the retrospective voting question that allows us to identify the relevant sample of survey respondents, we rely exclusively on surveys from Modules 2-4. Having dropped a few surveys for lack of data on independent variables of interest, our dataset consists of 40 elections in 16 countries countries over the period 2001-15.[1]

Our theoretical framework and empirical analyses are inspired by *Paper Stones*, the classic 1986 book by Adam Przeworski and John Sprague. Famously, Przeworski and Sprague (1986) argue that reformist socialist parties face an electoral dilemma: they need the support of middle-class strata and other non-workers in order to obtain a parliamentary majority, but they tend to loose working-class support when they pursue catch-all strategies. Przeworski and Sprague argue further that unions reinforce the class identity of workers and thereby mitigate the electoral dilemma of socialist parties. Following Przeworki and Sprague, we might reasonably expect that union decline—a pervasive trend across OECD countries over the last 20-30 years (see Pontusson 2013)—renders the trade-off between working-class and middle-class support more severe and that this accounts for some of the electoral difficulties that mainstream Left parties are currently experiencing.

To anticipate, our analyses rely on the occupation-based class schema proposed by Oesch (2006). Adopting a broader definition of the working class than Przeworski and Sprague's, we estimate the class profile of new voters for Left parties and explore how this variable affects the propensity of workers and non-workers—primarily middle-class voters—to abandon the mainstream Left. Our analysis suggests that working-class voters are more likely to abandon Left parties that mobilize relatively few working-class

voters and that non-workers are more likely to abandon Left parties that primarily mobilize working-class voters. Interacting union membership with the class identity of previous voters and the class profile of new voters, we find that union membership indeed makes workers less likely to abandon Left parties when these parties appeal to non-workers. On the other hand, and counter-intuitively, our results suggest that unionized middle-class voters are particularly prone to abandon Left parties that mobilize working-class voters.

The results of our analysis of the behavior of voters who have abandoned the mainstream Left leavers can be summarized as follows. Controlling for union membership, workers who abandon the mainstream Left are more likely to abstain from voting and to vote for radical Right parties while they are less likely to vote for mainstream Center-Right parties and for Greens that non-workers who abandon the mainstream Left. Among working-class leavers, union membership is associated with a lower probability of abstention and a higher probability of voting for radical Left parties. Among non-workers who abandon the mainstream Left, union membership is associated with a lower probability of voting for mainstream Center-Right parties and, again, with a higher probability of voting for radical Left parties.

Two limitations of our empirical analysis should be noted at the outset. First, the most recent elections included in the CSES data on which we rely took place in 2015. Hence our analysis fails to capture the recent rise of radical Right parties as direct competitors to mainstream Left parties in some countries. Secondly, our data only allows us to analyze short-term voter trajectories, i.e., changes in voting behavior from election to the next. It may be that some of the voters who we identify as "leavers" subsequently

returned to the mainstream Left or that they subsequently moved to parties other than those that we identify as their "destination." For example, Evans and Mellon's (2016) analysis of British panel data shows that the Conservatives lost more votes to UKIP than Labour did in 2015, but many UKIP voters were former Labour voters who either did not vote or voted for the Conservatives in 2010.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We begin by documenting the decline of mainstream Left parties and then elaborate on the core arguments in *Paper Stones*. In the third section, we explain the class categories that we use in our empirical analyses, introduce our measure of the class profile of new Left-party voters, and present descriptive data on the class composition of electorates and unionization by social class as well as the class profile of new Left-party voters. While Section 4 analyzes how class profiles affect the propensity of different voters to abandon the mainstream Left, Section 5 addresses the question of where the leavers have gone. And then we conclude.

1. The electoral decline of the mainstream Left

For nineteen liberal democracies, Table 1 tracks the electoral decline of mainstream Left parties based on official election results.[2] The first column records the post-war election year in which the vote share of the mainstream Left party peaked and the second column records the year of the most recent election.[3] In the following three columns, we adjust for extraordinary elections by reporting the average vote share of the mainstream Left party over two elections: (1) for the peak election and the immediately following election; (2) for the best two elections in the 1990s; and (3) for the two most

recent elections. Finally, the last two columns of Table 1 report on changes in the average vote share from the 1990s to the most recent elections, with change measured first in percentage points and then as a percentage of the 1990s vote share.

For heuristic purposes, we sort countries (parties) into five groups. The first group consists of the three countries in which Social Democrats most successfully mobilized working-class voters in the wake of democratization: Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Aided by the fragmentation of the Center-Right (Castles 1978), the mainstream Left held a position of political dominance for several decades in these countries. The second group consists of countries in which Left parties became one of the two main electoral contenders in the post-war period, competing with a united Center-Right party. This characterization applies to the Anglophone Labour parties, operating under more or less majoritarian electoral rules, but also to the Austrian and German Social Democrats. The common characteristic of the third group of countries is that Left parties have always faced strong competition from at least two Center-Right parties. The fourth group consists of Southern European countries in which Socialists parties made dramatic electoral advances in the 1980s, emerging as one the two main electoral contenders and, in the Greek and Spanish cases, briefly appeared to be on the verge of becoming dominant parties.[4] Finally, Iceland and Italy constitute special cases in that their mainstream Left parties reconstituted themselves in the early 2000s, rendering over-time comparisons of electoral performance less straightforward.[5]

[Table 1]

For our purposes, the most striking feature of Table 1 is that the average vote share of all mainstream Left parties, regardless of their past performance, fell from the

1990s to the most recent elections. Averaging across the nineteen countries included in Table 1, the vote share of the mainstream Left fell by 10.3 percentage points from the best two elections of 1990s to the two most recent elections. It should come as no surprise that when change is measured in percentage points, small parties have generally done better than large parties. When we instead measure change relative to initial levels, the Greek Socialists and the Icelandic Social Democratic Alliance stand out as the mainstream Left parties that have done worst at the polls, followed by the Portuguese Socialists and the Dutch Labor Party. At the other end of the spectrum, British and Irish Labour, along with the Belgian and Swiss Socialists, stand out as the parties whose vote shares have held up best.[6]

Aggregating our survey data for the period 2001-15 provides another way to illustrate recent electoral difficulties of mainstream Left parties. Pooling the 40 election surveys on which we draw, 32% of mainstream-Left voters in the previous election either abstained from voting or voted for another party while 26% of mainstream-Left voters in the current election were newcomers. By comparison, electoral support for Center-Right parties was considerably more stable in the period 2001-15, with only 19% of their voters leaving and newcomers accounting for 21% of their electorate.[7] While newcomers outnumbered leavers by two percentage points for Center-Right parties, leavers outnumbered newcomers by six percentage points for mainstream Left parties.

One other feature of Table 1 deserves to be noted: setting aside the special cases of Iceland and Italy, all but one of the mainstream Left parties whose vote shares are recorded in this table peaked well before the 1990s and suffered substantial vote-share losses from their peak to the 1990s. The electoral decline of the mainstream Left that

occurred over the period covered by our analysis represents the continuation of a trend that dates back to the 1970s (see Rennwald 2015). Arguably, the recent rise of right-wing populist parties with a strong working-class base should be seen as a late manifestation—rather than the cause—of the electoral decline of the mainstream Left. Be that as it may, it seems clear that mainstream Left parties have struggled more than other mainstream parties in recent elections.

2. *Paper Stones* revisited

The analytical history of electoral socialism presented in in *Paper Stones* (1986) proceeds from the "constructivist"—or Gramscian—proposition that the rhetoric and activities of political parties determine the voting behavior of individuals. For Przeworski and Sprague, there is nothing natural about politics being organized on the basis of class divisions in society. In their words, "the claims of workers are particularistic, and when workers organize as a class they seek to impose upon the entire society the image of classes, each endowed with particularistic interests." By contrast, capitalists represent themselves as a class "only in moments of folly." Their response to the particularistic claims of the working class "is not a particularism of the bourgeoisie but ideologies which deny altogether the salience of class interests, either by posing a universalistic model of society composed of individual-citizens whose interests are in harmony or by evoking alternative particularisms of religion, language, ethnicity, etc." In short, the salience of class for politics and, in particular, for the political behavior of workers depends on the presence of political parties that seek to mobilize workers as a class (Przeworski and Sprague 1986, 8–10).

Przeworski and Sprague proceed to document that, contrary to the expectations of Marx and other 19th-century socialist thinkers, the development of industrial capitalism did not usher in the demise of the middle classes and the proletarianization of society as a whole. Farmers, shopkeepers and other small businessmen were displaced, but they were replaced by new middle classes as well as manual workers. According to Przeworski and Sprague's census-based estimates for seven West European countries, manual workers as a proportion of the electorate peaked some time between 1900 and 1950. Workers constituted just about 50% of the Belgian electorate in the early 1920s, but their share of the electorate never exceeded 40% in the other six countries (Przeworski and Sprague 1986, 39).

Recognizing that the mobilization of working-class voters could not possibly deliver the electoral majority required to implement systemic reforms by democratic means, socialist parties began to court other electoral constituencies—in the first instance, small farmers and farm laborers, but also, increasingly, the new middle classes. In pursuing what Przeworski and Sprague refer to as "supra-class strategies," they abandoned or, at least, postponed some of their more radical transformative ambitions. This is a familiar story and its retelling by Przeworski and Sprague is not terribly distinctive. What makes *Paper Stones* an exciting and important book is the light that it sheds on the following puzzle: firmly committed to democratic principles and pursuing supraclass strategies, socialist parties have only rarely succeeded in mobilizing a majority of voters. Their rapid rise in the wake of democratization was followed, from the 1940s onwards, by a long period of electoral stagnation. Przeworski and Sprague's explanation of this stagnation boils down to the following proposition: seeking to mobilize support

among non-workers by making supra-class appeals, socialist parties undermine the salience of class to workers and thereby enable other political parties to compete for the working-class vote.

Analyzing aggregate voting patterns from 1900 to 1980, Przeworski and Sprague identify a persistent trade-off: as socialist parties have gained support among other classes, they have invariably lost support among workers. Their analysis also shows that the steepness of this trade-off varies considerably across countries and, as a result, so does the "carrying capacity" of socialist parties. Historically, the trade-offs faced by Danish, Norwegian and Swedish Social Democrats have been less steep than the trade-offs faced by their Belgian, Finnish, French and German counterparts. Put differently, the Scandinavian parties suffered smaller losses among working-class voters as they expanded their electoral base beyond the working class.

Seeking to explain cross-national variation in the steepness of the electoral trade-off, Przeworski and Sprague invoke the presence of rival parties that appeal to workers on the basis of class or some other "particularistic" identity as a source of vulnerability for socialist parties that pursue supra-class strategies. While their discussion focuses on competition between socialist and communist parties, they also suggest that the existence of "confessional, linguistic and ethnic parties" render socialist parties vulnerable to working-class defections (Przeworski and Sprague 1986, 74). However, Przeworski and Sprague's main explanation of variation in the steepness of the trade-off has to do with unionization. Unions, they argue, serve to sustain the class identity of workers and thereby reduce the need for socialist parties to emphasize class politics in order to preserve the electoral support of workers. According to Przeworski and Sprague, the

union effect on the electoral trade-off faced by socialist parties is particularly strong when union membership in concentrated in a single confederation and when collective bargaining is centralized.[8]

As noted by Sainsbury (1990), Przeworski and Sprague's empirical analysis proceeds from a narrow and arguably old-fashioned conceptualization of the working class as consisting exclusively of manual workers employed in mining, manufacturing, construction, transport and agriculture. Sainsbury (1990, 34) also points that Przeworski and Sprague's analysis does not involve any direct observations of the proportion of workers voting socialist. Instead, Przeworski and Sprague estimate this critical parameter based on the proportion of workers within the population eligible to vote and official election results.

Our individual-level analysis of survey data is meant to complement Przeworski and Sprague's macro-level historical analysis of election results, but also to address the concerns raised by Sainsbury. Analyzing survey data allows us to observe the class profile of Left party electorates directly and to assess whether or not working-class voters become less loyal supporters of Left parties as these parties mobilize other voters. As we explain below, we pursue this strategy based on a definition of the working class that is considerable broader than Przeworski and Sprague's definition. We also seek to break new ground by exploring the effects of union membership among middle-class voters, departing from Przeworski and Sprague's conceptualization of unionization as exclusively a working-class phenomenon. In many of the countries included in our analysis, unionization of white-collar professionals became widespread in the 1970s and

1980s and has held up better than unionization of production and service workers since the 1980s.

In principle, the trade-off argument pertains to voters switching to Left parties as well as voters abandoning Left parties. For the time period covered by our analysis, it makes sense to focus on voters leaving the mainstream Left. The core hypothesis that we derive from *Paper Stones* is that workers are less likely to abandon the mainstream Left parties than other voters when these parties actively appeal to working-class voters and, conversely, that they are more likely to abandon the mainstream Left parties when they do not target the electoral appeals in this fashion. Also derived from the argumentation of Przeworski and Sprague, our second hypothesis is that unionized workers are less responsive to the class profile of the mainstream Left parties than workers who are not union members (i.e., less likely to abandon the mainstream Left when its working-class profile is weak).

As for the effects of unionization among middle-class voters, we do not have strong prior expectations, but it seems reasonable to suppose that unionization renders middle-class voters as well as working-class voters more likely to vote for Left parties and, by extension, more loyal to these parties. More tentatively, we hypothesize, again, that unionization renders such voters less responsive to the class profile of Left parties: in other words, that unionized middle-class voters are less likely to abandon Left parties with a strong working-class profile than middle-class voters who are not union members.

Leaving individual-level implications aside for the time being, Przeworski and Sprague's argumentation suggests that unionization affects the carrying capacity or, in other words, the long-term vote share of Left parties. Plotting changes in the average

vote share of Left parties from the 1990s to the two most recent elections against changes in union density from 1990 to 2013 (as recorded by Visser 2016), there does not appear to be any association whatsoever between these two developments. As reported in Table 2, however, the picture changes if we estimate a simple OLS regression model with a couple of dummy variables as controls. The first dummy variable takes the value of 1 for countries in which mainstream Left parties have not faced sustained competition from the radical Right or the radical Left (Australia, New Zealand and the UK). The second dummy variable takes the value of 1 for countries that experienced a sharp economic downturn while the mainstream Left party held the office of Prime Minister in 2008-11 (Iceland, Greece, Portugal, Spain and the UK). When both of these variables are included in the model, the absence of radical competitors is associated with a smaller decline in the vote share, the combination of incumbency and crisis is associated with a larger decline in the vote share and, most importantly for our purposes, a one-percentage-point decline in union density is associated with a vote-share decline of nearly half a percentage point. Given the small number of observations, these results should be taken with a grain of salt, but they suggest that union decline might indeed be a factor behind the electoral decline of mainstream Left parties.[9]

[Table 2]

3. Class membership of voters and class profiles of parties

Social class is the critical individual-level variable for our analysis of where mainstream-Left voters have gone as well as our analysis of who has abandoned the

mainstream Left. Identifying voters as members of social classes also provides the basis for the party-level measure of working-class mobilization that we will employ to test the hypotheses set out above.

In identifying election-survey respondents as members of social classes, we rely on the occupational class schema proposed by Oesch (2006). The Oesch schema distinguishes classes—or class segments—based on work logics as well as skills and the nature of employment contracts. The vertical dimension—labor market status—serves to distinguish between employers and self-employed, on the one hand, and employees, on the other hand, and then to distinguish two broad classes of employees: the middle class and the working class. The horizontal dimension in turn serves to identify three distinct segments of the middle class and the working class. In Oesch's terminology, the middle class consists of managers, technical experts and socio-cultural professionals while the working class consists of clerical staff, production workers and service workers. Again on the vertical dimension, Oesch distinguishes further between more and less skilled members of these six "classes." For example, he distinguishes between professionals and semi-professionals and between skilled and routine workers (in services as well as production).

As documented by Oesch (2006) and many others, low-skilled individuals employed in services occupy disadvantageous positions in the labor market that are comparable to (or worse than) the positions of production workers in terms of job security, occupational status and earnings. While these individuals are less likely to be unionized and may be less likely to self-identify as "working class" than production workers, they are surely part of the working class as defined by objective criteria. In our

view, "clerical staff" constitutes a more heterogeneous occupational category and assigning all individuals in this category to "the working class" stretches the latter concept too far. For the purposes of this paper, we define "the working class" as production and service workers and categorize clerical staff, along with middle-class professionals, managers, farmers and businessmen, as "non-workers."

Thus conceived, "non-workers" constitute a broad swath of the electorate and it seems quite plausible to suppose that some non-workers will be more attracted to parties with a strong working-class profile than others (and that workers will find some cross-class appeals more acceptable than others). In particular, an extensive literature, spearheaded by Kitschelt (1994) and Kriesi (1998), emphasizes the importance of socio-cultural professionals as an electoral constituency that has become increasingly important to Left parties since the 1970s (see also Kitschelt and Rehm 2014, 2015; Häusermann and Kriesi 2015; Gingrich and Häusermann 2015). The core claim of this literature is that socio-cultural work ("people processing") makes people more disposed in favor progressive positions on the distributive dimension as well as the cultural dimension of politics and that socio-cultural professionals constitute a natural ally of workers in the domain of redistributive politics. As recognized by several contributions to the literature, the fact that socio-cultural professionals commonly work in the public sector arguably provides another, more "self-interested," basis for the apparent alignment of socio-cultural professionals with the working class as core constituencies of mainstream Left parties over the last two or three decades. Though the aforementioned literature does not quite put it this way, it would seem to predict that socio-cultural professionals will be more attracted to Left parties with a working-class profile than other middle-class voters.

In keeping with the "worker-centric" framework of *Paper Stones*, we begin by estimating the trade-off between mobilizing workers and non-workers and then explore whether or not socio-cultural professionals respond differently to working-class mobilization than other non-workers. The category "non-workers" could, of course, be disaggregated further—as, indeed, could the category "workers"—but we do not have any strong theoretical reasons for doing so and it is not our goal, in this paper, to contribute to the empirical literature on occupation and vote choice.

Table 3 presents our CSES-based estimates of the distribution of the total electorate sorted into three categories: workers, socio-cultural professionals and other non-workers.[10] By our definition, the working class constitutes, on average, 33% of the electorate in the 16 countries included in our analysis. Australia and Switzerland stand out as the countries with the smallest working classes. In the other 14 countries, the working-class share of the electorate ranges between 27% (Greece) and 43% (Finland). Consistent with Przeworski and Sprague, the working class is nowhere close to an electoral majority, but it represents a large electoral constituency, which Left parties ignore at their peril. As shown in Table 3, socio-cultural professionals constitute, on average, 17% of the electorate. Setting the exceptional case of Spain aside, their share of the electorate ranges between 14% and 25%. Averaging across the 16 countries, voters who are neither workers nor socio-cultural professionals constitute 50% the electorate, but workers and socio-cultural professionals together constitute an electoral majority in 10 countries.[11]

[Table 3]

Table 4 in turn presents CSES-based estimates of unionization by social class. In most countries, workers are more likely to be union members than other non-workers, but this is not the case for France, Spain, Switzerland and the UK. More strikingly, the rate of unionization of socio-cultural professionals is equivalent to or higher than the rate of unionization among production and service workers in all but one country (Norway). Averaging across the 16 countries, the rate of unionization for socio-cultural professionals exceeds the rate of unionization for production and service workers by 5 percentage points.

[Table 4]

In the first set of analyses presented below, we explore electoral trade-offs by analysing how the class profile of new voters that mainstream Left parties attract conditions the probability that members of different classes will abandon these parties. Our measure of the class profile of new voters is the percentage of workers (as defined above) in the party's intake of new voters divided by the (election-specific) percentage of workers in the (potential) electorate as a whole. This ratio takes a value greater than 1 if the workers are overrepresented among new voters, relative to their share of the electorate, and a value of less than 1 if workers are underrepresented among new voters. (New voters may be either first-time voters or voters who switched to the party in the election that just occurred).

As background, Table 5 provides descriptive data on our measure of working-class mobilization, which ranges from .75 for the British Labour Party in the election of 2015 to 2.08 for the Greek Socialists in the election of 2012. The Greek figure is problematic because 2012 was a catastrophic election for the Greek socialists and only

two new socialist voters were recorded in the election survey (one of whom was a service worker and the other an office clerk). For this reason, we will drop Greece 2012 from our analysis of electoral trade-offs. The score for the Finnish Social Democrats in 2011 (1.52) thus becomes the maximum value of our measure of working-class mobilization. Australian Labour, New Zealand Labour and the Swedish Social Democrats stand out as the mainstream Left parties that have most consistently mobilized more workers than non-workers over the period 2001-15.[12]

[Table 5]

Following Przeworski and Sprague (1986) as well as recent literature that emphasizes "supply-side" explanations of class voting (e.g. Evans and De Graaf 2013; Rennwald and Evans 2014; Rennwald 2015), we assume that the class composition of new voters reflects, at least in part, the electoral strategies that Left parties pursue and that old as well as new Left party voters respond to the appeals that these parties make during electoral campaigns. Parties seeking to appeal to working-class voters are likely to emphasize different issues in their election campaigns and to position themselves differently on some issues than parties seeking to appeal to middle-class voters. It is tempting to assume that Left parties that seek mobilize workers will be more "leftist" in their programmatic orientation, at least with respect to policies with important distributive implications, but it is important to keep in mind, we think, that Labour and Social Democratic parties that successfully mobilized working-class majorities in the post-war era often did so on the basis of quite moderate political platforms. Arguably, moderate and leftist policy proposals alike might be framed in more or less "workerist"

terms and the framing of policies may be as important as the policies themselves (cf. Thau 2017).

4. How previous voters respond to the class composition of new voters

As noted at the outset, we rely on harmonized national post-election surveys assembled by the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) to analyze determinants of individual decisions to abandon the mainstream Left and then to explore, in the next section, where the leavers have gone. Both sets of analyses are restricted to survey respondents who, by their own account, voted for the mainstream Left in the previous election (i.e., the election prior to the one that just occurred).[13] With nested data and dependent variables that are dichotomous, we follow the standard practice of estimating hierarchical logistic regression models, with country-elections as the level-2 units. We also include country dummies to take account of the fact that for many countries we have data for more than one election.

In our first set of analyses, the dependent variable takes the value 1 for respondents who did not vote for the mainstream Left party in the election that just took place and zero for those who again voted for the mainstream Left party. At the individual level, the independent variables of theoretical interest are social class and union membership. Based on Oesch's (2006) occupation-based classification scheme, we first use a dummy variable for production and service workers to capture the class affiliation of survey respondents, with non-workers as the reference category, and then introduce a second dummy to capture the distinction between socio-cultural professionals and other

non-workers. Union membership is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for survey respondents who belong to a union. As explained above, our core hypotheses concern the interaction of class and union membership with the class profile of mainstream Left parties' electoral strategies and we use the relative representation of workers among new voters as a proxy for this variable. Centered at its mean value, the class-profile variable ranges from -0.30 to 0.46 once we drop the 2012 Greek election (on account of the small number of new PASOK voters).

Our regression models include individual-level controls for age, gender, education and residence (village, small or medium city, suburbs, large city).[14] These are standard socio-demographic control variables that have been shown to be relevant predictors for mainstream Left voting, but we do not have strong theoretical expectations as to how they might affect probabilities of abandoning the mainstream or the trajectories of voters who abandon the mainstream Left.

To take account of options available to voters who consider abandoning the mainstream Left party, we include the vote shares of Radical Left, Radical Right and Green parties in the previous election as macro-level variables. (Voting for a mainstream Center-Right party is always an option). In addition, we include a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the mainstream Left party was in government going into the election and another dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for elections during or immediately following the crisis of 2008-10 if (a) the mainstream Left party held the office of prime minister at the time and (b) the crisis was very severe.[15]

Our first set of models distinguishes between workers and non-workers and interacts the dummy for working-class respondent with the class profile of new voters,

treating union membership as a control variable. With full regression results presented in Appendix 3, Figure 1 shows our estimates of the probabilities of workers and non-workers abandoning the mainstream Left conditional on the class profile of its new voters. Figure 2 in turn shows the average marginal effect of class (i.e., the effect of a respondent being a worker rather than a non-worker) on the probability of abandoning the mainstream Left party conditional on the degree to which the working-class voters are overrepresented among the party's new voters.

[Figures 1 and 2]

Figures 1 and 2 confirm that mainstream Left parties still face a trade-off between working-class support and middle-class support in the contemporary era and suggest that this trade-off stems as much, if not more, from middle-class aversion to Left parties that mobilize workers than working-class aversion to Left parties that mobilize non-workers. According to Figure 1, the average probability of workers and non-workers abandoning the mainstream Left party is roughly the same (30-32%) when workers are under-represented among new voters. As the working-class profile of new voters increases, workers become less likely to abandon the mainstream Left and, conversely, non-workers become more likely to abandon the mainstream Left. At the maximum value of working-class representation among new voters in our sample, non-workers are roughly 7 percentage points more likely to abandon the mainstream Left than non-workers (36% compared to 29%). The differences in the probability of workers or non-workers abandoning the mainstream Left across the range of values on the conditioning variable (class profile of new voters) do not clear conventional thresholds of statistical significance, but, as Figure 2 illustrates, the differences between workers and non-

workers are significant with 95% confidence for values greater than 0.1. Put differently, the responsiveness of workers and non-workers to the class profile of party appeals is statistically significant when these groups are considered jointly.[16]

Figure 3 replicates Figure 1 based on estimating a model that treats socio-cultural professionals as separate from other non-workers (see Appendix 5 for full regression results). In a nutshell, we find no evidence that socio-cultural professionals are less responsive to the class profile of party appeals than other non-workers. They seem to be just as prone as other non-workers to abandon Left parties that primarily mobilize workers.[17]

[Figure 3]

Turning to the role of unionization, the first thing to be noted is that all of our analyses yield a direct effect of union membership that is negative and highly significant. Everything else being equal, union members are less likely to abandon the mainstream Left than non-members. Sticking with the three-class set-up (i.e., treating socio-cultural professional as separate from other non-workers), we explore the role of unionization further by estimating a model with three-way interactions between respondents' class, union membership and representation of workers among new mainstream Left voters. Table 6 summarizes the results of this exercise (again, see Appendix 5 for full regression results). Consistent with Przeworski and Sprague's hypothesis, we find that unionization of production and service workers indeed mitigates the trade-off faced by mainstream Left parties: unionized workers are less likely to abandon mainstream Left parties when they appeal to non-workers than workers who are not union members. When Left parties primarily mobilize workers, the union effect among workers disappears, i.e., there is no

significant difference in the probability on union members and non-members to abandon the mainstream Left. Contrary to our expectations, however, middle-class unionization reinforces the trade-off faced by Left parties. Relative to non-members, socio-cultural professionals as well as other non-workers who are union members are less likely to abandon mainstream Left parties that primarily appeal to non-workers, but they are not less likely to abandon mainstream Left parties that primarily appeal to workers. This counter-intuitive union effect appears to be strongest for socio-cultural professionals in the sense that, for this category of non-workers, the association between union membership and loyalty to mainstream Left parties disappears already when workers are marginally over-represented among new voters. As we shall see in the next section, unionized non-workers, and especially unionized socio-cultural professionals, have a particular affinity for Greens and radical Left parties. Arguably, this is the main reason for the counter-intuitive effect of union membership on loyalty to mainstream Left parties that seek to mobilize workers.

[Table 6]

Based on a three-way interaction model that simply distinguishes between workers and non-workers (i.e., ignores the distinction between socio-cultural professionals and other non-workers), the left-hand panel of Figure 4 replicates Figure 1 for non-unionized respondents while the right-hand panel replicates it for unionized respondents.[18] With the difference in class-specific probabilities of abandoning the mainstream Left approaching 10 percentage points when over-representation of workers among new voters takes its maximum value, the trade-off between working-class and middle-class support is more pronounced than in Figure 1 when we only look at non-

unionized respondents. Comparing the two panels in Figure 4, it is immediately apparent not only that unionized respondents are less likely to abandon mainstream Left parties, regardless of the class profile of new voters, but also that the trade-off between working-class and middle-class support is much less steep among unionized respondents than among non-unionized respondents. (From a statistical point of view, the trade-off for unionized respondents is not significant by conventional standards). The difference in the steepness of the trade-offs appears to be primarily due to the loyalty of unionized working-class voters to Left parties that mobilize non-workers. In sum, our results indicate that *working-class de-unionization* does indeed reinforce the electoral dilemma identified by Przeworski and Sprague (1986), but this is not the case for middle-class de-unionization.

[Figure 4]

5. Where have the leavers gone?

We now turn to the question of where voters who abandoned the mainstream Left have gone or, more precisely, where they went at the time they abandoned the mainstream Left. As this analysis is restricted to "leavers," i.e., to survey respondents who say that they voted for the mainstream Left in the previous election and did not vote for the mainstream Left in the current election, the total number of observations is much smaller than in our analysis of the choice to abandon (or stay with) the mainstream Left.

We consider each of following options available to voters who abandon the mainstream Left: (1) non-voting, (2) vote for a Center-Right party, (3) vote for a Green

party, (4) vote for a radical Left party or (5) vote for a radical Right party. Pooling all 40 elections at our disposal, the distribution of choices by the 3,889 respondents who abandoned the mainstream Left is as follows: 45% voted for a Center-Right party, 16% voted for the radical Left, 16% abstained from voting, 15% voted for the Greens and 8% voted for the radical Right. The small number of leavers who turned to the radical Right comes as something of a surprise, but other studies (e.g., Evans and Mellon 2016) show that radical Right parties primarily draw voters from the Center-Right and that mainstream-Left leavers who end up voting for the radical Right commonly transition through the Center-Right. It should also be noted, again, that our dataset does not include very recent elections (in which radical Right parties have done well and have perhaps become more direct competitors of the mainstream Left).

As in the analysis of abandonment of the mainstream Left, we are interested in how class and union membership and the interaction between them shape the electoral behavior of individuals. Przeworski and Sprague's core argument is that supra-class strategies appeal to voters as individual citizens and thus turn workers into issue-oriented voters without strong partisan attachments (e.g., Przeworski and Sprague 1986, 51). The implication would seem to be that workers who abandon the mainstream Left might go anywhere and should not be expected to behave differently from non-workers. At the same time, however, Przeworski and Sprague (1986, 79) suggest that the existence of rival parties that appeal to workers on the basis of class or some other "particularistic" identity renders the mainstream Left more vulnerable when it adopts supra-class strategies.

Going beyond *Paper Stones*, there can be little doubt that working-class households have fared badly by comparison to middle-class households in terms of income growth and economic insecurity since the 1990s. Globalization in general and immigration in particular threaten the economic status of workers to a far greater extent than they threaten the economic status of middle-class professionals. Meanwhile, it seems to be generally true that the policy platforms on which mainstream Left parties have campaigned in elections (and implemented in government) have prioritized fiscal consolidation, at the expense of redistributive social spending, and structural reforms designed to promote labor-market flexibility, supplemented by "social investment."[19] Against this background, it seems reasonable to suppose that workers who abandon the mainstream Left do so with other options in mind than their middle-class counterparts. More specifically, we hypothesize that, relative to middle-class leavers, workers who abandon the mainstream Left are more likely to abstain from voting and more likely to vote for "anti-establishment parties" of the radical Left or the radical Right.[20]

We expect union membership to condition the effects of class. Many studies show that union members are more likely to vote and there is at least some evidence to suggest that the association between union membership and electoral participation is strongest for citizens with low socio-economic status (e.g., Kerrissey and Schofer 2013; Rosenfeld 2014). Other studies have shown that union membership is associated with support for redistribution (Mosimann and Pontusson 2017) and with support for immigration (Donnelly 2016). Drawing on these studies, we propose three additional hypotheses: (1) union membership reduces the propensity of workers who abandon the mainstream Left to abstain from voting; (2) union membership reduces the propensity of

workers who abandon the mainstream Left to vote for the radical Right; and (3) union membership increases the propensity of workers and non-workers to abandon the mainstream Left in favor of other Left parties.

For each of the five options identified above, we again estimate hierarchical logistic regression models, with country-elections as the level-2 units. The dependent variable in each of the models is dichotomous: choosing the option or not. The models include the individual-level control variables identified earlier. As the class profile of the mainstream Left party is no longer relevant, we do not include any macro variables in this analysis, but we do include country dummies and in estimating the models designed to predict voting for Greens, radical Left and radical Right, we drop elections in which such parties were not meaningful options.[21]

Sticking with three classes (workers, socio-cultural professionals and other non-workers) throughout the analyses, we begin by estimating models that do not interact class and union membership and then estimate models with interaction terms added. Reported in Appendix 8 the first set of models are less vulnerable to the small-N problem and, in any case, provide the most appropriate tests of our baseline hypotheses concerning differences between workers and non-workers who abandon the mainstream Left. Figure 5 summarizes the results for social class graphically. Relative to "other non-workers," workers who abandon the mainstream Left are more likely to abstain and to vote for the radical Right while they are less likely to vote for Greens and Center-Right parties. Against the same benchmark, socio-cultural professionals are less likely to vote for Center-Right parties and more likely to vote for Green parties.

[Figure 5]

Again, the effects of class displayed in Figure 5 derive from models that control for union membership, along with other individual-level characteristics. As shown in Table 7, the direct effects of union membership are straightforward and, with one exception, consistent with our expectations. Controlling for social class, union members who abandon the mainstream Left are less likely to stop voting and less likely to vote for the Center-Right. Simply put, union members who abandon mainstream Left parties are more likely to remain on the Left, broadly conceived, than leavers who are not union members. Note, however, that these results do not bear our expectation concerning the radical Right: union members who abandon the mainstream Left are as likely to vote for the radical Right as non-union members.

[Table 7]

Turning to the results of estimating interaction models, Table 8 presents the marginal effects of union membership on choosing one of the five options conditional on respondents' social class. Among workers who abandon the mainstream Left, union membership is associated with continued voting and with voting for radical Left parties. Again, contrary to our expectations, unionized workers are not less likely to abandon the mainstream Left for the radical Right than non-union workers. Among social-cultural professionals, union membership moves Left-party leavers away from the radical Right as well as the Center-Right, towards Greens and, most strongly, towards radical Left parties. Among other non-workers who abandon the mainstream Left, finally, union membership is also associated with a higher probability of voting for the radical Left and a lower probability of voting for the Center-Right.

[Table 8]

6. Conclusion

Our analyses of CSES data for 2001-15 show that class remains an important feature of electoral behavior in liberal democracies and, more specifically, that the trade-off between working-class and middle-class support posited by Przeworski and Sprague (1986) continues to haunt Left parties. As suggested by the authors of *Paper Stones*, unionization of workers mitigates the electoral dilemma of the mainstream Left, but our results indicate that unionization of white-collar professionals and other middle-class strata does not have this effect. Middle-class voters who are unionized are more likely to vote for mainstream Left parties, as well as other Left parties, than middle-class voters who are not unionized, but they, too, become more likely to abandon Left parties when these parties target working-class voters in their mobilizational efforts. While unionization keeps middle-class voters on the Left, it may actually reinforce—rather than mitigate—the trade-off between working-class and middle-class support for mainstream Left parties.

In short, union decline represents an electoral problem for Left parties and this problem assumes particular importance to the extent that union decline is concentrated among production and service workers. Good data on unionization rates by occupation are hard to come by, but for countries with separate blue-collar and white-collar unions, notably Sweden, we know that it is primarily blue-collar unions that have declined over the last 20-30 years (see Mosimann and Pontusson 2018). More broadly, available data indicate that unionization has held up much better in the public sector than in the private

sector (Pontusson 2013) and that de-unionization has been most pronounced in the lower half of the earnings distribution (Becher and Pontusson 2011, Mosimann and Pontusson 2017).

An obvious limitation of the preceding analysis is that it does not take into account party platforms or the policies that mainstream Left parties have pursued in government. Following Przeworski and Sprague, we have simply assumed that the class composition of new voters tells us something meaningful about strategic choices that parties make. As a first, admittedly very crude, attempt to address the question of what parties do (or might do) to mobilize workers, Table 9 presents the results of regressing our measure of class profile, i.e., the relative representation of workers among new voters, on two features of party platforms captured by the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP): the overall Right-Left position of manifestos ("rile") and the percentage of positive mentions of labor and labor groups in manifestos ("per 701"). With a sample consisting of 37 elections out of the 40 elections in our dataset,[22] we find no association whatsoever between the overall Left-Right position of the platform and the extent to which mainstream Left parties mobilize workers in any given election, but we do find a positive and statistically significant association between the extent to which parties make positive references to "labor" and the extent to which they mobilize workers in particular. The latter association remains when we include a dummy to control for the absence of radical competitors on either the Left or the Right.[23] In light of the small number of observations and obvious endogeneity concerns, these results are, at best, suggestive. The main take-away is perhaps that being more "leftist" does not appear to be the universal formula for mobilizing working-class voters. This finding dovetails with our

previous finding that unionized middle-class voters, especially socio-cultural professionals, often switch to radical Left parties when mainstream Left parties mobilize workers.

[Table 9]

The results presented in Table 9 also suggest that mainstream Left parties are more able to mobilize new working-class support when they do not face radical Left and radical Right competitors. This raises another question that we want to pursue in future work. In the analysis of electoral trade-offs presented above, we control for the vote shares of Green, radical Left and radical Right parties in the previous election, but we do not interact these macro variables with respondents' class positions (and the effects of the control variables are rarely significant). In light of our analysis of where Left-party leavers have gone, it seems plausible to suppose that the presence of radical options, especially radical Right options, increases the propensity of working-class voters to abandon the mainstream Left more than it increases the propensity of middle-class voters to abandon the mainstream Left.

Two further limitations of what we have accomplished in this paper deserve to be noted. It goes without saying that the results presented above are based on generalizing across countries and over time. To address the question of whether or not electoral trade-offs have become more severe for mainstream Left parties, it would be worthwhile to replicate the macro-level analysis in *Paper Stones* with more recent data, but also to analyze surveys for individual countries going back to the 1960s. Less obviously perhaps, the preceding analyses assume that "union membership" has similar implications across countries and individuals. We have not taken into account that some

unions are more closely affiliated with mainstream Left parties than others (see Arndt and Rennwald 2016) and that some are more solidaristic than others (Mosimann and Pontusson 2017). There are significant data constraints, but also exciting research opportunities in this domain.

While further nuance surely needs to be added, the core message of this paper boils down to the following proposition: for self-interested reasons, mainstream Left parties should worry about the decline of working-class organization and ought to make of an effort to reverse this process. As many scholarly studies have shown, de-unionization is not an inevitable result of structural changes in advanced capitalist economies.[24] To mention only a few examples, political decisions pertaining to the regulation of temporary employment contracts, outsourcing of public services and the administration of unemployment insurance have important consequences for working-class organization. And working-class organization in turn has important electoral consequences.

References

Afonso, Alexandre and Line Rennwald. 2018. "Social Class and the Changing Welfare State Agenda of Radical Right Parties in Europe." In *Welfare Democracies and Party Politics: Explaining Electoral Dynamics in Times of Changing Welfare Capitalism*, eds. Philipp Manow, Hanna Schwander and Bruno Palier, 171-194. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Armingeon, Klaus, Christian Isler, Laura Knöpfel, David Weisstanner, and Sarah Engler. 2018. *Comparative Political Data Set 1960-2016*. Bern: Institute of Political Science, University of Berne.

Arndt, Christoph and Line Rennwald. 2016. "Union Members at the Polls in Diverse Trade Union Landscapes." *European Journal of Political Research* 55(4): 702–722.

Arzheimer, Kai. 2013. "Working-Class Parties 2.0? Competition between Centre-Left and Extreme Right Parties." In *Class Politics and the Radical Right*, ed. Jens Rydgren, 75-90. London; New York: Routledge.

Becher, Michael and Jonas Pontusson. 2011. "Whose interests do unions represent? Unionization by income in Western Europe." In *Research in the Sociology of Work* 22B: 181-211.

Bremer, Björn. 2019. *Austerity from the Left: Explaining the Fiscal Policies of Social Democratic Parties in Response to the Great Recession*. PhD thesis, European University Institute (Florence).

Castles, Francis G. 1978. *The Social Democratic Image of Society: A Study of the Achievements and Origins of Scandinavian Social Democracy in Comparative Perspective*. London etc.: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Donnelly, Michael J. 2016. "Competition and Solidarity: Union Members and Immigration in Europe." *West European Politics* 39(4): 688-709.

Evans, Geoffrey and Nan Dirk De Graaf. 2013. "Explaining Cleavage Strength: The Role of Party Positions." In *Political Choice Matters. Explaining the Strength of Class and Religious Cleavages in Cross-National Perspective*, eds. Geoffrey Evans and Nan Dirk De Graaf, 3-26. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Evans, Geoffrey and Jon Mellon. 2016. "Working Class Votes and Conservative Losses: Solving the UKIP Puzzle." *Parliamentary Affairs* 69(2): 464-479.

Gingrich, Jane and Silja Häusermann. 2015. "The Decline of the Working-Class Vote, the Reconfiguration of the Welfare Support Coalition and Consequences for the Welfare State." *Journal of European Social Policy* 25(1): 50-75.

Häusermann, Silja and Hanspeter Kriesi. 2015. "What do Voters Want? Dimensions and Configurations in Individual-Level Preferences and Party Choice." In *The Politics of Advanced Capitalism*, eds. Pablo Beramendi, Silja Häusermann, Herbert Kitschelt and Hanspeter Kriesi, 202-230. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Horn, Alexander. 2018. "The Asymmetric Long-Term Consequences of Unpopular Reform." Paper for presentation at the Annual International Conference of Europeanists, Chicago, March.

Kerrissey, Jasmine and Evan Schofer. 2013. "Union Membership and Political Participation in the United States." *Social Forces* 91(3): 895-928.

Kitschelt, Herbert and Philipp Rehm. 2015. "Party Alignments: Change and Continuity." In *The Politics of Advanced Capitalism*, eds. Pablo Beramendi, Silja Häusermann, Herbert Kitschelt and Hanspeter Kriesi, 179-201. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kitschelt, Herbert. 1994. *The Transformation of European Social Democracy*. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge; New York etc.: Cambridge University Press.

Kitschelt, Herbert and Philipp Rehm. 2014. "Occupations as a Site of Political Preference Formation." *Comparative Political Studies* 47 (12): 1670-1706.

Knutsen, Oddbjørn. 2006. *Class Voting in Western Europe: A Comparative Longitudinal Study*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Kriesi, Hanspeter. 1998. "The Transformation of Cleavage Politics. The 1997 Stein Rokkan Lecture." *European Journal of Political Research* 33(2): 165-185.

Mosimann, Nadja and Jonas Pontusson. 2017. "Solidaristic Unionism and Support for Redistribution in Contemporary Europe." *World Politics* 69(3): 448-492.

Mosimann, Nadja and Jonas Pontusson. 2018. "Heterogeneity of Unions and Its Effects on Support for Redistribution." Unpublished paper, University of Geneva.

Oesch, Daniel. 2006. *Redrawing the Class Map. Stratification and Institutions in Britain, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

———. 2008. "Explaining Workers' Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: Evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway and Switzerland." *International Political Science Review* 29(3): 349-373.

Pontusson, Jonas. 2013. "Unionization, Inequality and Redistribution." *British Journal of Industrial Relations* 51(4): 797-825.

Pontusson, Jonas and David Weisstanner. 2017. "Macroeconomic Conditions, Inequality Shocks and the Politics of Redistribution, 1990–2013." *Journal of European Public Policy* 25(1): 31-58.

Przeworski, Adam and John Sprague. 1986. *Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism*. Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press.

Rathgeb, Philip. 2018. *Strong Governments, Precarious Workers: Labour Market Policy-Making in the Era of Liberalisation*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Rennwald, Line. 2015. *Partis Socialistes et Classe Ouvrière. Ruptures et Continuités du Lien électoral en Suisse, en Autriche, en Allemagne, en Grande-Bretagne et en France (1970-2008)*. Neuchâtel: Editions Alphil-Presses universitaires suisses.

Rosenfeld, Jake. 2014. *What Unions no Longer Do*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Sainsbury, Diane. 1990. "Party Strategies and the Electoral Trade-Off of Class-Based Parties." *European Journal of Political Research* 18(1): 29-50.

Thau, Mads. 2017. "How Political Parties use Group-Based Appeals: Evidence from Britain 1945-2015." *Political Studies* Online first.

Tucker, Todd. 2018. *Seven Strategies to Rebuild Worker Power for the 21st Century Global Economy: A Comparative and Historical Framework for Policy Action.* New York: Roosevelt Institute.

Visser, Jelle. 2016. *Data Base on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts, 1960-2014 (ICTWSS), Version 5.1*. Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies, University of Amsterdam, http://www.uva-aias.net/en/ictwss.

Table 1: The vote share of mainstream Left parties

	election years		average vote share			change since 1990s	
	post-1960 peak	most recent	peak+1	best 2 in 1990s	2 most recent	absolute	percentage
1. long-term dominant parties:							
Norway	1957	2017	47.6	36.0	29.1	-6.9	-19.2
Denmark	1960	2015	42.0	36.7	25.6	-11.1	-30.3
Sweden	1968	2018	47.7	41.5	29.7	-11.8	-28.4
2. long-term contenders:							
UK	1966	2017	45.6	39.1	35.2	-3.9	-10.0
Australia	1972	2016	49.2	42.2	34.1	-8.1	-19.2
Germany	1972	2017	44.2	38.7	23.1	-15.6	-37.0
New Zealand	1972	2017	44.0	36.9	31.0	-5.9	-28.7
Austria	1979	2017	49.3	40.5	27.7	-12.8	-30.6
3. permanent also-rans:							
Belgium	1961	2014	32.5	25.0	21.7	-3.3	-13.2
Switzerland	1963	2015	25.1	22.2	18.8	-3.4	-15.3
Ireland	1969	2016	15.4	14.9	13.0	-1.9	-12.8
Netherlands	1977	2017	31.1	26.5	15.3	-11.2	-42.3
Finland	1995	2015	25.6	25.6	17.8	-7.8	-30.5
4. post-1980 risers:							
France	1981	2017	34.0	22.3	18.3	-4.0	-17.9
Greece	1981	2015	47.0	44.2	9.3	-34.9	-79.0
Spain	1982	2016	46.4	38.2	22.3	-15.9	-41.6
Portugal	2005	2015	42.1	43.9	31.4	-10.7	-24.4
5. reconstituted parties							
Iceland	2003	2017	28.9		8.9	-20.0*	-69.2*
Italy	2008	2018	29.3		22.1	-7.2*	-25.6*
average						-10.3	-28.3

See text for explanation. * = change from peak+1 (rather than 1990s). Source: Armingeon *et al* (2016), supplemented by data from Wikipedia (for recent elections).

Table 2: Correlates of change in the vote share of mainstream Left parties since the 1990s (OLS regression).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Δ union density	.039	.273	.116	**.458**
	(.851)	(.297)	(.525)	(.033)
no radical competitor		9.144		**12.838**
		(.152)		(.014)
crisis+incumbency			**-9.607**	**-11.426**
			(.016)	(.002)
constant	-9.874	-10.518	-6.569	-4.656
	(.006)	(.013)	(.026)	(.066)
Observations	19	19	19	19
Adj R-square	-.057	-.030	.584	.454

P-values in parentheses: bold = $p < .05$. See text for explanation (and note 9 on robustness to alternative of control variables).

Table 3: The class composition of electorates (averages for available election surveys 2001-15).

	production and service workers	socio-cultural professionals	other non-workers
Australia	23%	22%	55%
Austria	37	16	47
Denmark	37	21	42
Finland	43	16	41
France	41	16	43
Germany	37	16	47
Greece	27	14	59
Iceland	38	14	48
Ireland	39	14	47
Netherlands	30	20	50
New Zealand	29	18	53
Norway	32	20	48
Spain	41	7	52
Sweden	41	25	34
Switzerland	22	20	58
UK	38	14	48
Average	33	17	50

Source: Own estimates based on CSES data.

Table 4: Unionization by social class, averages for available election surveys 2001-15.

	workers	socio-cultural professionals	other non-workers
Australia	31%	37%	22%
Austria	31	54	30
Denmark	90	90	79
Finland	61	73	59
France	7	16	11
Germany	20	19	15
Greece	13	14	10
Iceland	88	92	80
Ireland	38	57	35
Netherlands	29	31	23
New Zealand	14	27	12
Norway	59	45	37
Spain	6	21	7
Sweden	62	74	59
Switzerland	14	27	14
UK	20	43	21
average	41	46	32

Source: Own estimates based on CSES data.

Table 5: Relative representation of production and services workers among new voters for mainstream Left parties (with number of new voters in parentheses), 2001-2015.

	1	2	3	4	average
Australia	.90 (124)	1.19 (257)	1.43 (148)		1.25
Austria	1.39 (12)				1.39
Denmark	0.89 (49)				0.89
Finland	0.81 (40)	0.97 (30)	1.52 (27)	0.98 (29)	1.07
France	0.99 (158)				0.99
Germany	1.07 (131)	0.85 (133)	0.82 (33)	0.81 (45)	0.89
Greece	0.83 (41)	***2.08 (2)***			***1.46***
Iceland	1.10 (138)	0.78 (65)	0.98 (90)	1.08 (28)	0.98
Ireland	0.98 (53)	0.86 (43)			0.93
Netherlands	0.85 (34)	.86 (60)	0.93 (91)		0.88
New-Zealand	1.18 (130)	1.39 (51)	1.48 (66)	1.24 (46)	1.31
Norway	0.98 (39)	0.96 (149)	0.93 (104)	0.83 (56)	0.93
Spain	1.23 (98)				1.23
Sweden	1.07 (79)	1.30 (45)	1.15 (63)		1.19
Switzerland	0.81 (169)				0.81
United Kingdom	0.97 (35)	0.75 (96)			0.83

Source: Own calculations based on CSES data.

Table 6: Marginal effects of union membership on abandoning the mainstream Left conditional on class and working-class profile (with p-values in parentheses).

	working-class profile					
	-0.3	-0.15	0	0.15	0.30	0.45
workers	-.067**	-.054**	-.041**	-.028	-.015	-.002
	(.007)	(.002)	(.007)	(.142)	(.570)	(.946)
socio-cultural professionals	-.077*	-.067**	-.056**	-.045+	-.034	-.022
	(.016)	(.004)	(.004)	(.055)	(.306)	(.622)
other non-workers	-.092***	-.085***	-.077***	-0.069***	-0.061*	-0.052
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.023)	(.157)

Based on M2 in Appendix 5. P-values in parentheses: $^{+}p < 0.10$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$.

Table 7: Average marginal effects of union membership on the choice of options.

Center-Right	-.042* (.028)
non-voting	-.040** (.002)
radical Left	.095*** (.000)
Greens	.024 (.133)
radical Right	-.012 (.371)

Based on M1-M5 in Appendix 8. P-values in parentheses: $^{+}p < 0.10$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$.

Table 8: Marginal effects of union membership on the choice of options conditional on social class

	Workers (1)	Socio-cu (2)	Other non-workers (3)	Diff 1-2	Diff 1-3	Diff 2-3
Center-Right	.012 (.673)	-.098** (.007)	-.062* (.030)	.110* (.014)	.074^{+} (.052)	-.036 (.415)
non-voting	-.072** (.001)	.001 (.960)	-.029 (.123)	-.073* (.021)	-.043 (.104)	.030 (.317)
radical Left	.081** (.002)	.134*** (.000)	.088*** (.000)	-.053 (.197)	-.007 (.836)	.046 (.255)
Greens	-.009 (.696)	.060^{+} (.059)	.026 (.305)	-.069^{+} (.071)	-.035 (.291)	.034 (.389)
radical Right	-.013 (.555)	-0.057* (.030)	0.007 (.712)	0.044 (.174)	-0.020 (.461)	-0.064* (.045)

Based on M6-M10 in Appendix 8. P-values in parentheses: $^{+}p < 0.10$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$.

Table 9: Correlates of the class profile of new voters (OLS regressions).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Right-Left	.003	-.000		.001
	(.212)	(.854)		(.541)
pro-labor	**.017**		**.015**	**.017**
	(.043)		(.035)	(.031)
no radical competitor		**.242**	**.248**	**.236**
		(.005)	(.002)	(.004)
constant	1.012	.996	.911	.932
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
N	37	37	37	37
adj. R-square	.071	.170	.272	.259

P-values in parentheses: bold = p < .05. Source: Comparative Manifesto Project (https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/).

Figure 1: Predicted probabilities of leaving the mainstream Left by social class conditional on the working-class profile of newcomers.



Based on M3 in Appendix 3.

Figure 2: The average marginal effect of working class conditional on the working-class profile of newcomers, with 95% confidence intervals.



Based on M3 in Appendix 3.

Figure 3: Predicted probabilities of leaving the mainstream Left by class conditional on the working-class profile of newcomers, with sociocultural professionals as separate class category.

Based on M1 in Appendix 5.

Figure 4: Predicted probabilities of leaving the mainstream Left by social class conditional on the working-class profile of newcomers.

a) Non-unionized respondents



b) Unionized respondents



Based on M4 in Appendix 3.

Figure 5: Average marginal effects of social class on the choice of options



Based on M1-M5 in Appendix 8.

ENDNOTES

[1] The countries and elections included in our analysis are listed in Appendix 1. We exclude surveys from the US, Canada, Japan and Eastern Europe on account of the difficulty of identifying mainstream Left parties that satisfy of the criterion of having historically prioritized the mobilization of working-class voters. For further information about CSES data, see http://www.cses.org/.

[2] Belgium, Italy and Portugal are included in Table 1, but not in our individual-level analyses (for lack of CSES data).

[3] With one exception, the post-war peak is also the all-time peak. The exception is Sweden, where the Social Democratic vote share peaked, at 53.8%, in 1940.

[4] While post-1980 figures for Belgium represent the combined vote share of the Flemish and Francophone socialist parties, the figures for France refer to the vote share of the French Socialists in the first round of parliamentary elections. The latter measure arguably understates the electoral strength of the French Socialist Party relative to mainstream Left parties in other countries. It is importance to keep in mind that the French Socialists won three out of seven presidential elections between 1981 and 2017.

[5] The figures for Iceland refer to the Social Democratic Alliance, formed in 2000 by the Social Democratic Party and several smaller leftist parties, while the figures for Italy refer to the Democratic Party, created in 2006. The Social Democratic Alliance performed better in the elections of 2003, 2007 and 2009 than the Social Democratic Party had ever done. The formation of the Italian Democratic Party was a complicated process involving the incorporation of former Radicals and Christian Democrats as well as the departure of the left-wing faction of the former Democratic Left Party, rendering cross-time comparisons particularly fraught, but note that the vote share of the Italian Communist Party (historical predecessor of the Democratic Left Party) peaked at 34.4% in 1976.

[6] The French figure for recent elections is the average of a very good performance in 2012 and a very bad performance in 2017.

[7] The label "Center-Right parties" is shorthand for "Center-Right and other parties." In our analysis, this category includes all parties that are not coded as mainstream Left, radical Left, Greens or radical Right. Appendix 2 presents our coding of parties.

[8] Przeworski and Sprague's view of unions as enablers of the pursuit of supraclass electoral strategies by socialist parties stands in marked contrast to the view advanced by Kitschelt (1994). Influenced by the advances made by Southern European socialist parties in the 1980s, Kitschelt argues that strong unions represent a constraint on the ability of mainstream Left parties to reposition themselves in response to new political issues and cleavages.

[9] Mainstream Left parties also held the office of Prime Minister in Austria and Norway in 2008-11 and the association between union decline and vote-share losses for mainstream Left parties fails to clear the 90% significance threshold if these cases are coded as "incumbency during crisis." The association between union decline and vote-share losses also becomes statistically insignificant if the UK is recoded as a case of radical Right competition, on account of UKIP's

performance in the 2015 election. There can be no doubt that the crisis of 2008-10 affected Austria and Norway less any of the countries that we code as 1 on "incumbency during crisis:" while the UK unemployment rate rose from 5.3% in 2007 to 8.1% 2011, the Norwegian rate rose from 2.5% to 3.4% and the Austrian rate fell from 4.9% to 4.6%. It should also be noted coding Ireland as a case of no radical competitors (i.e., coding Sinn Feín as an "ethnic-nationalist" rather than a radical Left party) greatly strengthens the association between union decline and vote-share losses for mainstream Left parties and that the results reported in Table 2 are robust to dropping France from the analysis.

[10] The estimates presented in Table 3 include non-voters and are based on pooling all available CSES data for the period 2001-15 (i.e., pooling several election surveys for one country when possible). For Modules 2-3 of the CSES, our coding of the class identity of respondents is based on the two-digit level of the 1988 version of the ILO's International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISC0); for Module 4, it is based on the three-digit level of the 2008 version. Unemployed and retired survey respondents as well as home-keepers are assigned a class based on their prior occupation or dropped for lack of information on prior occupation.

[11] For European countries, the estimates the working-class share of the electorate presented in Table 3 are very similar to estimates derived from the European Social Survey (see Rennwald 2015, 71). By our definition, the share of workers in the total electorate has declined since the 1970s, but not nearly as much as the share of production workers. Averaging across the five countries for which Rennwald (2015) provides data, the share of production workers in the total electorate fell from 33% to 19% while the share of service workers rose from 12% to 20% from the first half of the 1970s to the second half of the 2000s.

[12] The Austrian Social Democrats and Spanish Socialists may also belong in this camp, but we have only one observation for each of these parties.

[13] There are good reasons to be concerned about the accuracy of respondents' recall of how they voted, especially their recall of how they voted in the previous election (often four or five years ago). To reassure ourselves in this regard, we have explored the correlations between our survey-based estimates of the vote shares of Left parties and official elections as reported by Armingeon et al (2016). For vote shares in the current election, the correlation is .963 ($p < .001$); for vote share in the previous election, the correlation is .837 ($p < .001$); and for vote-share changes from the previous election, the correlation is .774 ($p < .001$). Note also that respondents who do not declare any party (or abstention) in the current election represent 6.9% of all respondents in the CSES surveys on which we draw and those who do not declare any party choice in the previous election represent 13.9% of all respondents. These respondents are dropped from our sample.

[14] For pragmatic reasons, the education variable is a dummy for tertiary education.

[15] As the only Spanish election included in the CSES database predates the crisis, the British election of 2010 is not included in the CSES database, and we drop the Greek election of 2012, this dummy simply controls for the extraordinary circumstances of the Icelandic election of 2013.

[16] See Appendix 4 for the equivalent to Figure 1 based on analysis that includes data for the Greek election of 2012. The main difference between the two graphs is that, with Greece 2012 included, workers and non-workers alike are more likely to abandon Left parties that primarily mobilize workers: the differences in probabilities between workers and non-workers abandoning

the mainstream Left at high values of class profile of new voters is actually larger when data for the Greek election of 2012 are included. Note also that differences in probability at high values of the class profile remain statistically significant (at 95%) if we drop all five cases (including Iceland 2013) with less than 30 new voters for mainstream Left parties included in the election surveys.

[17] See also Appendix 6.

[18] Full regression results are presented in Appendix 3 (M4) and average marginal effects of social class in Appendix 7.

[19] See Rathgeb (2018), Horn (2018) and Bremer (2019) and also, on the OECD-wide retreat from redistribution since the mid-1990s, Pontusson and Weisstanner (2017).

[20] See Oesch (2008), Arzheimer (2013) and Afonso and Rennwald (2018) on the appeal of right-wing populist parties for working-class voters.

[21] In models of voting for the radical Left as well as the New Zealand election of 2014 and all Australian and British elections; in models of voting for Greens, we drop all Icelandic and British; and in models of voting for the radical Right we drop the Swedish election of 2002, Australian elections of 2007 and 2013 as well as all British, Icelandic, Irish and Spanish elections. Literally no mainstream Left leavers voted for these options in the cases that have been dropped. We assume that abstention and voting for the Center-Right are always options. In principle, voting is mandatory in Australia, but the law is no longer strictly enforced and we do have Australian mainstream Left leavers who stopped voting in our dataset. In the most recent Australian election (2016), voter turnout was 91.0%. Note the total number of observations used to estimate the model of voting for the radical Right is only 2,423.

[22] We again exclude the Greek election of 2012 on account of having only two new PASOK voters for this election. In addition, we loose Finland 2015 and Norway 2013 for lack of CMP data.

[23] The dummy for absence of radical competitors takes the value of 1 for all elections in Australia and New Zealand. It takes the value of 1 for the British election of 2005, but the value of zero for the British election of 2015, on account of UKIP being a viable contender. Note also that the statistical significance of the results presented in Table 9 improve if standard errors are clustered by country.

[24] See Tucker (2018) for useful review of relevant literature.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Countries and elections included in the analysis.

Australia	2004, 2007, 2013
Austria	2013
Denmark	2001
Finland	2003, 2007, 2011, 2015
France	2012
Germany	2002, 2005, 2009, 2013
Greece	2009, 2012
Iceland	2003, 2007, 2009, 2013
Ireland	2002, 2007
Netherlands	2002, 2006, 2010
New-Zealand	2002, 2008, 2011, 2014
Norway	2001, 2005, 2009, 2013
Spain	2004
Sweden	2002, 2006, 2014
Switzerland	2011
United Kingdom	2005, 2015

Appendix 2: Classification of parties in CSES dataset.

	Mainstream Left	Radical Left	Greens and other left parties	Center-Right and other parties	Radical Right
Australia	• Australian Labour Party		• Australian Greens	• Liberal Party of Australia • National Party of Australia • Liberal National Coalition • Australian Democrats • Smaller parties (e.g., Liberal Democrats, Christian Democratic Party, Palmer United Party, etc.) Others • Minor parties (e.g., Wikileaks Party) • Independent	• One Nation
Austria	• Social Democratic Party of Austria	• Communist Party of Austria	• The Greens	• Austrian People's Party • Liberal Forum • The New Austria and Liberal Forum • Team Stronach • Citizens' Forum Austria (Fritz) Others • Pirate Party	• Freedom Party of Austria • Alliance for the Future of Austria
Denmark	• Danish Social Democratic Party	• Socialist People's Party • Red-Green Unity List		• Liberal Party (Venstre) • Conservative People's Party • Christian People's Party • Centrist Democrats • New/Liberal Alliance Others • Danish Social Liberal Party (Radikale Venstre)	• Danish People's Party
Finland	• Finnish Social Democratic Party	• Left Alliance • Communist Party of Finland • For Peace and Socialism – Communist Workers' Party • Finnish workers' Party	• Green League	• National Coalition Party • Centre Party of Finland • Christian Democrats • Swedish People's Party of Finland • Liberal Party • Progressive Finnish Party Others • Minor parties (e.g., Forces for Change in Finland, Finnish Senior Citizen Party, Change 2011, Pirate Party, etc.)	• True Finns/Finns Party

France	• Socialist Party	• Left Front • French Communist Party • Workers' Struggle • New Anticapitalist Party • Workers' Party	• Greens/Europe Ecology • José Bové • Radical Party of the Left	• Union for a Popular Movement • Democratic Movement/Union for French Democracy • Hunting, Fishing, Nature and Traditions • Movement for France • Arise the Republic • New Centre	• National Front
Germany	• Social Democratic Party of Germany	• Left Party/Party of Democratic Socialism	• Alliance 90/Greens	• Christian Democratic Union • Christian Social Union • Free Democratic Party Others: • Minor parties (e.g., Ecological Democratic Party, Party of the Rule of Law, etc.)	• Alternative for Germany • The Republicans • German People's Union • National Democratic Party of Germany
Great-Britain	• Labour Party		• Green Party	• Conservative Party • Liberal Democrats Others: • Scottish National Party • Plaid Cymru	• United Kingdom Independence Party
Greece	• Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement	• Communist Party of Greece • Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza)	• Ecologists-Greens • Democratic Left (DIMAR)	• New Democracy	• Golden Dawn • Independent Greeks • Popular Orthodox Rally
Iceland	• Social Democratic Alliance/ Social Alliance Party • Icelandic Movement (merge 2009)	• Left-Green Movement		• Independence Party • Progressive Party • Liberal Party • Christian Democracy Party Others • Minor parties (e.g., Citizens' Movement, New Movement, Households Party, etc.)	
Ireland	• Labour Party	• Sinn Fein • Workers' Party • Irish Socialist Network • Socialist Party	• Green Party	• Fianna Fail • Fine Gael • Progressive Democrats Others • Independents • Minor parties (e.g., Christian Solidarity)	
Netherlands	• Dutch Labour Party	• Socialist Party	• Green Left • Party for the	• Christian Democratic Appeal • People's Party for Freedom and Democracy	• List Pim Fortuyn • Freedom party

			Animals	• Christian Union Others • Democrats 66 • Political Reformed Party • Minor parties	
New Zealand	• Labour Party	• Jim Anderton's Progressive Coalition/ Party • Alliance	• Green Party	• National Party • Conservative Party • Act New Zealand • United Future Others • Minor parties (e.g., Christian Heritage, Outdoor recreation, Maori Party, etc.)	• New Zealand First
Norway	• Norwegian Labour Party	• Socialist Left Party • Red Electoral Alliance/Red	• Green Party	• Conservative Party • Centre Party • Christian People's/Democratic Party • Liberal Party (Venstre)	• Progress Party
Spain	• Spanish Socialist Party	• United Left	• Ecologists	• Popular party Others • Nationalist and regionalist parties	
Sweden	• Swedish Social Democratic Party	• Left Party	• Green Party • Feminist Initiative	• Moderate Party • Liberal Party • Christian Democratic Party • Centre Party	• Sweden Democrats
Switzerland	• Social-Democratic Party of Switzerland	• Swiss Labour Party	• The Greens • Left parties	• The Liberals/Radical Democratic Party • Liberal Party • Christian Democratic Party • Christian Social Party • Evangelical People's Party • Conservative Democratic Party • Green Liberal Party • Right parties, Centre parties Others • Federal Democratic Union	• Swiss People's Party • Ticino League • Geneva Citizens' Movement • Swiss Democrats • Freedom Party

Appendix 3: Full regression results, 2-class models (for Figures 1, 2 and 4).

	M1	M2	M3	M4
Union member	-0.298***	-0.298***	-0.297***	-0.347***
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.059)
Workers	-0.071	-0.060	-0.069	-0.130+
	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.055)	(0.068)
Age	-0.021***	-0.021***	-0.021***	-0.021***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.005
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)
University education	-0.103*	-0.100+	-0.099+	-0.097+
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Residence (ref.=large city)				
Village	0.165**	0.162*	0.163*	0.164**
	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)
Small/Med city	0.162**	0.164**	0.164**	0.167**
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)
Suburbs	0.067	0.066	0.067	0.069
	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)
WC profile	0.495	0.243	0.356	0.217
	(0.429)	(0.365)	(0.399)	(0.407)
Compet. Radical left	0.041*	-0.000	0.001	-0.000
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Compet. Radical right	0.013	0.006	0.007	0.006
	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Compet. Greens	0.042	0.069+	0.058	0.062+
	(0.041)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.038)
PMincumb&crisis		1.415***	1.348***	1.382***
		(0.409)	(0.398)	(0.402)
Govtparty		0.123	0.117	0.121
		(0.108)	(0.106)	(0.107)
WC profile*worker			-0.478+	-0.530+
			(0.244)	(0.297)
WC profile*union member				0.313
				(0.264)
Union member*worker				0.147
				(0.092)
WC profile*worker*union member				0.133
				(0.425)
Constant	0.252	0.137	0.162	0.146
	(0.261)	(0.228)	(0.226)	(0.227)
Random effects				
Variance random slope	0.032***	0.034***	0.019***	0.021***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Variance intercept	0.077***	0.053***	0.047***	0.049***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.011)
N level-1 (2)	11539 (39)	11539 (39)	11539 (39)	11539 (39)
AIC	13803.9	13795.8	13794.4	13795.2
ICC	0.023	0.016	0.014	0.015
Log likelihood	-6871.0	-6864.9	-6863.2	-6860.6

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. All models include country dummies (not shown). ICC Null model: 0.094 (with country dummies: .030)

Appendix 4: Figure 1 with Greece 2012 included.



Appendix 5: Full regression results, 3-class models (for Figure 3 and Table 6).

	M1	M2
Union member	-0.298***	-0.205**
	(0.049)	(0.076)
Social class (ref.=working class)		
Socio-cultural prof.	0.071	0.101
	(0.068)	(0.088)
Other non-workers	0.066	0.136*
	(0.056)	(0.069)
WC profile	-0.104	-0.300
	(0.432)	(0.453)
Compet. radical left	0.000	-0.001
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Compet. radical right	0.007	0.006
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Compet. Greens	0.063+	0.066+
	(0.035)	(0.035)
PMincumb&crisis	1.389***	1.427***
	(0.382)	(0.384)
Govtparty	0.115	0.118
	(0.106)	(0.106)
WC profile*Socio-cultural	0.416	0.392
	(0.279)	(0.375)
WC profile*other non-workers	0.505*	0.565+
	(0.255)	(0.304)
WC profile*union member		0.428
		(0.350)
Union member*socio-cultural		-0.073
		(0.119)
Union member*other non-workers		-0.179+
		(0.101)
WC profile*Socio-cultural*union member		-0.044
		(0.544)
WC profile*Other non-workers*union member		-0.122
		(0.478)
Constant	0.083	0.012
	(0.227)	(0.231)
Random effects		
Variance random slope	0.005***	0.005***
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Variance intercept	0.110***	0.101***
	(0.032)	(0.030)
N level-1 (2)	11539 (39)	11539 (39)
AIC	13798	13802
ICC	0.032	0.030
Log likelihood	-6863.2	-6860.2

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Note that the models include controls for age, sex, education and residence, as well as country dummies (not shown).

Appendix 6: Statistical significance of class differences in Figure 3.

	working-class profile of newcomers					
	-0.3	-0.15	0	0.15	0.30	0.45
workers – socio-cultural professionals	-0.011 (0.615)	0.002 (0.917)	0.014 (0.301)	0.027^{+} (0.097)	0.040^{+} (0.072)	0.053^{+} (0.073)
workers – other non-workers	-0.017 (0.352)	-0.002 (0.882)	0.013 (0.240)	0.029* (0.043)	0.045* (0.025)	0.061* (0.024)

Based on M1 in Appendix 5. P-values in parentheses: $^{+}p < 0.10$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$.

Appendix 7: The average marginal effect of working class conditional on the working-class profile of newcomers, with 95% confidence intervals

a) Non-unionized respondents



b) Unionized respondents



Based on M4 in Appendix 3.

Appendix 8: Full regression results, 3-class models (for Figure 5 and Tables 7-8).

	M1 Mains. right	M2 Non-voting	M3 Rad. Left	M4 Greens	M5 Rad. Right	M6 Mains. Right	M7 Non-voting	M8 Rad. Left	M9 Greens	M10 Rad. Right
Union member	-0.184*	-0.357**	0.674***	0.183	-0.140	0.054	-0.518***	0.566**	-0.088	-0.124
	(0.084)	(0.119)	(0.124)	(0.120)	(0.158)	(0.127)	(0.157)	(0.179)	(0.228)	(0.211)
Social class (ref.=workers)										
Socio-cultural prof.	0.072	-0.754***	0.048	0.853***	-0.563*	0.296*	-0.984***	-0.136	0.679***	-0.292
	(0.112)	(0.168)	(0.160)	(0.156)	(0.234)	(0.144)	(0.218)	(0.218)	(0.190)	(0.278)
Other non-workers	0.298***	-0.553***	-0.103	0.482***	-0.346*	0.430***	-0.638***	-0.148	0.384*	-0.406*
	(0.083)	(0.110)	(0.120)	(0.133)	(0.148)	(0.105)	(0.131)	(0.157)	(0.156)	(0.184)
Age	0.000	-0.012***	0.010**	-0.005	0.014**	0.000	-0.012***	0.010*	-0.006	0.014**
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Female	-0.049	-0.011	0.181+	0.357***	-0.655***	-0.038	-0.019	0.173+	0.346***	-0.651***
	(0.072)	(0.099)	(0.103)	(0.104)	(0.135)	(0.072)	(0.099)	(0.103)	(0.104)	(0.135)
University education	0.125	-0.756***	0.053	0.623***	-0.284+	0.132	-0.763***	0.046	0.618***	-0.281
	(0.087)	(0.132)	(0.127)	(0.118)	(0.172)	(0.087)	(0.132)	(0.128)	(0.118)	(0.172)
Residence (ref.=large city)										
Village	0.311**	-0.020	-0.325*	-0.391*	0.172	0.321**	-0.029	-0.335*	-0.399*	0.192
	(0.106)	(0.142)	(0.157)	(0.155)	(0.191)	(0.106)	(0.142)	(0.157)	(0.155)	(0.191)
Small/Med city	0.176+	-0.013	-0.273*	-0.153	0.124	0.178+	-0.014	-0.269*	-0.155	0.118
	(0.095)	(0.128)	(0.136)	(0.138)	(0.178)	(0.095)	(0.128)	(0.136)	(0.138)	(0.178)
Suburbs	0.271*	-0.225	-0.154	-0.200	0.034	0.278**	-0.229	-0.150	-0.200	0.026
	(0.106)	(0.157)	(0.145)	(0.152)	(0.219)	(0.106)	(0.157)	(0.145)	(0.152)	(0.219)
Union member*Socio-cultural						-0.487*	0.532+	0.351	0.462	-0.766+
						(0.199)	(0.306)	(0.279)	(0.293)	(0.457)
Union member*Other non-workers						-0.320+	0.238	0.082	0.279	0.210
						(0.166)	(0.230)	(0.229)	(0.283)	(0.289)
Constant	-0.762**	-0.683*	-1.763***	-1.869***	-3.834***	-0.884**	-0.607+	-1.700***	-1.761***	-3.839***
	(0.283)	(0.323)	(0.360)	(0.273)	(0.524)	(0.288)	(0.326)	(0.366)	(0.282)	(0.526)
Random effects										
Variance intercept	0.196***	0.203***	0.278***	0.064***	0.461+	0.198***	0.203***	0.276***	0.064***	0.454*
	(0.030)	(0.037)	(0.045)	(0.020)	(0.092)	(0.030)	(0.037)	(0.045)	(0.021)	(0.091)
N	3815	3690	3045	3286	2869	3815	3690	3045	3286	2869
AIC	4924.9	2922.2	2685.9	2657.8	1781.8	4921.9	2922.9	2688.3	2659.2	1781.2
ICC	0.056	0.058	0.078	0.019	0.123	0.057	0.058	0.077	0.019	0.121
Log Likelihood	-2436.4	-1437.1	-1319.0	-1304.9	-867.9	-2433.0	-1435.4	-1318.2	-1303.6	-865.6

Standard errors in parentheses; $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. All models include country dummies (not shown).