

# **Social Policy Outcomes of Government Participation by Radical Right Parties**

Juliana Chueri  
University of Geneva

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## Introduction

The increasing electoral success of radical right-wing parties (RRWPs) has led to recurring RRWP participation in Western European democracies. De Lange (2012) shows that mainstream parties’ ambitions to gain government power and implement policies have caused them to turn to RRWPs as coalition partners. Notably, the inclusion of RRWPs in coalitions has allowed mainstream right-wing party members to assume office and implement their policy preferences. This partnership has also provided the opportunity for RRWPs to influence policy making on core issues; for example, scholars have pointed to RRWPs’ direct and indirect influence on the adoption of restrictions on immigration and integration policies (Minkenberg, 2001; Shain, 2006; Williams, 2006; Akkerman, 2012). Additionally, studies focusing on immigrants’ entitlement to social rights have noted that RRWPs have successfully influenced the adoption of chauvinist welfare policies (Koning, 2013; Afonso, 2015; Careja et al., 2016). Once these parties achieve government power, it is expected that they will influence policy beyond their core issues, including economic and social policies (Röth, Afonso & Spies, 2017).

However, the differences between mainstream and RRWPs’ positions regarding distributive issues pose a potential conflict between these parties within a government coalition. Mainstream right-wing parties have economic performance as a priority goal; they cast votes based on their economic proposals and want to be perceived as fiscally responsible, which often means supporting welfare state retrenchment. Conversely, by the early 1990s, many RRWPs that had begun promoting neoliberal agendas expanded their vote share by embracing welfare state defense (Betz, 1994; Kriesi et al., 2006; Afonso & Rennwald, forthcoming). Moreover, RRWPs’ distributive agenda often includes support for excluding immigrants from social protections, which is a policy not generally embraced by mainstream parties.

While this dilemma is documented in the literature (Afonso, 2016), the outcome of RRWPs' incumbency in terms of social policies has barely been explored. Therefore, this paper aims to shed light on these issues by performing two statistical analyses. The first assesses the impact of RRWPs' government participation in general welfare state provision measured in terms of public welfare state expenditure and welfare state generosity. The second focuses on RRWPs' impact on the adoption of chauvinist welfare policies measured in terms of the adoption of legislation that restrict immigrants' entitlement to social rights. The paper will proceed as follows. First, I will discuss the policy position of RRWPs on distributive issues. Second, I will present the hypotheses of the study. Third, I will introduce the methodology of both statistical studies. Last, I will present the results and conclusions.

#### 1. RRWPs' profile vis-à-vis distributive issues

In their influential work *The Radical Right in Western Europe* (1995), Kitschelt and McGann (1995) analyze the positioning of RRWPs in two dimensions, socialist/capitalist and libertarian/authoritarian. The authors point out three possible positions for these parties: 1) authoritarian and capitalist, 2) populist, 3) antistatist, and 4) authoritarian "welfare chauvinist" and consider the authoritarian capitalist appeal the "winning formula". Moreover, they affirm that the authoritarian "welfare chauvinist" strategy is associated with limited electoral returns; it may be effective in a short period of depression or unemployment, but parties lose votes if they abandon the master strategy and emphasize immigration, xenophobia, and race.

In fact, this "winning formula" corresponds to the initial economic agenda of many RRWPs. RRWPs in Scandinavia and other countries, such as the Netherlands and Switzerland, defend a strong liberal agenda that includes reducing taxes to a minimum in addition to having an authoritarian appeal. This formula has mainly attracted small business owners, white-collar workers, blue-collar workers, and unemployed (Kitschelt & McGann, 1995). However, scholars have pointed out that the master strategy that corresponded to the emergence of those parties did not correspond to their expansion (Betz, 1994; de Lange, 2007).

By 1990, to increase the number of working class voters and not to lose the support of the *petite bourgeoisie*, RRWPs in the left-right dimension became centrist. This has

been empirically confirmed by de Lange<sup>1</sup> (2007) and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey<sup>2</sup> (Chapel Hill Expert Survey 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2010). However, Ronvy (2013) questions the possibility of placing RRWPs in the left–right dimension, as these parties adopt a deliberated position that blurs the strategy on economic issues. Nevertheless, as RRWPs assumed power, it became difficult to avoid taking a position on distributive issues (Röth, Afonso & Spies, 2017). Additionally, the research suggests that rather than obscure their economic agenda, RRWPs have increased the salience of the redistributive issue in their manifestos over time (Afonso & Rennwald, forthcoming).

Therefore, there is a relative consensus in the literature that RRWPs' position on the welfare state, a main aspect in left–right positioning, has become more similar to that of the traditional left-wing parties (Betz, 1994; Marks, Hooghe, Nelson & Edwards, 2006; Röth, Afonso & Spies, 2017). However, it is important to highlight some specificities of RRWPs' rhetoric in relation to the welfare state. First, RRWPs' nativist ideology prevents true egalitarianism, as these parties usually support excluding immigrants from social schemes or restricting their access. They justify this position by the cultural distance between natives and aliens, as exemplified by foreigners' alleged non-commitment to such core European values as gender equality and freedom of speech (Reeskens & Van Oorschot, 2012). Additionally, the social perception of immigrants as underserving of social benefits, as welfare abusers, and as welfare tourists (see Thomann and Rapp, 2017 for an analysis of the Swiss case) is often used to justify restrictions on immigrants' entitlement. Accordingly, to defend national interests, RRWPs often advocate that aliens' access to social benefits should be based on previous contributions, proof of attachment to the country, or long periods of residence.

This rhetoric also serves as a justification for RRWPs' preference for policies that benefit the elderly, a group they perceive as having worked hard to build the nation and that deserves to benefit from social expenditure. However, the unemployed, especially long-term unemployed (along with ethnic minorities), are considered undeserving and are often regarded as lazy and as abusers (Afonso & Rennwald, forthcoming). Finally, the authoritarian appeal also shapes RRWPs' distributive preferences. These parties are

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<sup>1</sup> The author considered seven aspects in placing RRWPs in the left/right dimension: 1) privatization, 2) the public sector, 3) the welfare and social security system, 4) the labor market, 5) taxation, 6) the budget and financial deficit, and 7) and trade and enterprise policies.

<sup>2</sup> RRWPs' position varies from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right). This classification considers the position of the parties in terms of the role of government in the economy, regulation, welfare state taxes, and spending.

generally critics of the status quo and accuse existing social institutions of being permissive and of cheating, endorsing laziness, and creating privileges for politicians and civil servants (Derks, 2006, Van der Waal et al., 2010). Consequently, RRWPs often defend stricter rules for benefit entitlement, particularly for social assistance and unemployment benefits programs, and a tougher approach to deal with cheaters.

In summary, RRWPs have become more supportive of welfare state expenditure since the 1990s<sup>3</sup> (Rydgren, 2004; Afonso, 2015; Careja et al., 2016; Schumacher & Kersbergen, 2016). This support is not unrestricted and comes with limitations as to who deserves access to social benefits. Immigrants and the unemployed are regarded as non-deserving of public expenditure (Rydgren, 2004; Afonso, 2015; Careja et al., 2016; Schumacher & Kersbergen, 2016), and the elderly are regarded as most deserving of social policies.

## 2. Policy outcomes of PRWPs' government participation

Many scholars have argued that political parties have a decisive impact on policy outcomes. Focusing generally on left-to-right positioning, the research has shown a significant relationship between right-wing parties and welfare state retrenchment (Allan and Scruggs, 2004; Castles, 1982; Hicks, Swank & Ambuhl, 1989). Nevertheless, the presence of RRWPs in government muddies this relationship. While they join right-wing parties in cabinets, which generally defend welfare state adjustments, these parties have a distributive agenda that combines defending the welfare state to benefit deserving groups and restricting immigrants' access.

Afonso (2016) describes the dilemma of RRWPs' government participation in distributive issues. By prioritizing a vote-seeking strategy and seeking to preserve or expand the welfare state, these parties might create tension within coalitions and jeopardize their strategy to gain office. Supporting welfare chauvinist measures is equally problematic, as mainstream right-wing parties might be cautious about adopting populist measures because it might alienate moderate voters. However, as these issues are not equally important to all parties, it is expected that negotiations between coalition parties will lead mainstream parties to seek concessions in terms of economic policies and to grant RRWPs latitude in relation to integration policies (Christiansen, 2017).

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<sup>3</sup> The Swiss People's party is one exception, as it supported the welfare state less and less over time.

This is supported by the fact that although the welfare state issue has become more important on RRWPs' agendas, these parties still cast votes based mainly on their positions on immigration, integration, and law and order. In addition, empirical studies have shown that welfare chauvinism has become a crucial component of the anti-immigrant agenda (Rydgren, 2004; de Koster et al., 2013) and that this rhetoric is important to right-wing populist voting (Ivarsflaten, 2008; Koster et al., 2013). Therefore, RRWPs will concede legislative support of welfare state adjustment and in exchange will implement restrictions on immigrants' entitlement to social rights. Based on this, two hypotheses are put forward, as follows.

H1: RRWPs' government participation will lead to a decrease in welfare state generosity/public social expenditure.

H2: RRWPs' government participation will lead to a decrease in immigrants' entitlement to social rights.

Considering the particularities of RRWPs' distributive preferences and the constraints imposed by coalition parties, RRWPs might concentrate their efforts on preserving the welfare state for deserving recipients, namely the elderly, and consent to policy retrenchments that target undeserving recipients (Van Oorschot, 2006; Afonso, 2016). By preserving their core electorate's interests and conceding support for mainstream parties to promote budget cuts, RRWPs accommodate vote- and office-seeking goals.

Foremost, retrenchment focusing on undeserving recipients can be communicated to the electorate as indirect welfare chauvinism. While direct welfare chauvinist measures entail governments restricting immigrants' access to social rights and preserving the rights of other groups, indirect chauvinist welfare measures entail restrictions that do not target immigrants specifically but that harm them the most (Emmenegger & Careja, 2012). Examples include restrictions on unemployment benefits, social assistance, and family benefits, as immigrants are more likely to become unemployed, depend on social assistance, and have a greater number of children.

In line with this perspective, Arndt and Thomsen's work (forthcoming) shows that some voters link unemployment benefits, social assistance, and family benefits with ethnic minorities, whom some voters consider undeserving, while pension policies are positively associated with native elderly who have worked hard and contributed to

society. Focusing on citizens' preferences, the study found a positive relationship between the perception of immigration as an ethnic threat and support for restrictions that target groups perceived as undeserving. These preferences have been shown to have political consequences, as voters who are less inclined to support policies that benefit mostly ethnic minority groups have abandoned left-wing parties in favor of right-wing parties. This study agrees with that of Burgoon (2014), who finds that immigrants' dependence on the welfare state diminishes citizens' support for redistribution and social protection. The idea that welfare recipients are not equally deserving of social policies is also corroborated by Van Oorschot's (2006) empirical work, which states that the elderly and the sick are viewed by European citizens as the most deserving, while the unemployed and immigrants are considered the least deserving.

H3: RRWPs' government participation will lead to a decrease in welfare state generosity/public social expenditure on policies linked to *undeserving* recipients.

H4: RRWPs' government participation will lead to an increase in welfare state generosity/public social expenditure on policies linked to *deserving* recipients.

### 3. Statistical studies

The assessments of RRWPs' influence on general welfare state distribution and immigrants' access to social benefits will be performed separately. First, I will study the relationship between RRWPs' government participation and the retrenchment/ expansion of the welfare state. Second, I will assess RRWPs' influence on the restriction of immigrants' entitlement to social benefits. I am aware that policy negotiations in coalition governments often occur as part of policy packages, that is, parties trade compromises across different policy areas (Thies, 2001). Therefore, RRWPs might agree on the general retrenchment of welfare state in exchange for restrictions on immigrants' access to welfare state programs. A simultaneous analysis of the adoption of these two types of policies would be preferred; however, the incompatibility of my dependent variables precludes this.

#### 3.1 RRWPs' influence on the adoption of welfare state retrenchment

Following previous studies (Kwon & Pontusson, 2010; Lupu & Pontusson, 2011; Römer, 2017; Röth, Afonso & Spies, 2017), the statistical analysis relies on a linear or

ordinary least squares regression with panel-corrected standard errors (OLS-PCSE)<sup>4</sup>. In such a model, the dependent variable is expressed in first difference and the change in the value of each dependent variable and the lagged level appear as independent variables. The rationale is to distinguish the effect of transitory and endurance changes in independent variables on the variable of interest (Kwon & Pontusson, 2010). All models include country dummies to control for omitted variables at the country level. For sensitivity analysis, all models were also tested with public social expenditure to GDP ratio as the dependent variable and with year dummies. The results of the alternative models are given in Appendix E.

### Dependent variables

Changes in welfare state generosity are measured in two ways, welfare state effort and welfare state generosity. The first variable is operationalized as the annual change in the public social expenditure per head in in US dollars, at constant prices, and constant purchasing power parity (PPP) (OECD, 2010). Four variations of this measure are employed. The first is the total public expenditure per head. The second considers the old age<sup>5</sup> and health public social expenditure per head, policies that target *deserving* recipients. The third is the sum of public social expenditure per capita in unemployment schemes<sup>6</sup>, social assistance, and income maintenance, policies that benefit *undeserving*<sup>7</sup> recipients. Finally, the *deserving* public expenditure to total social public expenditure ratio will also be applied as a dependent variable. This last indicator aims to assess the influence of RRWPs in the public welfare effort.

Whereas the literature notes that social spending it is not a complete measure of welfare state effort because it does not consider *how* this budget is allocated, there are still good reasons to rely on this information. For example, the easy availability of this data is an indisputable advantage. In addition, Jansen (2011) argues that concerns about

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<sup>4</sup> All estimations use the pairwise option. Tests suggested by Wooldridge (2002) show AR(1) serial correlation in my data. Therefore, I included the lagged dependent variable in our models accounts for this. I also correct for contemporaneous correlation.

<sup>5</sup> Old age expenditure considers pension, early retirement, residential care and other benefits in cash and kind.

<sup>6</sup> Unemployment schemes encompasses unemployment compensation, severance pay, and early retirement for labor market reasons.

<sup>7</sup> Social expenditure on family policies was not included in this variable to avoid ambiguity, as the data combines expenditure in family allowances and parental leave. While the first social policy is often associated with undeserving recipients, the second is often linked with deserving recipients.

differences in programs' entitlement rules and benefit types are less critical in social programs (other than unemployment benefits, old-age pensions, and sickness insurance benefits, which differ significantly among countries).

To compensate for those limitations, a second dependent variable that measures changes in welfare state generosity will be applied. This second dependent variable is an index that considers the replacement rate, duration of the benefit, waiting period for entitlement, and time of contribution necessary for entitlement for three insurance programs—unemployment insurance benefits, sickness insurance, and public pension; the data comes from the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset (CWED). Once again, the dependent variable will be used in three forms, the complete index that includes the three policies, an alternative index composed of sickness insurance and pension policies, and a measure that considers only unemployment benefit generosity.

The aim of analyzing the programs separately is to determine RRWPs' influence on the generosity of the pension system and sickness insurance, policies that target the elderly and sick who are considered deserving of public benefit and that might be associated with ethnic minorities who are considered least deserving of public support. The analysis that relies on public welfare spending covers the period from 1980–2013, while the study based on CWED data is limited to the period from 1980–2011.

#### Independent variables

The variable of interest in this study is RRWPs' government participation, measured as a binary variable (participation and non-participation). I also consider as government participation the stable legislative support of a RRWP to a minority government, without receiving portfolios. Consequently, the Danish government from 2001–2010, the Dutch government from 2000–2001, and the Norwegian government from 2002–2005 were included in the analysis.

Table 1. Cases of RRWPs formal and informal participation in government

Country	Formal	Informal
Austria	1985–1986 2000–2006	
Denmark		2002–2011
Greece	2011	
Italy	1994 2001–2005 2008–2011	
Netherlands	2002–2003	2010–2011
Norway	2014–	2002–2005
Switzerland	1985–2007 2009–2014	

This work adopts Mudde’s definition of RRWPs. According to the author, these parties’ ideology includes a combination of at least nativism, authoritarianism, and populism (Mudde, 2007). The RRWPs considered in the study are listed in Table 2.

Table 2. Radical right-wing parties with representation in parliament from 1980–2014

Country	Party name	Acronym
Austria	Freedom Party of Austria	FPÖ
	Alliance for Austria’s Future	BZÖ
Belgium	National Front Belgium	FN(b)
	Flemish Interest/Flemish Block	VB
Denmark	Danish People’s Party	DF
	Progress Party	FRP(d)
Finland	Finns Party/True Finns	Ps
France	National Front	FN
Greece	Popular Orthodoxy Rally	LAOS
	Independent Greeks	AE
	Popular Association – Golden Dawn	LS-CA
Italy	Italian Social Movement/National Alliance	MSI/AN
	Northern League	LN
Netherlands	Centre Party/Centre Democrats	CP/CD
	Pim Fortuyn List	LPF
	Party for Freedom	PVV
Norway	Progress Party (Norway)	FRP(n)
Sweden	New Democracy	ND
	Sweden Democrats	SD
Switzerland	Swiss People’s Party/Democratic Union of the Centre	SVP/UDC
	Swiss Automobile Party/Freedom Party of Switzerland	FPS
	Ticino League	LdT
	National Action for People	NA
UK	UK Independence Party	UKIP

Government orientation is a control variable, as the research has associated right-wing government with the adoption of welfare retrenchment (Allan & Scruggs, 2004; Huber & Stephens, 2001; Korpi & Palme, 2003). This variable is a weighted measure of government parties' position in the left–right dimension (please refer to appendix B for more details).

According to the literature, economic and demographic factors can lead to the adoption of welfare retrenchment. Budget deficits and unemployment increase the likelihood of welfare state retrenchment and might disproportionately impact immigrants' entitlement (Pontusson, 1995). Some studies have concluded that ethnic homogeneity is essential to build trust, which is critical to support collective action (Putuman, 2007; Suroka et al., 2006). Therefore, immigrant influx can have a negative impact on welfare state solidarity. Finally, demographic factors can also play a role, as a high elderly dependence rate may negatively affect welfare state sustainability and lead to the adoption of restrictive measures. Table 3 details the study's independent variables.

Table 3. Independent variables in the first statistical study

Variable name	Explanation	Source
Elderly dependence rate	Ratio of the population over 65 to the population between 20 and 64	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
GDP	GDP yearly variation	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
Government orientation	Weighted average of left–right orientation of the cabinet	Parliament and government database (ParlGov) and author
Immigrant influx	Immigrant influx/total population	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
Public debt	Ratio total central government debt/GDP.	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
RRWP share in coalition	Ratio of PRWP share of seats in parliament/ share of seats of the entire coalition.	Parliament and government database (ParlGov) and author
RRWP government participation	PRWP government participation. No participation is the baseline.	Parliament and government database (ParlGov)
Unemployment	Unemployment rate	International Monetary Fund (IMF)

## Results

Table 4 includes the results of the models with the first difference of public welfare state expenditure as the dependent variable. Model 1 shows that RRWP government participation is negatively related with public expenditure on social policies. An increase in public debt level, unemployment, and immigrant influx are also negatively related with public social expenditure per head. However, an increase in the elderly dependence rate is positively correlated with public social expenditure. Model 2 includes the interaction between RRWP government participation and government orientation. The effect of RRWP is not further significant. However, the linear marginal effect of RRWPs government participation on the dependent variable, all other independent variables at mean values, is -53.7, but this is not statistically significant. These results are in line with hypotheses 1, which posits a positive relationship between RRWPs' government participation and welfare expenditure.

Models 3 and 4 have the first difference of *deserving* public expenditure per capita as the dependent variable. Model 3 shows that a marginal change in government orientation towards the right is associated with a decrease in old age public expenditure. and that RRWPs' participation has a positive but statistically insignificant correlation. Model 4 includes the interaction between RRWPs and government orientation and indicates that an increase in government orientation is negatively associated with old age public expenditure and RRWPs' government participation is positively associated. The marginal effect of the latter variable on the dependent variable, all other independent variables at mean values, is 59.8 with a confidence level of 10%.

Finally, Models 5 and 6 have the first difference of *undeserving* public expenditure per capita as the dependent variable. Model 5 indicates that RRWPs' government participation is associated with a decrease in *undeserving* expenditure and that an increase in government orientation is associated with a reduction in expenditure; however, this result is not statistically significant. Model 6 includes the interaction between RRWPs' government participation and government orientation. The marginal effect of the latter variable on the dependent variable, all other independent variables at mean values, is -49.82; this result has a confidence level of 10%.

Table 4. Regression models with public welfare state expenditure per head

Model	1	2	3	4	5	6
Estimator	PCSE	PCSE	PCSE	PCSE	PCSE	PCSE
Dependent variable	$\Delta$ Public total /head	$\Delta$ Public total /head	$\Delta$ Deserving/ head	$\Delta$ Deserving/ head	$\Delta$ Undeserving/ head	$\Delta$ Undeserving/ head
Dependent variable $t-1$	-0.035**	-0.034**	-0.0563**	-0.054**	-0.116***	-0.117***
Government orientation $t-1$	-8.158	-6.522	-10.777***	-9.716***	-1.463	-2.014
RRWP government participation $t-1$	-110.512*	158.474	14.414	219.017*	-29.483**	-123.451
Interaction		-39.547		19.776		13.677
$\Delta$ Debt	4.503	4.422	0.767	0.751	0.993	1.072
Debt $t-1$	-3.034***	-3.069***	-0.532	-0.560	-0.328	-0.317
$\Delta$ GDP	-13.8*	-13.914**	-5.536	-5.564	-7.712***	-7.586***
GDP $t-1$	-13.645	-13.291	-8.617*	-8.3195*	12.841***	-12.812***
$\Delta$ Unemployment	0.081	-0.348	-4.098	-4.433	16.881***	17.021***
Unemployment $t-1$	-9.921**	10.46655**	3.481*	3.168	-0.875	-0.700
$\Delta$ Elderly dependence rate	22.656	22.984	43.132**	42.976**	5.701	5.370
Elderly dependence rate $t-1$	14.985**	14.659**	8.006*	7.799*	-0.160	-0.169
$\Delta$ Immigrant influx	-3.829	-4.326	1.978	1.756	-4.263**	-4.111***
Immigrant influx $t-1$	11.271**	11.048*	7.124**	7.098**	4.054**	4.019***
Dummy countries	omitted	omitted	omitted	omitted	omitted	omitted
Constant	367.117***	364.777***	130.809**	127.391**	97.321**	99.358***
Number of countries	17	17	17	17	17	17
Time frame	1980–2013	1980–2013	1980–2013	1980–2013	1980–2013	1980–2013

PCSE: ordinary least squares regression with panel corrected standard errors  
\*\*\*p<0.01; \*\*p<0.05; \*p<0.1

Table 4 shows the models with an index of welfare generosity as a dependent variable. In accordance with a study by Röth, Afonso & Spies (2017) that is based on the same dependent variable, Models 1 and 2 indicate a positive correlation between RRWPs' government participation and welfare generosity, whereas an increase in government orientation is found to be associated with a decrease in welfare generosity. In Model 1, these variables are not statistically significant. Model 2 includes the interaction between RRWPs' government participation and government orientation. The marginal effect of RRWPs' government participation on the dependent variable is 0.33, with a 0.1 significance level.

Models 3 and 4, which have an index of pension policy and sickness insurance generosity as dependent variables, also show a positive correlation between RRWPs' government participation and welfare generosity. Model 4, which includes the interaction between RRWPs' government participation and government orientation, indicates that

these parties' presence in government leads to a 0.33 increase in the dependent variable, with a 0.1 significance level.

These results sharply contradict the analysis based on welfare state expenditure. One possible explanation for this is that the CWED index is overrepresented (two-thirds of the index composition) by policies that target the elderly and the sick, who RRWPs consider most deserving of social benefits (Afonso & Rennwald, forthcoming).

Table 5. Regression models with welfare state generosity

Model	1	2	3	4	5	6
Estimator	PCSE	PCSE	PCSE	PCSE	PCSE	PCSE
Dependent variable	$\Delta$ Generosity	$\Delta$ Generosity	$\Delta$ Generosity deserving	$\Delta$ Generosity deserving	$\Delta$ Generosity underserving	$\Delta$ Generosity underserving
Dependent variable $t-1$	-0.081***	-0.084***	-0.078***	-0.08***	-0.133***	-0.133***
Government orientation $_{t-1}$	-0.012	-0.002	-0.012	-0.007	0.000	0.002
PRWP government participation $t-1$	0.023	1.388**	0.155*	0.869**	-0.069	0.175
Interaction		-0.2**		-0.105*		-0.037
$\Delta$ Debt	0.012	0.010	0.002	0.002	0.005	0.005
Debt $t-1$	-0.005	-0.005	-0.006***	-0.006***	0.000	0.000
$\Delta$ GDP	0.031	0.031	0.006	0.006	0.015	0.015
GDP $t-1$	-0.003	-0.002	-0.005	-0.005	0.001	0.001
$\Delta$ Unemployment	0.036	0.038	0.026	0.028	-0.013	-0.012
Unemployment $t-1$	-0.023**	-0.024**	-0.003	-0.003	-0.023***	-0.022***
$\Delta$ Elderly dependence rate	0.081	0.086	0.016	0.023	0.024	0.023
Elderly dependence rate $t-1$	-0.003	-0.002	-0.004	-0.003	0.001	0.000
$\Delta$ Immigrant influx	0.053*	0.054*	0.037*	0.037*	0.009	0.009
Immigrant influx $t-1$	0.015	0.018	0.008	0.009	0.006	0.007
Dummy countries	omitted	omitted	omitted	omitted	omitted	omitted
Constant	2.957***	2.904***	2.129***	2.113***	1.353***	1.328***
Number of countries	16	16	16	16	16	16
Time frame	1980–2011	1980–2011	1980–2011	1980–2011	1980–2011	1980–2011

PCSE: ordinary least squares regression with panel corrected standard errors

\*\*\*p<0.01; \*\*p<0.05; \*p<0.1.

Models 5 and 6 partially illustrate this argument. The relationship between RRWPs and welfare becomes negative and statistically non-significant when only the generosity of the unemployment policy is considered. These results support hypotheses 3 and 4 and suggest that the impact of RRWPs' government participation in the welfare state involves selectivity. While these parties protect social policies that target *deserving*

recipients, they retrench benefits that target *undeserving* groups. One important limitation of this analysis is that the retrenchment of pension policies is adopted gradually. Therefore, the total effect of such retrenchments of public spending and changes in generosity are not immediate.

### 3.2 RRWPs' influence on the adoption of welfare chauvinist measures

The assessment of RRWPs' influence on immigrants' entitlement to social rights will be based on a study of the adoption of welfare chauvinist legislation. Therefore, I will perform two statistical analyses of the Determinants of Migration Policy (DEMIG POLICY) database. The first analysis is an event history analysis. This method is traditionally employed to model time to an event and duration of certain status. Nevertheless, it can be used to address a broader set of questions, as it is a powerful tool to assess causal relationships between variables (Steele, 2005) and enables a dynamic analysis of the data (Blossfeld et al., 2012; Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 1997). This paper applied the Cox proportional hazard model with the possibility of repeated events, a feature that indicates the event of interest. Here, that event is the restriction of immigrants' entitlement to social rights, which occurs more than once for each country in the study.

The second empirical analysis is a statistical study based on an ordinal logistic regression<sup>8</sup>. The same dependent variable will be transformed to obtain an ordinal dependent variable that takes into account the severity and scope of the restrictive measure (see Appendix D for detailed information about the coding process). Compared to the event history analysis, this method has the advantage of allowing a better assessment of the severity of the restriction but the disadvantage of being static.

#### Dependent variables

Data on immigrants' entitlement to social rights comes from the DEMIG POLICY database at Oxford University. This is a qualitative database that provides information about the adoption of legislation that restricts immigrants' entitlement to social rights<sup>9</sup>. Note that I consider citizens' entitlement as the baseline, so a decrease in immigrants'


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<sup>8</sup> Statistical test pointed to the choice of a standard ordered logistic regression over a random-effects ordered logistic regression and the Brant test of the parallel assumption for the model (refer to appendix C for more details).

<sup>9</sup> The explanation tables in the MIPEX and SOM databases were also consulted to crosscheck information and include missing data. In this last step, four new legislation changes were incorporated in the study.


social rights represents a change that increases the gap between immigrants' and citizens' entitlement to social rights. Therefore, changes in legislation that target both immigrants' and citizens' rights are not considered. Graph 1 reports the amount of legislation restricting immigrants' entitlement to social rights by country.

Graph 1. Amount of approved legislation that decreased immigrants' entitlement to social rights from 1980–2014.




The scope of legislation varies, as bills might target more than one immigrant group and restrict more than one social right at once. To deal with this reality, this paper takes two approaches. For the history event analysis study, which necessarily has a binary variable as the dependent variable (1 if an event occurs and 0 otherwise), I adopted a granular structure for the database that has the immigrant groups instead of the country as the unit of analysis. Six immigrant groups were considered— asylum seekers, EU citizens, temporary immigrants, permanent immigrants, refugees, and non-documented immigrants, resulting in a database with 3570 inputs. Using immigrant groups' entitlement as the basis of analysis, 54 restrictions occurred between 1980 and 2016. As shown in Graph 2, asylum seekers were by far the group most targeted by restrictive legislation, with 24 restrictions. EU citizens and temporary immigrants are in second place, with each group having their entitlement to social rights reduced by eight pieces of legislation in the period studied.

Graph 2. Number of restrictions on immigrants' entitlement to social rights from 1980–2014 in the 17 countries of the study by immigrant group.



To construct the dependent variable for the ordered logistic regression, the qualitative information about legislation that restricted immigrants' entitlement to social rights provided by DEMIG POLICY database was coded according to three criteria—change in coverage engendered by the law, the number of immigrant groups targeted, and the number of polices affected by the legislation. As a result, I have a four-level variable where the dependent variable zero represents no legislation change, 1 represents legislation that entails a minor restriction of immigrants' entitlement to social right, 2 represents a middle-range restriction, and 3 represents a major restriction.

Graph 3. Table of frequency of the dependent variable of the ordinal logistic regression<sup>10</sup>



### Independent variables

The set of independent variables applied in this second case differs slightly from the first. Immigrant group was included as a control variable, as the study adopted a more

<sup>10</sup> Zeros were excluded.

granular approach (described previously). I also included a control variable for RRWPs' participation in parliament to take into account the indirect impact of RRWPs on immigrants' entitlement to social rights (Minkenberg, 2001; Shain, 2006). The explanation and source of those two additional dependent variables are listed in Table 6.

Table 6. Dependent variables in statistical study two

Variable name	Explanation	Source
Immigrant group	Refugees, non-documented, permanent and temporary immigrants, and asylum seekers are the baseline	DEMIG POLICY database and author
RRWPs' share of seats in parliament	Participation of RRWPs in parliament	Parliament and government database (ParlGov)

## Results

Table 6 reports the results of the history event analysis and the ordinal logistic regression. The four models support hypothesis 2, that RRWPs' government participation measured as a dummy variable and as RRWPs' share of participation in coalitions is linked with the decrease in immigrants' entitlement to social rights. Table 6 reports odd ratios for Models 1 and 2 and hazard ratios for Models 3 and 4. In general terms, odd ratios and hazard ratios above 1 imply that a marginal increase of the explanatory variable increases the odds or hazards of an event.

Model 1 indicates that RRWPs' government participation increases the odds of adopting more restrictive measures by about 175%, while Model 2 shows that a marginal increase in RRWPs' participation share in coalitions increases the odds of more severe welfare chauvinist measure by 3.2%. Model 3 indicates that RRWPs' government participation increases the risk of a welfare chauvinist policy by approximately 268%, and Model 4 indicates that a marginal increase in RRWPs' participation share in coalitions increases the risk of restricting immigrants' entitlement to social rights by 6.3%. Additionally, Models 1 and 2 show that an increase in public social expenditure increases the likelihood of adopting a welfare chauvinist policy. The coefficients in Models 3 and 4 show that asylum seekers and non-documented immigrants face a higher risk of restrictive measures. Finally, Models 3 and 4 have a significant frailty<sup>11</sup> for the variable country

<sup>11</sup> Frailty is a random effect used to control for the effect of unobserved covariates on the hazard (Hougaard, 1995).

Table 7. Regressions on RRWPs' influence on welfare chauvinist measures. The table reports odds ratios<sup>12</sup> for Models 1 and 2 and hazard ratios<sup>13</sup> for Models 3 and 4.

Model	1	2	3	4
Estimator	OLR	OLR	Cox model	Cox model
Dependent variable	Ordinal	Ordinal	Event	Event
RRWPs' government participation	2.752*		3.682**	
RRWPs' share in coalitions		1.032*		1.063***
RRWPs' participation in parliament	0.987	0.984	0.989	0.972
Government orientation	1.253	1.220	1.034	0.984
Government debt $\Delta$	0.999	0.998		
Government debt $t_{-1}$	1.011	1.009		
Immigrant influx $\Delta$	1.013	1.008		
Immigrant influx $t_{-1}$	1.042	1.039		
Unemployment $\Delta$	0.923	0.945		
Unemployment $t_{-1}$	0.943	0.943		
Public social expenditure $\Delta$	1.354	1.351		
Public social expenditure $t_{-1}$	1.103**	1.087*		
Elderly dependence rate $\Delta$	1.163	1.142		
Elderly dependence rate $t_{-1}$	0.924	0.940		
<b>Immigrant group (asylum seekers and non-documented immigrants as baseline<sup>14</sup>)</b>				
EU member			0.526*	0.530
Permanent immigrants			0.128***	0.128***
Refugees			1.619**	0.326**
Temporary immigrants			0.604	0.610
Frailty (country)			***	***
Number of countries	17	17	17	17
Timeframe	1980–2014	1980–2014	1980–2014	1980–2014

OLR-ML: ordinal logistic regression method of estimation

Cox model: Cox proportional-hazard model

\*\*\*p<0.01; \*\*p<0.05; \*p<0.1.

<sup>12</sup>Odds ratios are the exponential transformation of the coefficients. The odds ratio represents the odds of obtaining greater values of the dependent variable for a unit of change in the predictable variable. For dichotomous and nominal variables, the hazard ratio compares two groups that have different levels of the categorical variable.

<sup>13</sup> Hazard ratios are the exponential transformation of the coefficients. A hazard ratio is a relative measure that compares the risk of an event of two levels of the explanatory variable that differ marginally, with all other covariates being equal. For dichotomous and nominal variables, the hazard ratio compares two groups that have different levels of the categorical variable.

<sup>14</sup> The categories asylum seeker and non-documented immigrants were merged to comply with the parallel assumption.

#### 4. Conclusions

The literature has reported a change in RRWPs' welfare agenda. These parties have taken a liberal approach regarding the welfare state and have adopted a rhetoric that combines welfare state protection and the exclusion of groups perceived as undeserving, particularly immigrants. Nevertheless, as these parties have joined with right-wing mainstream parties to form governments, their policy positions on distributive issues might cause a conflict between coalition parties (Afonso, 2015). Mainstream right-wing parties have economic performance as their primary goal, which often involves the adoption of welfare state retrenchment. Additionally, the risk of alienating moderate voters could prevent these parties from adopting populist measures. Therefore, this article aimed to assess policy outcomes of RRWPs' government participation in relation to distributive issues by addressing their influence on adopting restrictions on immigrants' entitlement to social rights and on changes in welfare state expenditure and generosity.

The analysis shows that RRWPs' government participation influences changes in the size and scope of national welfare states. The first conclusion is that RRWPs' government participation increases the chance of adopting welfare chauvinist policies and that this participation is also linked to the adoption of more severe restrictions on immigrants' entitlement to social rights. The second conclusion is that RRWPs' government participation has a negative impact on total public social expenditure, which indicates that these parties compromise with mainstream parties on welfare retrenchment to gain policy latitude in integration policies.

This is only a partial explanation. An analysis that focuses on a specific set of policies shows that RRWPs' influence on welfare state expenditure and generosity depends on the social group benefited by the policy. The participation of RRWPs in government is associated with an increase in expenditure and generosity in policies that target the elderly, the group perceived by these parties as most *deserving* of benefits. However, the effect is negative for policies that target groups regarded as *undeserving* of benefits, namely the unemployed and ethnic minorities.

This study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it demonstrates that the rhetoric about who is deserving is an important dimension of RRWPs' pro-welfare state, which illustrates that these parties' defense of the welfare state has more layers than is often assumed in the literature. In addition, the fact that RRWPs have a positive impact on public expenditure and the generosity of policies that focus on their core constituencies illustrates the centrality of distributive issues on RRWPs' agendas and corroborates the

general argument that influence of RRWPs on policy goes beyond immigration and law and order issues.

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## Appendix A

Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the variables

Variable	Number of observations	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Generosity	494	34.5	5.3	24.1	46.6
$\Delta$ Generosity	478	0.1	0.7	-2.9	7.6
Unemployment generosity	512	10.3	2.7	2.6	14.5
$\Delta$ Unemployment generosity	496	0.0	0.4	-1.9	3.4
Pension and sick insurance generosity	494	24.1	3.5	16.5	35.1
$\Delta$ Pension and sick insurance generosity	478	0.1	0.5	-2.8	4.2
Public expenditure/ head	563	7638.6	3076.5	1395.1	19437.2
$\Delta$ Public expenditure/ head	542	185.1	246.9	-872.4	1521.0
Public expenditure deserving	563.0	2559.2	1061.5	448.4	5560.1
$\Delta$ Public expenditure deserving	542.0	67.9	125.4	-1379.7	1262.1
Public expenditure undeserving	550	583.22	345.40	33.34	1691.66
$\Delta$ expenditure undeserving	529	15.38	79.12	-279.46	502.73
Ratio public expenditure deserving/ total public social expenditure	563	59.5	8.3	42.6	79.8
$\Delta$ Ratio public expenditure deserving/ total public social	542	0.1	1.6	-13.6	12.6
Public expenditure to GDP	595	21.8	4.6	9.5	34.2
$\Delta$ Public expenditure to GDP	594	0.0	1.8	-15.0	4.9
Unemployment	595	7.6	4.5	0.2	27.5
$\Delta$ Unemployment	578	0.1	1.1	-3.3	6.6
Immigrant influx	595	6.7	6.4	0.1	36.9
$\Delta$ Immigrant influx	578	0.2	1.5	-12.2	13.1
Elderly dependence rate	595	25.5	3.5	17.3	34.8
$\Delta$ Elderly dependence rate	578	0.2	0.4	-1.1	3.8
GDP growth	595	2.2	2.5	-9.1	10.6
$\Delta$ GDP growth	578	0.0	2.5	-9.7	11.3
Debt	595	52.0	30.7	0.8	147.8
$\Delta$ Debt	578	0.8	4.3	-30.6	20.8
Government orientation	595	5.4	1.4	0.5	7.6
PRWP share in coalition	595	3.2	9.5	0.0	63.2

## Appendix B

The variable government orientation applied in the statistical studies is equal to the sum of the product of party position in the left-right scale and its share in cabinets for all parties in government:

$$\text{Government orientation} = \sum_{\text{party}=1}^n \text{party position}_i \times \text{government participation}_i$$

For minority governments, this study takes two approaches. The first approach is to look for informal supporters. If the minority government had one or more supporter parties that were not formal members of the coalition, such parties are considered in the calculation because they were members of the coalition. If the minority government had no informal supporters and looked for *ad hoc* allies to pass bills, the calculation of this variable considers the entire parliament position in left-right scale multiplied by its participation in the coalition, which is the additional share necessary to build a simple majority of 50%. For example, if the government has 35% of the parliament seats and its position is 3,5, the position of the entire parliament, excluding the government parties, is 6,0. This variable will assume the value of 4,25:  $((0,35/0,50) * 3,5) + ((0,15/0,50)) * 6,0$ .

## Appendix C

The decision to apply ordered 1 logistic models followed the following steps. First, I compared random-effects ordered logistic regression over a standard ordered logistic regression. The reported likelihood-ratio test shows that there is not enough variability between schools to favor a random-effects ordered logistic regression over a standard ordered logistic regression. ( $\text{chibar2}(01) = 0.92$   $\text{Prob} > = \text{chibar2} = 0.168$ ). Second, I performed the Brant test after the standard logistic regression to test the parallel assumption. The insignificant statistic tests indicate that the parallel assumption was not violated.

Table 2. P-values of the Brant test

Model	1	2
Test	p>chi2	p>chi2
All	1.0	1.0
RRWP government participation	0.43	
RRWP share in the coalition		0.84
RRWP parliament participation	0.775	0.974
Government orientation	0.851	0.947
Government debt $\Delta$	0.257	0.269
Government debt t-1	0.772	0.824
Immigrant influx $\Delta$	0.652	0.533
Immigrant influx t-1	0.831	0.71
Unemployment $\Delta$	0.906	0.917
Unemployment t-1	0.83	0.735
Public social expenditure $\Delta$	0.607	0.682
Public social expenditure t-1	0.719	0.688
Elderly dependence rate $\Delta$	0.677	0.616
Elderly dependence rate t-1	0.201	0.206

#### Appendix D

As discussed, the number of legislation adopted does not provide a complete information about countries' change in exclusion (or inclusion) of immigrants in the welfare state as scope of the legislation varies. Therefore, to have a clear understanding about the scope of those measures, I coded the qualitative information present in DEMIG POLICY database in a numerical variable that considers not only the number or legislation adopted, but also its reach. To this end, the following dimensions were considered:

1. The number of immigrant groups affected. The entitlements of six categories of immigrants are considered: EU citizens, permanent residents, temporary residents, asylum seekers, refugees, and non-documented immigrants.
2. The number of policies affected (compulsory education, non-compulsory education, family allowances and childcare benefits, old age assistance, minimal income and long-term unemployment, social housing, and public health or subsidies for insurance fees).

For each country, the following eight social policies will be considered: minimum income, social pension, guaranteed income for the elderly, children's allowances, housing allowances, healthcare aid, compulsory education, and non-compulsory education. These

are all non-contributory policies, which means they are generally financed by taxes and that the benefits received do not depend on previous contributions.

The choice of non-contributory policies stems from three factors. First, they represent a greater fiscal burden to the state because they are not linked to contributions. Second, immigrants have a higher exposure to social risks, such as poverty and unemployment, so they are relatively more dependent on these types of benefits than the general population (Boeri, 2010). Therefore, such policies are likely targets of restrictions. Finally, the literature reports that, generally, immigrant access to contributory policies has no restrictions (Fix and Laglagaron, 2002).

The dependent variable applied in this study is calculated in a two-step process. First, I multiply the values of criterion 1, 2 and 3 aforementioned. For example, if the change corresponds to a mid-level restriction of rights, two immigrants' groups are affected, and the bill affects one social policy, this legislation change receives the value - 4. As a result, I have an ordinal variable with values form from 0 to 36. Second, I collapse the outcome of the first step into an ordinal scale from 0 to 3.<sup>15</sup>

Legislations that score 7 or more were considered major restrictions and received the code 3. Legislation changes scored between 4 and 6 were considered mid-level restrictions and were coded 2. Legislation changes scored between 1 and 3 were considered minor restrictions and were scored 1.

#### Appendix E. Proportionally test for Cox Models

The Cox proportional models are based in the assumption that hazard ratios are proportional over time. If this assumption does not hold the coefficients are biases and the power of significant test is decreased (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 1997). The table 8 bellow reports the result of the test of the proportional hazard assumption. Non-significant coefficients of the test indicate that proportional assumption is not violated. Therefore, the conclusion of the test is that the proportional hard assumption holds for all coefficients of the, but for the variable EU member immigrants. Nevertheless, the global test still confirm that the models are proportional.

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<sup>15</sup> In proportional odds models, it is common practice to collapse adjacent categories. For a detailed discussion of the pros and cons of this method, see Murad, Fleischman, Sadetzki, Geyer, and Freedman (2003).

Table 3. Test for proportional hazard assumption

Model	3	4
Test	p-value	p-value
Government orientation	0.5	0.7
RRWP parliament participation	0.2	0.2
RRWP share in the coalition		0.5
RRWP share in the coalition	0.8	
EU member	0.0	0.0
Permanente immigrants	0.1	0.1
Refugees	0.8	0.8
Temporary immigrants	0.2	0.2
GLOBAL	0.1	0.1

## Appendix E. Alternative models

Table 4. Regression models with public welfare state expenditure to GDP ratio

Estimator	PCSE	PCSE	PCSE	PCSE
Dependent variable	$\Delta$ Public expenditure to GDP			
Dependent variable $t-1$	-0.128***	-0.129***	-0.135***	-0.127***
Government orientation $t-1$	-0.006	-0.005	-0.019	-0.003
RRWP government participation $t-1$	-0.233*	-0.007*		0.061
RRWP share of participation in coalition $t-1$				
Interaction				-0.045
$\Delta$ Debt	0.0265***	0.027***	0.029***	0.026***
Debt $t-1$	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003
$\Delta$ GDP	-0.198***	-0.198***	-0.198***	-0.198***
GDP $t-1$	0.183***	-0.183***	-0.184***	-0.183***
$\Delta$ Unemployment	0.086***	0.083**	0.079**	0.086***
Unemployment $t-1$	-0.023**	-0.023**	-0.019*	-0.024**
$\Delta$ Elderly dependence rate	0.229**	0.231**	0.215***	0.2301**
Elderly dependence rate $t-1$	0.047***	0.045***	0.048	0.046***
$\Delta$ Immigrant influx	-0.015	-0.015	-0.015	-0.016
Immigrant influx $t-1$	0.024***	0.026***	0.026**	0.025**
Dummy countries	omitted	omitted	omitted	omitted
Constant	2.607***	2.649***	2.683***	2.57***
Number of countries	17	17	17	17
Time frame	1980–2013	1980–2013	1980–2013	1980–2013

PCSE: ordinary least squares regression with panel corrected standard errors

\*\*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*p&lt;0.05; \*p&lt;0.1.

Table 5. Alternative models with welfare state generosity

Estimator	PCSE	PCSE	PCSE	PCSE	PCSE	PCSE
	$\Delta$ Generosity	$\Delta$ Generosity	$\Delta$ Generosity deserving	$\Delta$ Generosity deserving	$\Delta$ Generosity underserving	$\Delta$ Generosity undeserving
Dependent variable						
Dependent variable $t-1$	-0.081***	-0.081***	-0.079***	-0.083***	-0.134***	-0.134***
Government orientation $t-1$	-0.017	-0.010	-0.013	-0.002	-0.005	-0.004
RRWP share of participation in coalition $t-1$	0.003		0.005**		0.000	
$\Delta$ Debt	0.012	-0.081	0.002	0.001	0.006	0.006
Debt $t-1$	-0.005	-0.010	-0.006***	-0.006***	0.000	0.000
$\Delta$ GDP	0.031	0.011	0.005	0.006	0.015	0.015
GDP $t-1$	-0.002	-0.005	-0.006	-0.007	0.001	0.001
$\Delta$ Unemployment	0.035	0.032	0.027	0.028	-0.014	-0.014
Unemployment $t-1$	-0.022	-0.003	-0.003	-0.005	-0.022***	-0.022***
$\Delta$ Elderly dependence rate	0.073	0.036	0.015	0.041	0.021	0.022
Elderly dependence rate $t-1$	-0.004	-0.023**	-0.004	-0.002	0.000	0.000
$\Delta$ Immigrant influx	0.053	0.083	0.036*	0.037***	0.009	0.009
Immigrant influx $t-1$	0.014	-0.003	0.007	0.009	0.006	0.006
Dummy countries	omitted	omitted	omitted	omitted	omitted	omitted
Constant	2.959***	2.962***	2.164***	2.212***	1.379***	1.379***
Number of countries	16	16	16	16	16	16
Time frame	1980–2011	1980–2011	1980–2011	1980–2011	1980–2011	1980–2011

PCSE: ordinary least squares regression with panel corrected standard errors

\*\*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*p&lt;0.05; \*p&lt;0.1.

Table 6. Alternative models with public expenditure per head

Estimator	PCSE	PCSE	PCSE	PCSE	PCSE	PCSE
Dependent variable	$\Delta$ Public total /head	$\Delta$ Public total /head	$\Delta$ Deserving/ head	$\Delta$ Deserving/ head	$\Delta$ Undeserving/ head	$\Delta$ Undeserving/ head
Dependent variable $t-1$	-0.037**	-0.039***	-0.055**	-0.055**	-0.119***	-0.118***
Government orientation $t-1$	-9.642	-14.8*	-10.135**	-9.879***	-3.891*	-2.966
RRWP share of participation in coalition $t-1$	-2.318*		0.117			-0.316
$\Delta$ Debt	4.792*	2.829	0.687	0.665	1.201*	1.137*
Debt $t-1$	-2.945***	1.011	-0.551	-0.551	-0.258	-0.256
$\Delta$ GDP	-13.871*	7.128	-5.474	-5.442	-7.977***	-7.871***
GDP $t-1$	-13.751	9.425	-8.576**	-8.539	-13.056***	-12.927***
$\Delta$ Unemployment	-1.917	12.067	-3.715	-3.636	16.023***	16.248***
Unemployment $t-1$	-9.884**	4.726	3.347*	3.292*	-0.419	-0.573
$\Delta$ Elderly dependence rate	19.380	31.302	43.692**	43.964**	2.270	3.511
Elderly dependence rate $t-1$	15.25**	6.608	7.978*	7.953	-0.587	-0.524
$\Delta$ Immigrant influx	-3.409	7.442	1.922	1.909	-4.194**	-4.195**
Immigrant influx $t-1$	12.266**	6.255	6.998**	6.983**	4.06***	4.126***
Dummy countries	omitted	omitted	omitted	omitted	omitted	omitted
Constant	371.889***	371.603***	128.587**	128.598**	109.125***	106.422***
Number of countries	17	17	17	17	17	17
Time frame	1980–2013	1980–2013	1980–2013	1980–2013	1980–2013	1980–2013

PCSE: ordinary least squares regression with panel corrected standard errors

\*\*\*p<0.01; \*\*p<0.05; \*p<0.1.

Table 7. Alternative models with deserving public expenditure to total social expenditure

Estimator	PCSE	PCSE	PCSE	PCSE
	$\Delta$ Deserving to total expenditure ratio			
<b>Dependent variable</b>				
Dependent variable $t-1$	-0.111***	-0.111***	-0.116*** -0.113*	-0.109*** -0.075
Government orientation $t-1$	-0.122*	-0.111*		
RRWP government participation $t-1$	0.729***	2.662		
<b>Interaction</b>				
$\Delta$ Debt	-0.036*	-0.036*	-0.033**	-0.041**
Debt $t-1$	-0.012	-0.012	-0.015*	-0.013
$\Delta$ GDP	-0.013	-0.014	0.008	-0.009
GDP $t-1$	0.009	0.011	0.035	0.010
$\Delta$ Unemployment	-0.149*	-0.154*	-0.063	-0.127
Unemployment $t-1$	0.046	0.043	0.056*	0.039
$\Delta$ Elderly dependence rate	0.413	0.419	0.484*	0.474*
Elderly dependence rate $t-1$	0.08*	0.08*	0.088*	0.086
$\Delta$ Immigrant influx	0.033	0.032	0.043	0.033
Immigrant influx $t-1$	0.003	0.005	-0.007	0.004
<b>Dummy countries</b>				
	omitted	omitted	omitted	omitted
<b>Constant</b>				
	6.09***	6.072***	6.25***	5.852***
<b>Number of countries</b>				
	17	17	17	17
<b>Time frame</b>				
	1980–2013	1980–2013	1980–2013	1980–2013

PCSE: ordinary least squares regression with panel corrected standard errors

\*\*\*p<0.01; \*\*p<0.05; \*p<0.1.