UNEQUAL DEMOCRACIES

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Polarized Opinion, Consensual Election: How Preferences for Restrictive Immigration Policies Water Down Class conflict over Redistribution.

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ABSTRACT:

Why don't we observe more redistributive policies while income inequality is rising? Scholars bring two answers to solve this puzzle. The first focuses on individual preferences and suggests that while inequality has increased for the last 20 years, preferences for redistribution have stayed the same. The second argues that we are living in unequal democracies, where policies are more responsive to the preferences of the richest. This work tests a third way and explores the role of vote choice in unequal responsiveness to preferences for redistribution. I test my argument on twelve western European countries using the Inequality and Politics dataset (IAP), an original comparative survey with data collected in summer 2019. The IAP replicated key questions of the CHES, which allows me to measure individuals' tendency to vote for parties that are less in favor of redistribution than their own position. Results indicate that 1) rich and poor do not share the same redistributive preferences, and 2) when it comes to vote choice, lower and middle income citizens are more likely to vote for a party that is less in favor of redistribution than their own position; 3) a large part of the incongruence is driven by preferences for restrictive immigration policies 4) mainstream right and far right parties are catching voters far beyond their economical position; 5) large cross-country differences suggest that some party-systems might be responsible of the lack of elected parties with pro-redistribution position.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:

1. Introduction

For the last 20 years wealth and income inequalities have risen across OECD countries. All evidence points out to the same direction, rising inequality has negative consequences on societies (Delhey and Dragalov, 2014; Neckerman and Torche, 2007), and the poor and the middle-class are increasingly the losers of the actual income and wealth distribution. The growing concentration of wealth and revenues in the top 1% hands is even more puzzling as both the middle and lower class have a powerful weapon at hand: democratic elections. One would assumed that higher levels of inequalities should lead to higher demands for redistribution of both the middle and the lower-income groups. As these groups form a large majority of the population, they should have enough electoral weight to favor pro-redistribution parties and sanction those against, which should subsequently lead to higher redistribution levels. However, this inequality self-correction mechanism (Romer, 1975; Meltzer and Richard, 1981) has shown its limits in cross country and time-series analyses (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Kenworthy and McCall, 2008; Iversen and Soskice, 2009).

Two main approaches bring some elements of answers to this paradox: one focusing on the demand for redistribution, the other highlighting the political elite (un-)responsiveness. Both approaches are rather pessimistic. The literature on preferences for redistribution shows that demand for redistribution has remained stable over time and that individuals are firmly attached to the status quo (Giger et Lascombes, 2019). On the other hand, the literature on unequal responsiveness shows that policies are more responsive to the upper-class demands than the lower group (Bartels 2008, 2018). This unequal responsiveness is particularly the case on redistributive issues (Rosset et Stecker, 2019). However, if demands for redistribution have not increased significantly, it remains at a high level, and the literature on the causes of unequal responsiveness rarely considers individuals' electoral behavior to explain responsiveness gaps.

This work aims to contribute and link the two aforementioned literatures. More specifically, it analyses the redistributive vote congruency of the lower, middle, and higher income groups by comparing individuals' preferences for redistribution and the party's position on redistribution they intend to vote for. For the literature on demands for redistribution, this research helps to understand how redistribution preferences are turned into action, in this case, electoral behavior. For the unequal responsiveness' scholars, this work provides theoretical and empirical elements explaining why parties and political elites are more responsive to redistributive demands of the most well off without fearing electoral sanctions from the middle and lower classes.

Thanks to newly collected data (Pontusson et al., 2020), which replicates key questions of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2019 (Bakker et al, 2020), I was able to explore how individuals' vote choice fits with their preferences for redistribution and how individuals' position in the income distribution affect the vote congruency. My results indicate that lower, middle and upper income groups have distinct preferences for redistribution. However, the poor and the middle-income group tend to vote for parties that are less in favor of redistribution than their own position. On the other hand, individuals in the upper income group tend to vote for parties in line with their

preferences for less redistribution. Consequently, polarized preferences for redistribution are transformed into an electoral consensus toward a status quo position. I explain this unequal vote congruency by highlighting the heterogeneous effect of preferences for restrictive immigration policies. My empirical results show that individuals in favor of restrictive immigration policies tend to vote for parties that are less in favor of redistribution than their own position. Moreover, this distraction mechanism is more important for the middle and lower income groups. My exploratory analyses indicates that vote for nationalist and traditional right party are the main responsible for lower and middle-class vote incongruence. My results also show large variation between countries with Danish citizens being the least affected by the distraction mechanism and the Swiss the most.

In the next section, I detail how this article fits in the current debates. In section 3, I highlight my theoretical contribution. Section 4 describes the Inequality and Politics dataset and describes my empirical strategy. Section 5 highlights my main results.

2. Literature review

Why don't we observe more redistributive policies while income inequality is rising? Scholars bring two answers to solve this puzzle, one focusing on the demand, the other on the offer. The first focus on individual preferences and suggest that, while objective income inequality increased steadily, preferences for redistribution did not increase. The second argue that we live in unequal democracies, where most of the political elite and members of parliament are from the wealthiest segment of the population (descriptive misrepresentation) and where policies are more responsive to the preferences of the richest than the poorest (unequal responsiveness). In the following paragraphs, I attempt to give a brief overview of the two literatures to highlight a crucial but often missing link to bridge the two literatures: the role of vote choice to transform preferences into policies.

The demand side: preferences for redistribution

Broadly speaking, the literature on preferences for redistribution main interrogations could be summarized in three broad questions: why don't we observe more demand for redistribution? If large inequalities do not trigger political demands for redistribution, which individual and contextual factors influence this political preference? How do citizens prioritize their specific redistributive preferences?

Researchers investigated the role of citizens' perception of inequalities, economic expectations, fairness views, and self-interest to explain redistributive preferences at the individual level. Concerning the perceptions of inequalities, most of the authors converge to say that individuals largely underestimate the level of inequalities (Osberg and Smeeding, 2006; Norton and Ariely, 2011; Engelhardt and Wagener, 2014; Karadja et al., 2017); are notably bad at estimating their

position in the national income distribution (Engelhardt and Wagener, 2014; Fernandez-Albertos and Kuo, 2015; Karadja et al., 2017); and that perceived inequalities matter more than objective inequalities to form preferences for redistribution (Gimpelson and Treisman, 2018). Similarly, expectations of upward mobility in the income distribution (Benabou et Ok 2001, Piketty, 1995; Cojocaru, 2014; Lierse, Lascombes et Becker, forthcoming) or experienced relative income growth (Weisstaner, 2020) seem likely to reduce support for redistribution. Finally, individuals' normative views of inequalities seem to influence their attitudes toward inequalities. Perceiving inequalities as unfair or believing that the sources of inequalities are non-meritocratic is likely to reinforce preferences for redistribution (Castillo, 2012; Kiatpongsan and Norton, 2014; Norton and Ariely, 2011; Tyler, 2011; Sachweh and Sthamer 2019). Taken together, results point out that misperceptions of inequalities, expected and experienced mobility, and belief in meritocracy tend to lower preferences for redistribution, especially for those at the middle and the bottom of the distribution. However, despite the growing literature showing that preferences for redistribution are not uniquely driven by self-interest, objective position in the income distribution remains a strong predictor of preferences for redistribution. Most empirical evidence shows that higher position decreases support for redistribution (Fong, 2001; Lierse, 2018). Finally, the latest development in the literature disentangles the broad notion of redistribution preferences in more specific policies. Authors highlights individuals' policy priorities in trade-off situations whether between different type of redistributive policies (Beramendi et al 2015, Pinggera 2020) or between redistributive policies and other policies (Armingeon et Bürgisser, 2020).

Taken together, the literature on preferences for redistribution gives a detailed overview of the different mechanisms influencing individuals' preferences for redistribution and priorities. However, little is known on how these preferences for redistribution translate into actual behavior or matter compared to other preferences. Some highlight congruence between redistributive preferences and party positions (Pinggera 2020) but to my knowledge, little work has been done stressing the importance of preferences for redistribution compared to other preferences in vote choice. This work attempts to fill this gap by highlighting how preferences for redistribution matter and compete with immigration policy preferences in vote decisions. It also investigates how individuals in the upper income group favor their redistributive preferences in vote choice compared to the poor and the middle-income groups.

The supply side: Unequal responsiveness

The lack of redistributive policies could also be explained by a failure of the political elite to respond to the population's demands for more redistribution. In a nutshell, researchers on responsiveness analyze the congruence between citizens' policy preferences differentiated by income group and the national legislative outcomes. Most findings suggest that the political elites have more congruent opinion with the richest citizens, and policies are more responsive to this segment of the population (Bartels 2008, 2016; Gilens 2012; Rosset 2013, Rosset et Stecker 2019, Elsässer et al. 2017; Schakel 2019; Giger et al 2012). Empirical findings suggest that the responsiveness gap between the wealthiest and the poorest is particularly important on economic and redistributive preferences (Leeschave 2017, Rosset et Stecker, 2019).

Well-developed literature described the many mechanisms giving a larger influence of the wealthiest on the policy-making process. Among those mechanisms, some highlights the disproportionate influence of economic elites and business interest groups on policies (Gilens et Page 2014, Flavin 2015), the declining strength of labor unions (Flavin 2018, Becher and Stegmueller 2020), candidates and party dependency to campaign finance and donations (Gilens and Page 2014). Some also shed light on the descriptive mis-representation mechanism, which suggests that legislators' social background influences their legislative behavior and that legislators with lower classes background are underrepresented in parliament, which leads to less policy responsiveness toward the lower groups (Carnes 2013, Carnes and Lupu 2015). Others also show that the legislators poorly perceived population preferences (Varone et Helfer, 2021). Finally, on the electoral arena, the relative lower participation rate of the least well-off group could explain its inadequate representation (Peters et Ensinck 2015).

However, only few researches investigate the role of electoral choice as a source of unequal responsiveness. Among these few works, Rosset et Kurella (2020) show that, on a bi dimensional political space, the political supply better fits the middle and upper groups' preferences. Consequently, those at the bottom of the distribution are more cross-pressured and less likely to vote for parties sharing their economic preferences.

This work is in line with the preceding one and investigates the role of vote choice as a source of unequal responsiveness toward redistributive preferences. Indeed, given that the middle and lower income groups form a majority of the voting population, and given that income and wealth are concentrated at the very top of the distribution, it seems odd that many elected officials, if not most, have a non-redistributive policy agenda. Why citizens who should benefit from redistributive policies do not sanction the parties with an economic conservative agenda and vote for parties in favor of redistribution? This research suggests that the lower and middle-income groups are less likely to vote for parties sharing their same views on redistribution than the rich. Consequently, this unequal vote congruency could be a source of unequal redistributive responsiveness, as 1) the political elites electoral gains do not lie on the redistributive preferences of the lower and middle-income groups and 2) the elected officials should not expect to be electorally sanctioned by these social groups as their vote are driven by other considerations.

3. Analytical contribution

Building on the two branches of literature described above, this research aims to shed light on the role of preferences for redistribution in vote choice and ultimately illustrate how "redistributive vote incongruence" could cause unequal representation and responsiveness. In this section, I first define the concept of "redistributive vote congruency." I explain why this research focuses on three income groups, and finally, I detail my hypothesis on unequal redistributive vote congruency and the possible mechanisms behind it.

The critical conceptual tool of this research is the "redistributive vote congruency." This concept, lies on two essential premises described in spatial vote models. First, individuals can position themselves on broad policy issue, such as redistributive policies. Second, they are also able to project parties' positions on the same policy areas. Therefore, I consider a vote to be "congruent" when an individual vote in favor of a party sharing her position on redistributive policies. On the contrary, a vote would be incongruent with her redistributive preferences if she votes for a party with a different position on redistribution. The incongruence could either be negative, when the citizen votes for a party that is less in favor of redistribution than her own position, or "positive," she votes for a party that is more in favor of redistribution than she is.

The contribution of this article is twofold. First, it examines the heterogeneity of redistributive vote congruency across income groups. As mentioned earlier, if such a variation is observed, this would mean that electoral choice is among the root causes of unequal responsiveness toward preferences for redistribution. Second, it investigates one specific mechanism to explain unequal vote congruency: the distraction mechanism. Moreover, while the responsiveness literature focuses on the higher and lower groups, this work also considers the middle-income group. This group is of crucial interest when we question the role of preferences for redistribution in the electoral outcome. Indeed, while the rich can clearly identify redistributive policies as a cost and the poorest as a benefit, the middle-income group could have a harder time to identify whether they would be winner or loser of such policies. Because of its key role in elections and because of the ambiguity of its preferences, this research focuses as much on the middle income group as the upper and lower one.

Unequal electoral redistributive congruence hypothesis

My first hypothesis posits that the redistributive vote congruency varies across income groups. More precisely, I suggest that, when looking at vote decisions, poor and middle-income citizens are more likely to vote for a party that does not share their redistributive preferences compared to the wealthiest citizens. Put in a more formalized way, I posit that:

H1: Individuals in lower and middle-income groups are more likely to have an incongruent vote, while those in the higher group are more likely to have a congruent redistributive vote.

Unequal cross-pressure and distraction mechanisms:

Several reasons could explain why the poor and the middle-income class would be less likely to have a congruent vote. Leeschave (2017), for example, suggests that the poor and the middle-income individuals have less time to collect and process the appropriate information to make an informed electoral choice and therefore are more likely to "vote incorrectly". However, this work focuses on two other specific mechanisms: the unequal cross-pressure and the distraction mechanisms. The first, suggest that voters, and more specifically the poor, are likely to be cross-pressured when casting their vote. More specifically, Finseraas (2012), suggests that voters who

support both redistributive policies and restrictive immigration policies are cross-pressured and have to prioritize a policy position over the other when they come to vote. His results suggest that when immigration becomes salient, pro-redistribution voters are likely to cast a vote for a party that do not share their redistributive preferences. Given that immigration has been a salient issue over the last decade, I posit that:

H2: Individuals with restrictive immigration policy preferences are more likely to have a negative congruent redistributive vote.

Rosset and Kurella (2020) confirms that in most of the European party systems there is little to no political parties economically on the left but with conservative position on cultural issues. However, their argument goes one-step further and suggest that suggests that not all income groups are subject to the same level of cross-pressure. More precisely, their findings suggest that those at the bottom of the income distribution have more chances to be cross-pressured, while the rich are more likely to find a party that fits both their redistributive and immigration policy preferences.

In top of the unequal cross-pressure mechanism, I suggest that, when it comes to vote, the poor and more particularly the middle-income group are more likely to prioritize their immigration policy preferences over their redistributive policy preferences than the rich are. Two mechanisms could be at play: one explains why redistributive policies are more important for the rich; the second explains why the poor are more sensitive to immigration policies.

Concerning, redistributive policies, income maximization might be more important for the rich in their vote decision than for the middle and the poor income groups. Indeed, one can argue that the financial stakes of redistribution are more important for the rich than for the rest of the population. As Cavaillé and Trump (2015), I consider that redistribution is a set of two type of policies: "taking from the rich" and "giving to the poor". I argue that "taking from" policies are quite straightforward and clearly target the rich by increasing their taxation level (increasing progressivity in the tax scheme, (re-)introducing taxes targeting them (wealth tax, inheritance tax, higher taxation of capital income...). On the other hand, the "giving to" policies are blurred and can take many forms, such as social investment, social consumption or insurances mechanisms (Häusermann and Kriesi, 2015; Beramendi et al, 2015; Pinggera 2020). The variety of "giving to policies" makes the beneficiary targets unclear. For example, a worker with small risk of unemployment in the lowest income decile might not see an extension of unemployment benefit or an increase in higher education spending as a net benefit for herself.

Taken together, redistributive policies are a clear cost for the rich but are not a clear gain for the poor and even less for the middle-income class that is less exposed to social risks (unemployment). Because the stakes are clearer for the rich than for other voters, party positions

on redistribution could be of crucial importance for the rich but less so for the poor and the middle-class during vote choice[1].

On the other hand, there are also two good reasons to expect the poor and to some extent, the middle-income groups, to be more electorally responsive to their immigration policy preferences. First, from an economic self-interested perspective, migrants are more likely to be an economic threat to the poor and the working class than to the rich. Indeed, as those at the bottom of the distribution are more likely to compete with migrants on the labour market (substitution risk) but also to compete for scarce resources from the welfare states (Kayran 2020), restrictive immigration preferences are likely to weight in their vote decision. Second, national identity could trump the material self-interest of the lower class. Shayo's (2009) work suggests that lower-class people are more likely to identify with the nation than their class because national identity (higher status) is more appealing than their social class (lower status). In turn, identification with the nation lowers support for redistribution. Following recent work of Gidron (2022), I suggest that this mechanism is also at play in vote choice. Therefore, when casting their vote, the poor are likely to align this behavior with their national identity (anti-immigration policy) rather than their class (pro-redistribution policy).

In a nutshell, the described mechanisms suggest that the poor and the middle income are more likely to be cross-pressured and to give more weight on their restrictive immigration preferences (national identity and economic threat), while, on the other hand, the rich have higher stakes in redistributive policies. While disentangling the role of the different mechanisms is beyond the scope of this research, they all converge to say that the poor and the middle-income group should be more easily distracted from their redistributive preferences by their restrictive immigration policy preferences than the rich, Therefore, I posit that:

H3: H2 is stronger for those at the bottom or the middle of the income distribution

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[1] Loss-aversion could also explain why the stakes of redistributive policies are more important for the rich than for the poor. Indeed, since Tversky and Kahneman (1991), we know that the grievances experienced in losing a sum of money are more significant than the pleasure associated with gaining the same amount. Which means that potential income loss in redistributive policies ("taking from the rich policies"), could weight more in vote decision than potential gain in social benefits ("giving to the poor")

Expected electoral implications

If my hypotheses are correct, I expect three main consequences on the electoral outputs.

First, as the poor and the middle-income groups are more likely to vote for a party that is less in favor of redistribution than their own position, the electoral process should transform highly polarized preferences for redistribution into a more consensual electoral output toward less redistribution.

Second, the distraction mechanism should benefit traditional and far right parties that have clear positions in favor of restrictive immigration policies. Said differently, traditional right and nationalist parties should be able to attract voters that are much more in favor of redistribution than their own position. Finally, if H3 is correct we should not observe any redistributive vote congruency gap between left-voters. However, as the poor are more likely to be distracted, we should observe an important redistributive vote congruency gap between the poor and rich electorate of the traditional right and far-right parties.

Third, party systems should also play an important role on redistributive vote congruency. Indeed, H2 and H3 suggest that cross-pressured voters (with anti-immigration and pro-redistribution preferences) and more particularly the poor are likely to have an incongruent vote. Therefore, in countries with party-system including a party with clear pro-redistribution and anti-immigration stances, we should observe little redistributive incongruence. At the opposite, in countries where anti-immigrant parties are strong and have clear anti-redistribution position, we should observe stronger unequal redistributive vote incongruence.

4. Data, measures and method

I test my theoretical expectations on twelve western European countries[2] (Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom) on the Inequality and Politics (IAP) dataset (Pontusson et al., 2020), a newly collected dataset. The IAP is a large survey carried out in summer 2019 as part of the framework of two research projects, the "Unequal Democracies" research program (European Research Council, Advanced Grant 741538) and the "Inequality in the minds" project (Swiss National Science Foundations, Grant No. 100017_178980). The two projects seek to understand how individuals build their perception of inequalities and how perceived, and objective inequalities affect citizens' political attitudes and behavior through a comparative analysis of liberal democracies in Western Europe and the USA. A minimum of 2001 respondents, representative of the general population,

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[2] USA and Belgium were excluded from the analyses because US political parties are not coded in the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and because Belgium has three distinct party systems at the national level, which make my measurement of "redistributive vote congruency" (at the national level) particularly noisy. Boosted union members and respondents who were treated in the priming experiment (see codebook) were also excluded from the analyses.

answered an online questionnaire in thirteen European countries and the United States. Quotas were implemented by region, gender, age, income, and level of education. Respondents from the IAP politics dataset do not seem more liberal than respondents in other well-established surveys. In a replicated question from the ESS2016 and 2018, respondents of the IAP expressed strikingly similar levels of support for redistribution than those in the ESS.

The dataset addresses key issues of perceptions of income and political inequality as well as specific and more general redistributive policy preferences. To measure individual's general position on redistribution, I use the replicated question of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (2020) on preferences for redistribution. Respondents were asked to state their position on redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor on a 11-point scale where 0 means that they are "fully opposed to the redistribution of wealth" and 10 that they are "fully in favor of the redistribution of wealth." On the political supply side, the CHES experts positioned the main parties of the studied countries on the exact same 11-point scale. From this CHES variable, I was able to compute a variable measuring a "vote intention redistributive score," where the variable takes the values of the redistributive position of the party the respondent intends to vote for. From these two key variables, I operationalize the concept of "redistributive vote congruency" by computing the gap between the vote intention redistributive score, and their own position on redistribution. The values could theoretically vary between – 10 and 10. Positive values mean that the respondent intends to vote for a party that is more in favor of redistribution than its own position; negative values indicate that she intends to vote for a party that is less in favor of redistribution than her own position; 0 meaning that she has a redistributive congruent vote.

Contrary to previous works, this measure of congruence has the strong advantage to compare parties and individuals position on a single policy, on the same scale at about the same time. While comparing average experts' perception of a party position to an individual position might entail some methodological questions, this measure relies on three minimal assumptions. 1) Respondents have a position on preferences for redistribution; 2) the average expert position measure the "objective" party position on redistribution; 3) the two measures are close enough to allow a comparison.

Our main independent variables are the income groups, preferences for immigration policies, and a relative saliency measure. Following the literature on unequal responsiveness, the lower income group comprises the three first household income deciles and the higher group the three highest deciles. Our analyses also consider the middle-income group composed of the four central deciles (D4 to D7). Preferences for immigration policies are captured with two variables in the IAP dataset, in which respondents had to state their agreement on a 5 points Likert scale with the following two statements: "Immigration should be restricted a) to ensure well-paying jobs for unskilled workers; b) to protect our national identity and culture." In the models developed in the empirical evidence section, these two variables are recoded into a single dichotomous one where the value 0 means that the respondent disagree or "nor agree nor disagree" with any of the two above mentioned statements and 1 if the respondent agrees or strongly agrees with immigration restriction for any of the two reasons. Finally, we know that issue saliency plays a

crucial role in vote choice (Bélanger and Meguid, 2008). Therefore, I also include two variables measuring the saliency of economic inequality issue and immigration in my models. To do so I used the saliency variables in the IAP, where respondents declared the importance of a series of topics on a five-point scales (1: Not important at all; 2. Not important; 3. Somewhat important; 4. Very important; 5. Extremely important). In addition to these independent variables, I also include in my models a series of control variables that have proved to be important in attitudes formation toward redistribution and electoral behavior. These control variables measure respondents' gender, age, education, union membership (past and present), employment status, and immigration status (0 born in country, 1 born in another country).

Finally to assess the electoral consequences of the distraction mechanism, I classified all political parties available in the IAP dataset into ten party family, following the Comparative Manifesto Project classification: 1) Far-left; 2) Social democratic; 3) Ecological; 4) Liberal; 5) Christian democrat; 6) Conservative; 7) Agrarian[3]; 8) Far-right (Nationalist); 9) Ethnic and regional; 10) Special issue parties. As the CMP classification does not account for possible changes in party family, five parties were recoded from their original classification. Fratelli d'Italia (coded as conservative), the Swiss People Party (coded as Agrarian) and UKIP (coded as Special Issue Party) were recoded into far-right party, while Sinn Fein (coded as Special Issue Party) was recoded into far-left party. Fourteen other parties, which were not coded in the CMP were coded manually into one of the aforementioned categories (see table 6 in appendix for full party classification).

To test my hypotheses, I divided my empirical strategies into 3 sections. The first highlights the distortive role of vote choice. Through descriptive statistics, I show the differences and similarities of policy preferences across the three income groups. I also show that the electoral offer fits the redistributive preferences of the three groups equally. In the second section, I test the role of preferences for restrictive immigration policies on redistributive vote congruency through four linear regression models with country fixed effect. The third section highlights the electoral consequences of the of the unequal distraction mechanism.

5. Findings

5.1 Policy preferences and distance to the closest party and cross pressure

This subsection illustrates through descriptive statistics key questions behind my research puzzle: 1) Do the rich and the poor share similar policy preferences? 2) Are votes matching with redistributive preferences? 3) Does the party offer benefit to a specific group in terms of redistributive preferences?

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[3] In a robustness test, I grouped Liberals, Christian-democrats, Conservatives and Agrarians into a single category: "traditional right". Observed results are very similar.

In that sense, figure 1 partially answers our first two interrogations. The figure shows the average preferences for redistribution of the three income groups as well as their redistributive vote scores. Three findings are of interest. First, the figure indicates that lower, middle and higher income groups have distinct redistributive preferences, with a more than 1 point gap between the higher and lower group (6.58- 5.57). Second, all groups seem to vote for parties that are significantly less in favor of redistribution. On average, the gap between preference and vote is 0.48 points. Third and most importantly, the gap differs across income groups. While those at the top have a more redistributive congruent vote with a gap of only 0.21 points (5.57-5.36), those at the bottom and the middle intend to vote for parties that are respectively 0.64 (6.58-5.94) and 0.55 (6.26-5.71) point less in favor of redistribution. Figure A1, in the annex, shows that this unequal redistributive vote congruency can be observed in all countries except in Ireland and Denmark, with an error close to 0 for the upper class in most of the studied countries and consistently smaller than the other groups.

Figure 1: Preferences and vote for redistribution by income group[4]

From the results observed in figure 1, one can legitimately wonder if the electoral offer better fits the conservative preferences for redistribution of the upper group. Table 1 seems to rule out this possibility. Table 1 shows the average difference and average absolute distance between individuals' preferences for redistribution and the position of the closest party to their position for each income group. On pooled data, the political offer seems equally responsive to demands for redistribution of the three income groups. In each group, the average distance to the closest party position is on average 0.68. The country with the largest gap between demand and offer is

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[4] See variation across country in annex figure 8

Austria, with an average distance of 1.07 point while the country with the lowest distance are the Netherlands with an average gap of 0.34. In none of the observed countries, we find a substantial difference between the three income groups. The largest gap observed is in Austria between the lower and the middle-income group, with a distance gap of 0.18. It also seems that the closest parties to the upper group's redistributive preferences are on average slightly more in favor of redistribution than their own position. On the contrary, the difference is closer to 0 for the middle and lower income groups. Taken together, on the redistributive policy dimension, the demand matches the offer equally for the three income groups. Therefore, the source of the electoral discrepancy observed in figure 1 does not seem to come from an unequal policy offer for redistribution.

Table 1: Average difference and redistributive policy distance to the closest party by income group

Income group	Closest party position – Individuals' position	Average distance to the closest party
Lower	-0.06 (0.01)	0.68 (0.01)
Middle	0.00 (0.01)	0.64 (0.01)
Upper	0.14 (0.01)	0.68 (0.01)

To provide information on individuals' immigration policy preference, figure 2 plots the average agreement with restrictive immigration policy a) to protect the national identity and culture (left panel) and b) to ensure well-paying jobs for unskilled workers (right panel). Figure 2 highlights important country differences but little variation between income groups. Whether we look the cultural justification or the economic justification, the poor, the middle and the rich exhibits close preferences for restrictive immigration (at the exception of Switzerland, Ireland and Austria). The average gap between the lower and higher group is only 0.07 (3.39-3.32) point for the cultural justification and 0.16 (3.39 – 3.23) point for the economic justification. If we extend the interpretation, these results also suggest that respondents from all income are equally distant to the closest party position on immigration. In addition, with a Pearson coefficient of 0.67, the two variables are highly correlated, which means that we cannot totally disentangle the reason behind individuals' preferences for restrictive immigration. Moreover, one can argue that political parties defending restrictive immigration policies often mix and use the two arguments. Therefore, in my empirical models, the two variables will be merged into a single dichotomous variable taking the value 1 if the respondent agreed or strongly agreed with any of the two restrictive immigration policy statements and 0 otherwise. As expected, we observe little variation between income groups on this recoded variable: 63.0% of the poor, 62.7% of the middle and 58.6% of the rich are in favor of restrictive immigration policies.

Figure 2: Preferences for restricted immigration to protect identity and culture (left), to ensure well-paying jobs for unskilled worker (right)

To complete this descriptive round and consider the cross-pressure mechanism, let us consider table 2, which divide the electorate in four groups according to their preferences for income redistribution and restrictive immigration policies. More precisely, the columns describes the share of respondent across income group in favor of restrictive immigration policies, using the dichotomous variable described above while in lines are the share of respondents agreeing with the following statement: "The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels[5]". The first striking observation is the high level of support for the two policies from all income groups: 71% of the respondents support redistributive policies, including 62% of the rich and 63% of our pooled sample favor restrictive immigration policies. The combined popularity of the two policies lead 43% of the respondents in a potential crossed-pressure position where individuals support both redistributive and restrictive immigration policies. The rich are relatively less likely to be in that situation, but still more than a third of them agreed with the two policies. On the other hand, they are also slightly more likely to be in the other "cross-pressured position": 13% of the rich and 10% of the overall sample are against redistribution but do not think that immigration should be restricted.

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[5] Original answers are on 5 points Likert scale. The recoded variable reported in table 2 dichotomized that variable such as agree and strongly agree answers take the value 1 and "nor agree nor disagree"; "disagree" and "disagree strongly" take the value 0. Note also that this is a different variable than the one used to measure my dependent variable (redistributive vote congruency). However, the two variables are strongly correlated, for further discussion about the link between these two variables see Pontusson et al (2021)

Table 2: Preferences for restrictive immigration and redistributive policies

		Immigration should be restricted, share of agree: Lower: 62.97%; Middle: 62.65%; Higher: 58.59%	
		Agree (61.53%)	Disagree (38.47%)
The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels.	Agree (71.28%) Lower: 75.50% Middle: 73.30% Higher: 61.98%	Lower: 46.15% Middle: 43.32% Upper: 34.02% All sample: 42.88%	Lower: 29.10% Middle: 28.47% Upper: 28.11% All sample: 28.54%
	Disagree (28.72%)	Lower: 13.94% Middle: 17.67% Upper: 24.46% All sample: 18.66%	Lower: 7.83% Middle: 8.83% Upper: 13.40% All sample: 9.92%

In brief, our descriptive results show that the political offer is equally responsive to demands for redistribution across income groups (table 1), which discard the idea that there is a political hegemony of anti-redistributive ideas in the European party-systems. However, despite the apparent fair political offer, table 2 and figure 2 show that a high share of the population favor restrictive immigration policy preferences which lead 42% of the voters and more particularly the poor and middle-income to be in a cross-pressured position. Finally, figure 1 shows that the poor and the middle group consistently vote against their own redistributive preferences and interest. To explore this puzzle, the following section analyzes the role of preferences for immigration policies in the redistributive vote in-congruency.

5.2 Empirical evidence: the unequal distraction effect of immigration policy preferences

In this sub-section, I develop three linear models with country fixed effects to investigate the heterogeneous effect of preferences for restrictive immigration policies on the redistributive vote congruency. As a reminder, redistributive vote congruency is measured as the difference between one's position on redistribution and the party position on redistribution she intends to vote for. Table 3 summarizes the main findings: each model tests one of my hypotheses. Model 1 (M1) tests the effect of group position of the redistributive vote congruency (hypothesis 1), model 2 (M2) add preferences for restrictive immigration policies (dichotomous, see method section) as an independent variable (hypothesis 2), finally model 3 (M3) tests the unequal distraction hypothesis (hypothesis 3) by interacting immigration policy preferences with the three income groups.

The findings of the statistical analysis largely support my three hypotheses. First, M1 shows, with a constant of -0.738, that, individuals at the bottom of the distribution are more likely to vote for a party that is less in favor of redistribution than their own position. Moreover, as

expected in hypothesis 1, the upper group, with a coefficient of 0.337, is more likely to have a congruent vote than both the middle and the lower income groups. This finding is in line with the existing literature, which suggests that higher income individuals are voting more "correctly" than those at the bottom (Lesschaeve, 2017). M2 also confirms the distraction hypothesis, positing that restrictive immigration policies' preferences distort the transformation of redistributive preferences into vote. The constant overlapping the 0 value and the strong negative coefficient for the immigration preferences (-0.729), indicates that individuals in favor of restrictive migration policies tend to compromise their preferences for redistribution when they make their electoral choice, while those against immigration restriction align their vote with their redistributive preferences. The findings of the first two models are interesting as they suggest that the electoral process is not efficient to perform one of its most important task: transform the population policy preferences into elected officials that reflect those preferences. More precisely, the estimates imply that lower and middle-income citizens and citizens with preferences for restrictive immigration policies poorly express their redistributive preferences in their electoral choice.

**Table 3: Linear models with country fixed effects for redistribution vote congruency**

Mixed effect linear regressions

	Dependent variable:		
	Redistributive vote congruency		
	M1	M2	M3
Lower-income group	-0.146*	-0.127*	-0.100
(ref: middle-income)	(-0.265, -0.027)	(-0.246, -0.008)	(-0.293, 0.093)
Higher-income group	0.337***	0.332***	0.123
(ref: middle-income)	(0.225, 0.448)	(0.220, 0.443)	(-0.052, 0.297)
Preferences for restrictive immigration policy		-0.729***	-0.833***
		(-0.826, -0.631)	(-0.981, -0.685)
Lower-income*restrictive immigration policy			-0.037
(ref: middle-income)			(-0.276, 0.201)
Higher-income*restrictive immigration policy			0.348**
(ref: middle-income)			(0.125, 0.570)
Constant	-0.738***	-0.170	-0.109
	(-1.062, -0.414)	(-0.504, 0.163)	(-0.449, 0.232)
Controls: Gender, age, education, union membership, origin, employment status	✓	✓	✓
Observations	15,004	14,834	14,834
Country	12	12	12

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

The third model confirms the unequal distraction hypothesis, which suggests that the distortion effect of restrictive immigration preferences is more substantial for those at the bottom and middle of the distribution. To compare the impact of immigration policy preferences across the three groups, I plotted figure 3. The figure shows the three income groups' predicted redistributive vote congruency by position on immigration policy based on M3. The results are striking. When respondents are not in favor of restrictive immigration policies, all income groups make vote choices that align with their redistributive preferences. Individuals in the upper group are even slightly likelier to vote for a party more in favor of redistribution than their position. However, if respondents prefer restrictive immigration policies, they all tend to vote for a party that is less in favor of redistribution than their position. The incongruence gap is larger for those at the middle and the bottom of the distribution than those at the top, which confirms my third hypothesis. The predicted incongruence is at least two times larger for the middle (-0.861) and lower (-0.998) income groups than the higher group (-0.390)[6].

Figure 3: Predicted redistributive vote congruency by income group and position on immigration


While my three key hypotheses have all been confirmed, the underlying mechanism is not clear. Do we observe unequal vote congruency because the poor are more likely to be cross-pressured? or is it because the rich prioritize their economic preferences? Models 4 and 5 (in appendix) and figure 4 shed some lights on these mechanisms. To do so, M4 included as main independent variable an indicator categorizing respondents in four distinct groups according to their combine preferences for income redistribution and immigration restriction. This variable follows the categorization observed in table 2 and respondents are classified according to these following

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[6] I also run robustness tests changing the size of income groups, results hold.

attitudes: 1. Pro-redistribution and pro-immigration; 2. Pro-redistribution and restrictive-immigration; 3. Anti-redistribution and pro-immigration; 4. Anti-redistribution and restrictive-immigration. Model 5 interacts this variable with income groups and figure 4 report the predicted redistributive vote congruency by position and combined preferences based on M5.

Results indicate that when individuals are in favor of redistribution and have not restrictive immigration policy preferences, their vote tend to reflect closely their preferences for redistribution. However, those in favor of redistribution and restrictive immigration preferences have a predicted incongruence of more than 1 point and this gap is shorter for the higher income group. We can also observe on figure 4, that those positioned on the traditional right position (anti-redistribution and anti-immigration) tend to vote in line with their redistributive preferences, while those with anti-redistribution, pro-immigration policy preferences tend to vote for party that are more in favor of redistribution than their own position. Taken together, these results indicate that in cross-pressured situation most voters prioritize immigration at the cost of casting their vote for a party that is more or less in favor of redistribution than their own position.

Figure 4: Predicted redistributive vote congruency by income group and cross-pressure status

Overall, these results, while not able to entirely disentangle the different mechanisms behind the unequal distraction hypotheses, highlight the role of orthogonal but conflicting policy preferences on redistributive vote congruency. Knowing that 43% of the electorate (but "only" 34% of the higher income) have redistributive and restrictive immigration policy preferences, are much likelier to cast their vote for a party that is much less in favor of redistribution than their own position question the efficiency of the European party systems to transform redistributive preferences into electoral representation. These normative implications will be further discussed in the next sections.

5.3 Electoral consequences

To better grasp the electoral consequences of the distraction mechanism, from M3, I build a counterfactual redistributive vote score, representing the redistributive vote score of each respondent if they were no distraction mechanisms. In other words, I computed a redistributive vote score from which I subtracted the predicted redistributive vote incongruency from M3. For example, for a respondent from the lower income group and with preferences for restrictive immigration policies who intend to vote for a party which has a redistributive position of 6, I would compute a counterfactual redistributive vote score of 6.99 (6 - (- 0.998)), where - 0.998 is the predicted redistributive vote incongruency in model three for lower income individuals with anti-immigration policy preferences. Figure 5 plots the average counterfactual and observed redistributive vote score across each income group. The figure shows that the distraction effect of immigration preferences has two main effects on the electoral outcome. First, it considerably lowers the share of vote in favor of parties that have redistributive positions. In all income groups, the observed vote intention redistributive score is lower than the undistorted counterfactual. Second, as the distraction effect is stronger among the lower and middle groups and as they have slightly more preferences for restricted immigration policies than the rich, the electoral consequences are the largest among these groups. Overall, the distortion effect of immigration policy preferences seems to lower the polarization and reduce the level of electoral support for redistribution. Seen from a different angle, the electoral process reduce the conflict over redistribution in favor of the position of the rich for less redistribution.

Figure 5: Observed and counterfactual redistributive vote score

Let's have a look now at which party benefit the most from the distraction effect. As mentioned in the theoretical section, I expect the traditional right and far-right parties to be able to attract voters with higher redistributive preferences. To test these assumptions, I run two other linear models with country fixed effects (M6 and M7 in appendix) with the redistributive vote congruency as dependent variable, and income group and vote intention (party family) as independent variables. Model 7, contrary to model 6, interacts the two independent variables and both models are controlled with the same set of variables I used in the first five models.

Figure 6 describes the predicted redistributive vote congruency by income group and vote intention. Three lessons could be learned from that graph. First, the electorate of the three left wing party families (Far-left, socio-democrats and ecologists) tend to have a positive vote congruency. This result suggests that these parties also attract voters beyond their redistributive preferences and despite a shift toward cultural and environmental issues, these parties are in average more in favor of redistribution than their own electorate. Second, all the parties on the right of the political spectrum are capturing voters that are much more in favor of redistribution than their own position, including Liberal parties that generally do not have clear stance on immigration. Third, and most interestingly, the redistributive vote congruency gap is important for the right leaning electorate and negligible for the left wing voters. This result suggests that while left-leaning voters share similar preferences for redistribution, right wing parties have a heterogeneous electorate composed of rich voters close to their economic position and poor and middle-income voters much more in favor of redistribution than the party position. This result also indicates that most of the incongruence gap is captured by the vote for right wing parties.

Figure 6: Redistributive vote congruency by electorate and income group

Finally, to complete our views on the electoral consequences of the unequal distraction effect, I explore country differences. To do so, I run M3 for each country separately (in appendix) and report the predicted redistributive vote congruence score across income group, restrictive immigration policy preferences and country on figure 7. As a first observation, we can see that the distraction mechanism can be observed in all the countries of our sample: voters with restrictive immigration policy preferences are more likely to cast their vote for a party less in favor of redistribution than their own position and this is particularly the case for the poor and the middle-income groups. However, we also observe important country variation, signaling that redistributive vote incongruency is not an inevitable feature of western European democracies.

Figure 7: Redistributive vote congruency across country, income group and position on immigration

We can observe at least two distinct group of country. The first group includes Denmark, Ireland, and Sweden. In these countries, voters seem to align their vote with their redistributive preferences and preferences for restrictive immigration policies does not seem to alter importantly this link. On the opposite, Switzerland, Netherlands and Italy form the second group. In the latter group, not only the average redistributive vote congruency score reaches very low levels, but also the distortion effect of restrictive immigration policy preferences is particularly high. To explain the differences between these two groups, some elements of answer may lie in the different party-systems. For example, when considering Denmark, one might explain the low distraction effect by the recent shift of the Social Democrats toward a position more restrictive toward immigration. Similarly, one might suggest that the distraction effect remains small in countries where anti-immigration position is not strongly embodied in political parties, such as in Portugal or Ireland. On the opposite, Switzerland might have the perfect electoral offer to strengthen the distraction effect. First, immigration has been consistently a salient issue during the last two

decades. Second, the largest party, the SVP, is a nationalist anti-immigrant party with clear anti-redistribution position. Third, none of the left parties has welfare chauvinist stances nor anti-immigration position. Fourth, liberal parties (FDP and green liberal) can catch the vote of voters against redistribution and restrictive immigration policies. Overall, salient immigration issue, strong far-right party with clear economically liberal position and an electoral offer cross pressuring uniquely voters with anti-immigration and pro-redistribution position might explain the strength of the distraction mechanism in Switzerland.

6. Conclusion: a forced electoral consensus for less redistribution

This work positions itself at the intersection of two well-developed literature focusing on the demand side of redistribution and the lack of responsiveness of the political elites. To bridge the two literatures, this research seeks to answer two questions: 1) To what extent preferences for redistribution matter in vote choice? 2) Do individuals' electoral choices can be a driver of unequal responsiveness toward redistributive preferences?

In my theoretical framework, I suggest that preferences for restrictive immigration policy might have the power to distract individuals from their redistributive preferences. My results confirm this expectation. People align their vote with their redistributive policy preferences. However, when they have restrictive immigration policy preferences, they tend to vote in favor of parties that are less in favor of redistribution than their own position. Moreover, my empirics indicate that this distortion is not homogeneous. Lower and middle-income voters are more easily distracted by their immigration preferences. While my empirics cannot clearly identify the sources of the unequal distraction mechanism, its consequences are clear: the electoral process is a root cause of unequal responsiveness toward redistribution. Overall, the electoral outcome does not reflect the preferences for redistribution of the general population. On the contrary, it transforms polarized redistributive policy preferences into a consensual electoral output closer to the position of the rich in favor of less redistribution. Our exploratory analyses also indicate that the unequal distraction mechanism mostly benefits traditional and far-right parties that are able to capture poor and middle-income voters that are far from their conservative economic agenda. From that result, we could consider that the distraction effect gives a strategic advantage to right-wing parties and politicians as their anti-redistribution position have little chance to be sanctioned in the ballot boxes as long as they hold anti-immigration position.

Finally, while my analyses remains largely descriptive we observe important variation between countries that could indicate that party-systems have an influence on the strength of the distraction effect. For example in Denmark, voters with restrictive immigration preferences still align their vote with their preferences for redistribution, while Swiss voters with similar attitudes vote for parties that are much less in favor of redistribution than their own position. This result might indicate that left-parties position on immigration and economic position of nationalist parties might have important effect on the electoral representation of demand for redistribution.

From this empirical basis, we could wonder how to fix the electoral process to better voice the preferences for redistribution of the poor and the middle-income are better represented in parliaments. Knowing that 42% of the respondents are in favor of restrictive immigration policies and income redistribution and that these cross-pressured voters are likelier to have a redistributive incongruent vote, one could come with the following painful question: Would it be better if there were more party with pro-redistribution and anti-immigration position? If you consider that the role of the electoral process is to transform population preferences into elected representatives, the answer would be yes. Existing work actually observed that radical right parties have moved to the left economically (Rovny and Polk 2019) and the Danish' social democratic party move toward more restrictive immigration position might indicate that European party systems are adjusting to these combined demands.

However, there is no guarantee that integration of anti-immigration position by left parties would increase redistributive vote congruence or the share of pro-redistribution party in parliaments. For example, Abou-Chadi and Wagner (2020) find that Social Democratic parties adopting position that is more nationalist receive less electoral support[7]. In the same way, welfare chauvinist policies are rather associated with restricted access to the welfare state than its extension. While it is unlikely that restrictive immigration policy or excluding immigrants from the welfare state would increase the size of the welfare state, there is little doubt that these kind of discourses and policies would hurt the social fabric of these societies. Therefore, one might suggest that the issue does not come from the lack of political offer but from the space taken by immigration related issue in the political sphere and electoral arena.

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[7] Hjorth and Larsen (2020) find the opposite and suggest that anti-immigration position attract voters from the right and repels pro-immigration voters to other left parties, which overall increases support for the left-bloc.

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Annex

Figure 8: Preferences and vote for redistribution by income group and country

Table 4: Full regression table seen in table 2: Linear models with country fixed effects for redistribution vote congruency

	Dependent variable:		
	Redistributive vote congruency		
	M1	M2	M3
Lower-income group (ref: middle)	-0.146*	-0.127*	-0.100
	(-0.265, -0.027)	(-0.246, -0.008)	(-0.293, 0.093)
Higher-income group (ref: middle)	0.337***	0.332***	0.123
	(0.225, 0.448)	(0.220, 0.443)	(-0.052, 0.297)
Preferences for restrictive migr policies		-0.729***	-0.833***
		(-0.826, -0.631)	(-0.981, -0.685)
Lower-income*restrictive migration policy			-0.037
(ref=middle-income)			(-0.276, 0.201)
Higher -income*restrictive migration policy			0.348**
(ref=middle-income)			(0.125, 0.570)
Gender (woman)	0.324***	0.296***	0.296***
	(0.226, 0.421)	(0.199, 0.394)	(0.199, 0.394)
Education (university degree)	0.251***	0.163**	0.164**
	(0.144, 0.358)	(0.056, 0.271)	(0.056, 0.271)
Age	-0.005*	-0.005*	-0.005*
	(-0.009, -0.001)	(-0.009, -0.001)	(-0.009, -0.001)
Union membership	-0.162**	-0.143**	-0.141**
	(-0.265, -0.059)	(-0.245, -0.040)	(-0.244, -0.039)
Foreign born	0.183*	0.113	0.112
	(0.022, 0.344)	(-0.049, 0.274)	(-0.049, 0.273)
Employed part-time	-0.055	-0.059	-0.060
(ref: employed full time)	(-0.207, 0.097)	(-0.211, 0.093)	(-0.212, 0.092)
Self-employed	0.164	0.121	0.117
	(-0.040, 0.369)	(-0.083, 0.326)	(-0.088, 0.322)
Unemployed	-0.201*	-0.225*	-0.227*
	(-0.401, -0.001)	(-0.425, -0.026)	(-0.427, -0.028)
Full-time parent/homemaker	-0.241	-0.196	-0.193
	(-0.484, 0.002)	(-0.440, 0.047)	(-0.436, 0.051)
Full-time student	0.479***	0.358**	0.350**
	(0.266, 0.693)	(0.144, 0.573)	(0.135, 0.564)
Retired	0.116	0.103	0.103
	(-0.050, 0.281)	(-0.062, 0.268)	(-0.062, 0.268)
Constant	-0.738***	-0.170	-0.109
	(-1.062, -0.414)	(-0.504, 0.163)	(-0.449, 0.232)
Observations	15,004	14,834	14,834
Country	12	12	12

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 5: Predicted redistributive congruence vote score based from model 3, used in figure 3 and to build the counterfactual redistributive vote score without the distortion effect

Preference for restrictive immigration policy	Income group	Predicted incongruence	std.error	Conf.low	Conf.high
No	Lower	-0.128	0.140	-0.403	0.147
No	Middle	-0.028	0.128	-0.279	0.223
No	Higher	0.095	0.130	-0.161	0.350
Yes	Lower	-0.998	0.130	-1.253	-0.743
Yes	Middle	-0.861	0.122	-1.100	-0.621
Yes	Higher	-0.390	0.125	-0.634	-0.146

Models for Figure 4, 5 and 6 are available on these online spreadsheets

Table 6: List of parties and party family (Comparative Manifesto Project)

	Party name	Party family (CMP)	comments
Austria	Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP)	Christian democratic parties	
Austria	Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ)	Social democratic parties	
Austria	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ)	Nationalist parties	
Austria	NEOS - Das Neue Österreich und Liberales Forum	Liberal parties	
Austria	Jetzt – Liste Pilz	Ecological parties	
Austria	Die Grünen – Die Grüne Alternative	Ecological parties	
Denmark	Socialdemokraterne	Social democratic parties	
Denmark	Dansk Folkeparti	Nationalist parties	
Denmark	Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti	Liberal parties	
Denmark	Enhedslisten	Socialist or other left parties	
Denmark	Liberal Alliance	Liberal parties	
Denmark	Alternativet	Socialist or other left parties	
Denmark	Radikale Venstre	Liberal parties	
Denmark	Socialistik Folkeparti (SF)	Socialist or other left parties	
Denmark	Det konservative Folkeparti	Conservative parties	
Denmark	Folkebevægelsen mod EU	Special issue parties	coded manually
France	La république en marche (LREM)	Liberal parties	
France	Les républicains (LR)	Conservative parties	
France	Rassemblement national (RN), anciennement Front national (FN)	Nationalist parties	
France	La France insoumise (FI)	Socialist or other left parties	
France	Parti socialiste (PS)	Social democratic parties	
France	Europe Écologie Les Verts (EELV)	Ecological parties	
France	Mouvement démocrate (MODEM)	Conservative parties	
France	Union des démocrates et indépendants (UDI)	Liberal parties	

France	Parti communiste français (PCF)	Socialist or other left parties	
France	Debout la France	Nationalist parties	coded manually
France	Les Patriotes	Nationalist parties	coded manually
France	Union Populaire Républicaine	Nationalist parties	coded manually
France	Génération.s, le mouvement	Social democratic parties	coded manually
Germany	Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDU)	Christian democratic parties	
Germany	Christlich-Soziale Union (CSU)	Christian democratic parties	
Germany	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD)	Social democratic parties	
Germany	Die Linke (Linke)	Socialist or other left parties	
Germany	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Grüne)	Ecological parties	
Germany	Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP)	Liberal parties	
Germany	Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)	Nationalist parties	
Germany	Freie Wähler	Conservative parties	coded manually
Ireland	Fine Gael (FG)	Christian democratic parties	
Ireland	Fianna Fáil (FF)	Conservative parties	
Ireland	Sinn Féin (SF)	Special issue parties	Recoded into Socialist or other left parties
Ireland	Labour Party (LP)	Social democratic parties	
Ireland	Green Party (GP)	Ecological parties	
Ireland	Independence Alliance	Special issue parties	
Italy	Movimento 5 Stelle (MCS)	Special issue parties	
Italy	Partito Democratico (PD)	Social democratic parties	
Italy	Lega nord (LN)	Nationalist parties	
Italy	Forza Italia (FI)	Conservative parties	
Italy	Fratelli d'Italia (FDI)	Nationalist parties	Agrarian recoded into nationalist
Italy	Piu Europa	Liberal parties	
Italy	La Sinistra	Socialist or other left parties	coded manually
Netherlands	Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD)	Liberal parties	
Netherlands	Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV)	Nationalist parties	
Netherlands	Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA)	Christian democratic parties	
Netherlands	Democraten 66 (D66)	Liberal parties	
Netherlands	GroenLinks (GL)	Ecological parties	
Netherlands	Socialistische Partij (SP)	Socialist or other left parties	
Netherlands	Partij van de Arbeid	Social democratic parties	
Netherlands	ChristenUnie (CU)	Christian democratic parties	
Netherlands	Partij voor de Dieren (PvdD)	Special issue parties	
Netherlands	50PLUS (50+)	Special issue parties	
Netherlands	Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (SGP)	Special issue parties	
Netherlands	DENK	Social democratic parties	
Netherlands	Forum voor Democratie (FvD)	Nationalist parties	

Portugal	Partido Social Democrata (PPD/PSD)	Conservative parties	
Portugal	CDS – Partido Popular (CDS-PP)	Christian democratic parties	
Portugal	Partido Socialista (PS)	Social democratic parties	
Portugal	Bloco de Esquerda (BE)	Socialist or other left parties	
Portugal	Partido Comunista Português (PCP)	Socialist or other left parties	
Portugal	Partido Ecologista « Os Verdes » (PEV)	Ecological parties	
Spain	Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE)	Social democratic parties	
Spain	Partido Popular(PP)	Conservative parties	
Spain	Ciudadanos (C's)	Liberal parties	
Spain	Podemos	Socialist or other left parties	
Spain	Izquierda Unida (IU)	Socialist or other left parties	coded manually
Spain	Equo	Ecological parties	coded manually
Spain	Vox	Nationalist parties	coded manually
Spain	Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya-Sobiranistes (ERC-Sobiranistes)	Ethnic and regional parties	
Spain	Junts per Catalunya	Ethnic and regional parties	coded manually
Spain	Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea/Partido Nacionalista Vasco (EAJ/PNV)	Ethnic and regional parties	
Spain	EH Bildu	Ethnic and regional parties	
Sweden	Socialdemokraterna	Social democratic parties	
Sweden	Moderaterna	Conservative parties	
Sweden	Sverigedemokraterna	Nationalist parties	
Sweden	Miljöpartiet	Ecological parties	
Sweden	Centerpartiet;	Agrarian	
Sweden	Vänsterpartiet;	Socialist or other left parties	
Sweden	Liberalerna;	Liberal parties	
Sweden	Kristdemokraterna	Christian democratic parties	
Switzerland	UDC	Nationalist parties	Agrarian recoded into nationalist
Switzerland	PS	Social democratic parties	
Switzerland	PLR	Liberal parties	
Switzerland	PDC	Christian democratic parties	
Switzerland	Les verts	Ecological parties	
Switzerland	Vert libéraux	Ecological parties	
Switzerland	PBD	Conservative parties	
UK	Conservative Party (Con)	Conservative parties	
UK	Labour Party (Lab)	Social democratic parties	
UK	Scottish National Party (SNP)	Ethnic and regional parties	
UK	Liberal Democrats (LD)	Liberal parties	
UK	Brexit Party;	Nationalist parties	Single issue recoded into nationalist
UK	UKIP (UK Independence Party)	Nationalist parties	Single issue recoded into nationalist
UK	Change UK – The Independent Group;	Special issue parties	coded manually

UK	The Green Party of England and Wale	Ecological parties	